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In the last 25 years, eight outsider candidates won presidential elections in Latin America. 
Outsiders are candidates with little political experience running with new parties. This reality 
presents a dual puzzle, which is the focus of this dissertation. First, what explains the sudden rise 
and election of political outsiders in presidential elections? Second, what are the consequences of 
the election of outsiders for democratic governability and institutional performance? I address 
these questions through a combination of quantitative analyses and an in-depth qualitative 
analysis of the case of Alberto Fujimori (outsider president of Peru who governed between 1990 
and 2000). 
Against the conventional wisdom, the first part of my dissertation shows that the rise of 
outsiders is not a “peril of presidentialism.” When other important economic and political factors 
are controlled for, the political system (presidential vs. parliamentary) is not a good predictor of 
outsider success. The rise of outsiders in Latin America is associated with a combination of 
supply and demand factors. A series of institutional design characteristics (compulsory voting, 
reelection provisions, and non-concurrent elections) make it easier for outsiders to run. Once 
viable outsiders are in the race, their success is facilitated in contexts where a severe crisis of 
representation exists. Dealigned citizens and voters whose preferences are not reflected in the 
established party system are more likely to support outsiders on election day. 
OUTSIDER PRESIDENTS, INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE, AND 
GOVERNABILITY IN LATIN AMERICA 
 
Miguel Carreras, PhD 
University of Pittsburgh, 2014
 
 v 
The second main contribution of this dissertation is to show that outsiders are more likely 
to threaten democratic governability and to commit authoritarian excesses. There are three main 
factors that contribute to executive abuses when political outsiders reach the presidency: 1) the 
lack of democratic political socialization of outsiders, 2) the difficult socio-political context 
faced by outsiders –which creates a “window of opportunity” for executive excesses–, and 3) the 
lack of a strongly organized party monitoring the actions of outsider presidents. This work shows 
that executive-legislative relations tend to be more acrimonious when the president is an 
outsider. The in-depth analysis of the Fujimori case also suggests that outsiders tend to form very 
inexperienced cabinets, which generates serious governability problems. 
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 1 
1.0  INTRODUCTION 
“Alberto, what are we going to do if we win?” The campaign manager and chief advisor of 
Alberto Fujimori (president of Peru between 1990 and 2000) recalls asking him this question in 
late March 1990 when they were in a car going to a campaign event. Fujimori laughed for a long 
time but he could not give him a coherent answer because he was not prepared for an electoral 
victory.1 
Alberto Fujimori can be considered as the paradigmatic example of a successful political 
outsider. Fujimori was an agricultural engineer and mathematics professor at the Universidad 
Nacional Agraria (UNA) and the son of Japanese immigrants. He ran for president in 1990 with 
a new and weakly organized political party called Cambio 90 (Change 1990). Fujimori had no 
political experience, no political connections, and no clear program of government. His rise to 
power was meteoric and is often characterized as a tsunami because it shook the political system 
in Peru. In early March 1990, Fujimori was one of five minor candidates who together had less 
than 1% support in public opinion polls. Yet in the presidential election on April 8 Fujimori was 
the second most voted candidate with a stunning 29.1% of the votes. He was elected president 
when he won the runoff election by a landslide on June 10 (Schmidt, 1996). 
The example of Fujimori and the opening anecdote suggest a dual puzzle, which will be 
the focus of this study. On the one hand, what explains the sudden rise and election of political 
                                                 
1 Interview with Víctor Paredes, November 2012, Lima 
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outsiders in presidential elections? This is something that surprises scholars, analysts, and often 
the candidates themselves. On the other hand, what are the consequences of the election of 
outsiders for democratic governability and institutional performance? How do outsiders govern 
given their lack of political expertise and political connections? 
1.1 THE POLITICAL ARENA: NO PLACE FOR AMATEURS 
Political systems since ancient times have tended to create institutional mechanisms to make sure 
that the people occupying positions of political authority have the right combination of skills, 
connections, and expertise. During the period of the late Republic in Ancient Rome, aspiring 
politicians had to respect a sequential order of public offices, known as cursus honorum (“course 
of honors”). Public officials had to be elected to lower offices if they wanted to be eligible for 
the more prestigious offices. Public servants gradually received more prerogatives as they went 
up in this ladder of political advancement. The different roles that public officials had to perform 
during their careers covered different areas of public life (financial affairs, maintenance of public 
buildings, organization of public festivals, and administration of justice). This institutionalized 
system insured that individuals reaching positions of high authority had a long and diverse 
political experience having occupied various positions in public administration during their 
careers (H. Beck, 2012; Petit, 1974). But Ancient Rome did not have a democratic political 
system. It was much easier for the aristocratic families in Rome (the “patricians”) to enter into 
the cursus honorum than for the rest of the population (the “plebeians”). Most citizens in Rome 
were not involved in political decisions.  
 3 
The other major political system of the Ancient world in Western Europe was the 
Athenian democracy, and it had a completely different approach to political recruitment. The 
vast majority of magistrates and public officials in the Athenian Regime were selected by lot. 
One of the key features of the Greek democratic culture was rotation in office. Every citizen 
occupied the position of governor and governed alternatively. This practice was an important 
building block of Athenian democracy because all citizens had equal chance of occupying 
positions of political authority. Selection by lot made it possible for newcomers and amateurs to 
hold important magistracies while more experienced and knowledgeable individuals often had to 
wait on the sidelines (Hansen, 1999; Manin, 1997). But this was not considered a flaw of the 
Athenian institutions. On the contrary, there was a clear distrust of professionalism in Athenian 
democracy. Selection by lot guaranteed that individuals serving as magistrates would not enjoy 
extra power because of their expertise. In the words of Manin (1997: 33), “the Athenian 
democrats perceived a conflict between democracy and professionalism in political matters. 
Democracy consisted in placing decisive power in the hands of amateurs, the people the 
Athenians called hoi idiōtai.”  
This brief historical excursus makes it clear that the government of expert politicians is 
by no means the only option available or normatively superior in all instances. However, modern 
representative democracies are based on principles and institutions that favor professionalization 
and expertise. Modern democracies are much larger (in size and population) than the city states 
in pre-modern times. Hence, governing is more complex and requires the full-time attention of a 
body of experts. Moreover, citizens in modern states do not have slaves who can take care of 
their private activities while they are concerned with public affairs. These realities naturally lead 
to a representative system of government. In the words of Benjamin Constant in an important 
 4 
essay comparing the liberty of the moderns with the liberty of the ancients, political 
representation is “nothing but an organization by means of which a nation charges a few 
individuals to do what it can’t or doesn’t want to do itself. (…) The representative system is a 
mandate given to a certain number of men by the mass of the people who want their interests to 
be defended but don’t have the time to defend them constantly themselves” (Constant, 1988 
[1819]). 
Political representation goes hand in hand with a new conception of citizenship. The role 
of citizens is to provide political legitimacy to the elected leaders, rather than to hold office 
themselves (Manin, 1997). The emergence of political amateurs is not excluded de jure in most 
representative democracies. De facto, however, it is very difficult for political newcomers to hold 
high-level public offices. Representative systems select their leaders through elections. While 
citizens cannot directly influence political decisions, elections serve as a key mechanism of 
political representation and accountability (Fearon, 1999; Manin, Przeworski, & Stokes, 1999). 
Elections operate under a logic of distinction. In an electoral process, “voters are led to select a 
candidate who is superior to them in that he possesses a quality that they particularly value and 
that most of them do not possess” (Manin, 1997: 141).  
Political experience is one of the key characteristics that voters look for when they make 
voting decisions. Although the political class is discredited in many countries, the public 
continues to value the previous political experience and the previous record in public 
administration of the candidates running for positions of high political authority (Johnston, Blais, 
Brady, & Crête, 1992; Page, 1978). More experienced candidates tend to be perceived as more 
competent, which is one of the basic criteria voters use to evaluate political leaders running for 
office (Kinder, Peters, Abelson, & Fiske, 1980). 
 5 
Another characteristic that matters to voters is the party affiliation of politicians. The 
extension of the suffrage to increasingly large sectors of the population during the late 19th and 
the 20th centuries in most modern democracies made it impossible for political leaders to rely on 
patronage and direct contact with voters to obtain electoral support. Political leaders gradually 
became more policy oriented and joined political parties that were close to their policy goals. As 
a result of this political evolution, voters also became increasingly party-oriented, casting their 
votes for political parties as much as for individual politicians (Cox, 1987). Partisanship often 
works as a “shortcut” for voters, helping them to understand complex political debates and to 
choose among the different electoral options (A. Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1960). 
Political experience (developed in different political offices and inside political parties) is 
especially important in positions of high political authority, such as the presidency in a 
presidential system or the office of prime minister in a parliamentary system. Political leaders in 
these positions are expected to have issue expertise to be able to tackle difficult policy 
challenges, but also political expertise to be able to navigate the political and institutional 
system. In his classic study of presidential leadership in the United States, Neustadt (1990 
[1960]: 152) states that the presidency “is not a place for amateurs”. He further points out that 
“expertise can hardly be acquired without deep experience in political office. The presidency is a 
place for men of politics.” 
In sum, in modern representative democracies political leaders competing for the highest 
political office in their countries are expected to have a long political experience and are often 
evaluated by voters on the basis of their political expertise and their party affiliations. The vast 
majority of elected presidents and prime ministers are politically experienced and belong to 
established political parties, as will be shown in Chapter 3. 
 6 
1.2 THE PUZZLE 
We can now go back to the research questions I posed at the beginning of this introduction. The 
rise of Alberto Fujimori is not an isolated event in the contemporary political history of Latin 
America. Despite the natural tendency of voters to support experienced party politicians in 
presidential elections, seven other presidents were elected as outsiders since the rise of Fujimori 
in 1990. Many other presidential candidates obtained significant support from the voters but fell 
short of an electoral victory.  
The outsider presidents elected in Latin America had different profiles but shared two 
key characteristics: very limited political experience and rise to power with a new political party 
or political movement.  
Violeta Chamorro was elected as an outsider president in Nicaragua in February 1990. 
Chamorro was the widow of an important journalist and opposition leader to the Somoza 
dictatorship in Nicaragua (Pedro Joaquín Chamorro). Violeta Chamorro had no political 
experience –except for a brief participation in the first National Junta of National Reconstruction 
after the end of the Somoza regime. She spent most of the 1980s as a manager of the opposition 
newspaper La Prensa that she had inherited from her husband. In 1990, she became the leader of 
the Unión Nacional Opositora (UNO), an electoral movement that included political forces from 
the left to the right, as well as many political independents. She won the presidential elections by 
a landslide because she was seen as a unifying figure after the civil conflict that divided 
Nicaragua in the 1980s (Chamorro, 1996). 
The next political outsider to be elected president in Latin America was Hugo Chávez 
(president of Venezuela between 1999 and 2013). Chávez was an army officer with very limited 
political and administrative experience when he ran for the presidency in 1998. In the early 
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1990s, Chávez was completely unknown to the general public. He was opposed to the neoliberal 
policies implemented by Acción Democrática and wanted to reform political institutions in 
Venezuela, perceived by him as very corrupt. In February 1992, he attempted a military coup 
against the democratically elected government of Carlos Andrés Pérez. Although the coup failed, 
Chávez became a popular figure in Venezuela. He ran in the 1998 elections in Venezuela with a 
new political movement called Movimiento Quinta República (MVR) which combined an anti-
establishment rhetoric and a vague leftist ideology. Chávez comfortably won the presidential 
elections in 1998, and governed Venezuela in a delegative fashion for more than a decade 
(Canache, 2002; Corrales & Penfold, 2011; Hawkins, 2010). 
Lucio Gutiérrez (president of Ecuador between 2003 and 2005) followed a very similar 
pathway to power than Hugo Chávez. In the late 1990s, Gutiérrez was an army coronel with no 
experience in politics or in public administration. In January 2000, he led a military-indigenous 
popular uprising and coup attempt against the democratically elected government of Jamil 
Mahuad (Democracia Popular). Gutiérrez suddenly became a popular political leader and began 
a rapid political career after this failed coup attempt. He created a new political party called 
Sociedad Patriótica 21 de Enero (January 21 Patriotic Society –PSP–).2 This personalist political 
party ran in the 2002 national elections with a vague leftist and nationalist program, and allied 
with indigenous movements. Gutiérrez made it to the second round which he won with 58.7% of 
the votes, defeating the right-wing populist candidate Alvaro Noboa (CIDOB). 
Another political newcomer came to power a few years later in Ecuador: Rafael Correa. 
Correa has been the president of Ecuador since 2006. He is an economist trained at the 
Université Catholique de Louvain and at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, where 
                                                 
22 January 21 refers to the date of the 2000 Ecuadorean coup d'état. 
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he obtained his PhD in 2001. In 2005, Correa served as Economy and Finance minister under 
Alfredo Palacio. He only served in that capacity for four months, but he used that position as a 
platform to launch a new political movement: Alianza PAIS. The movement’s platform proposed 
institutional reforms, anti-corruption policies, regional integration, and economic relief for 
Ecuador's poor. In spite of his political inexperience and of not having the support of an 
organized political party, Correa defeated Alvaro Noboa by a landslide in the second round of 
the presidential election (Philip & Panizza, 2011).  
Ecuador is not the only country in which more than one outsider has been elected 
president since 1990. After the election of Fujimori in 1990, two other political newcomers came 
to power in Peru. In 2001, Alejandro Toledo was elected president defeating Alan García 
(APRA). Toledo was an economist with an impressive academic and professional background. 
After receiving his PhD from Stanford University in the 1970s, he worked as an economic 
consultant for many international organizations (IADB, USAID, OECD, and WTO), and as a 
professor in the Graduate School of Business (ESAN) in Lima. In the mid-1990s, he launched a 
political movement called País Posible to fight against the political and economic excesses of the 
Fujimori administration. First unsuccessful, Toledo managed to position himself as the main 
opposition figure to the Fujimori regime. With very limited political experience, Toledo won the 
first presidential elections after the fall of the Fujimori regime. 
The honeymoon period for Toledo was short. Although his time in office coincided with 
a period of sustained economic growth, he also became a victim of the public disenchantment 
with governmental institutions. Toledo’s approval ratings hovered around 10% during his last 
two years as president. Toledo’s party, Perú Posible, was repeatedly accused by the media of 
nepotism and influence peddling in Congress and the president himself was involved in a series 
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of corruption scandals. In this context of renovated discontent with political parties and 
democratic institutions, another outsider emerged with force in late 2005: Ollanta Humala. As in 
the cases of Chávez and Gutiérrez, Humala became a prominent political figure when he led an 
unsuccessful military revolt against President Fujimori in October 2000. He was later pardoned 
after the downfall of the Fujimori regime. In 2005 he founded the Peruvian Nationalist Party 
(Partido Nacionalista Peruano –PNP–) and registered to run in the 2006 presidential election. 
Humala positioned himself as an anti-corruption crusader criticizing career politicians and 
traditional political parties. His program combined some elements of left-wing and nationalist 
ideas, as well as a defense of ethnic interests (Cameron, 2007). In spite of his electoral 
inexperience, Humala qualified to the second round of the presidential election –obtaining 30.6% 
of the votes in the first round– but was narrowly defeated in the second round by the APRA 
candidate Alan García. Following the example of Toledo, Humala ran again in the 2011 
presidential elections with a more moderate program. While maintaining a leftist platform, he 
toned down the nationalist aspects of his program and pledged to maintain foreign investment in 
Peru. In this second attempt, Humala was elected president of Peru after narrowly defeating 
Keiko Fujimori in the second round. 
Another country that experienced the rise of a political outsider is Paraguay. This South 
American country was under the rule of the Colorado Party for 61 years between 1947 and 2008. 
In the 2008 presidential elections, the candidate of the ruling party was defeated by Fernando 
Lugo, a former bishop of an impoverished area –adherent of the “liberation theology”– and 
progressive reformist who had no previous political experience. Lugo led the Patriotic Alliance 
for Change (APC), a new and broad coalition of parties and groups spanning the entire 
ideological spectrum. He took advantage of the factionalism and fragmentation within the ruling 
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Colorado Party and managed to attract the second major party in Paraguay (the Liberal Party) to 
the APC coalition. Lugo proposed to fight against the entrenched corruption of the ruling party 
and to combat poverty and inequality in Paraguay. He clearly benefitted from his image as a 
political outsider in an electoral context in which the population was deeply disenchanted with 
the corruption and inefficiency of the traditional political class. The outsider candidate won with 
41% of the vote in a plurality system, while the Colorado Party candidate obtained only 30% of 
the votes cast (Abente-Brun, 2009; Lambert, 2008). 
Although each case of “outsidership” is different, some general observations can be made 
about these independent candidates. First, outsiders tend to be elected in moments of deep 
sociopolitical turmoil related to severe economic hardships (e.g. Fujimori and Chávez), 
institutional instability (e.g. Gutiérrez and Correa), and a context of widespread internal violence 
(e.g. Chamorro and Fujimori). These are also moments in which citizens’ trust in the traditional 
political class is extremely low. Political experience and policy expertise are most valuable in 
this context of crisis. Paradoxically, however, outsiders reach the highest office in this difficult 
situation without any previous political socialization and without political skills. 
The second general observation that can be made about outsider presidents is that they 
tend to generate situations of extreme institutional conflict and instability. Outsiders tend to 
govern in a very personalistic way, bypassing and confronting other institutions, such as the 
legislature, the judiciary, and the media. Outsiders such as Fujimori, Chávez, and Correa are 
among the most vivid examples of “delegative” presidents in Latin America after the Third 
Wave of democratization (O'Donnell, 1994), and they have managed to remain in power beyond 
their constitutional terms through a variety of illegal measures. On the other hand, the 
confrontational style and lack of political experience of other outsider presidents has led 
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powerful political actors to push for a democratic breakdown. Gutiérrez in Ecuador and Lugo in 
Paraguay were removed from power before the end of their terms. 
After analyzing in detail the contextual and individual-level factors that explain the rise 
of outsiders, this dissertation will focus on the governability problems and institutional failures 
that often materialize when a political outsider is in power. 
1.3 WHY STUDY OUTSIDERS? 
It is important to analyze the rise of political outsiders for several reasons. First of all, this study 
addresses a glaring empirical gap. As the previous section makes clear, the election of outsider 
presidents is not an isolated event in the fragile democracies of Latin America. Eight outsiders 
came to power in the region in the past 25 years, but we still lack a comprehensive comparative 
analysis of the causes and the consequences of the election of these political neophytes.  
Second, this dissertation also makes an important theoretical contribution. My study has 
important implications for different literatures and different areas of study in comparative 
politics such as the literature on party system weakness and the rise of new parties, the literature 
on the crisis of democratic representation in Latin America, the literature on democratic 
consolidation in fragile democracies, and most importantly the literature on the perils of 
presidentialism. I hope that this dissertation will contribute to the broadening of theoretical 
horizons about the crisis of democratic representation in Latin America by analyzing one of its 
most extreme outcomes: the rise of political newcomers to positions of high political authority. 
In line with Maiwaring et al. (2006: 12), democratic representation in this work refers to a 
“specifically democratic form of representation that is established when a voter (the principal) 
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chooses an agent (a politician or a party) to represent her interests in a democratic regime.” In 
many Latin American countries, especially in the Andean countries, this link between voters and 
politicians has eroded over the past three decades (Carreras, Morgenstern, & Su, 2013). Across 
the region, there is a widespread disaffection with political institutions in general –and political 
parties in particular–, as reflected in survey data (Booth & Seligson, 2009; Lagos, 1997). The 
deficient government performance in three key areas (economic security, public security, and 
corruption) has increased citizens’ disenchantment with democratic institutions (Hagopian, 2005; 
M. A. Seligson, 2002a). One of the most dramatic manifestations of the crisis of representation is 
the rise of outsiders (Mainwaring et al., 2006: 21-23), and the present study seeks to analyze the 
consequences of the election of political newcomers for democratic stability and institutional 
performance. 
This dissertation also revisits the theoretical debate on the perils of presidentialism. In the 
early 1990s, a series of scholars argued that presidential regimes threatened democratic quality 
and consolidation. In particular, executive-legislative relations in presidential systems were 
described as prone to conflict. Among the main perils of presidentialism, these scholars 
mentioned the dual democratic legitimacy, the temporal rigidity of presidentialism, the winner 
take all logic of presidential elections, and the principle of non-reelection (Lijphart, 1992a; Linz, 
1990, 1994). Since the early 1990s, several scholars of political institutions and Latin American 
politics tested these different claims. The current consensus is that these perils of presidentialism 
were greatly exaggerated in these early studies (Carreras, 2012). However, the critics of 
presidentialism also pointed out that the rise of outsiders is a peril of presidentialism because 
elections tend to be more personalized in presidential systems (Linz, 1994; Suárez, 1982). That 
argument was never tested empirically. My dissertation contributes to closing that empirical and 
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theoretical gap. I analyze whether outsiders are more likely to come to power in presidential 
systems, and whether they destabilize democratic institutions once they are elected.  
 Finally, this study addresses an important policy concern. There is a clear global tide of 
anti-political feelings. This crisis of representation is obvious in the fragile and weakly 
institutionalized democracies of Latin America, where polls repeatedly show the low approval 
ratings of political institutions and political parties (Lagos, 1997, 2008). Very similar patterns of 
political disenchantment are observed in Eastern European countries, where there was a clear 
erosion of trust in elected institutions since the democratic transitions (Jovanović & Pavićević, 
2012). But this crisis of confidence in democratic institutions and political leaders is also 
affecting consolidated democracies in Western Europe and North America, where trust in 
political parties is on the decline and citizens are becoming more critical of politicians and 
political institutions (Dalton & Wattenberg, 2000; Norris, 1999; Pharr & Putnam, 2000). Given 
this situation of widespread political distrust, it is reasonable to expect that many other political 
newcomers will be elected to positions of high political authority both in fragile and in more 
robust democracies. In addition to the outsider presidents in Latin America analyzed in this 
dissertation, political outsiders appear to be increasingly popular in many other democracies. 
Outsider candidates are emerging with force in presidential, gubernatorial, and mayoral races in 
Asia, in countries such as Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, and Pakistan. According to a recent 
article in The Economist, “a new force is emerging in Asian politics: the non-politician—or at 
least the politician posing as such” (The Economist, 2012). All these outsiders run anti-
establishment and anti-corruption campaigns which excite young people cynical about politics. 
Political newcomers are also becoming popular in Eastern Europe. In the presidential elections in 
Slovakia on March 30 2014, a political outsider (Andrej Kiska) defeated the candidate of the 
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incumbent party by a landslide. Kiska is a successful entrepreneur and a philanthropist, who has 
no political experience and prides himself on not having any political affiliations. This political 
newcomer ran on a wave of continuing popular anger at allegations of sleaze and distrust in 
established parties (BBC, 2014; Kral, 2014). Political outsiders and anti-party movements are 
knocking at the doors of more established democracies also. The Five Stars movement, an anti-
establishment political party launched by the comedian and blogger Beppe Grillo, obtained 
25.55% of the votes in the 2013 general elections in Italy, making it the second most voted party. 
The party has rejected to enter into coalitions with other established parties, creating a series of 
governability problems (Amenduni, 2014). The Tea Party movement in the United States is 
another example of a successful anti-establishment movement in a consolidated democracy. 
Given this global phenomenon of anti-parties or anti-politics feelings and the concomitant rise of 
newcomers and non-politicians, it is essential to understand the specific factors that lead to the 
election of outsiders and the consequences of the rise of outsiders for democratic governability. 
1.4 MOVING BEYOND INSTITUTIONS 
The study of Latin American politics has been dominated by the institutionalist approach in the 
last twenty-five years (Ames, 1999). This approach holds that political behavior and policy 
outcomes are shaped by political institutions. The formal rules of the game “regulate the 
formation of binding policy decisions and the selection of the people in charge of such decisions 
in a polity” (Pérez Liñán & Castañeda Angarita, 2012: 395). This approach has undoubtedly 
generated valuable insights and yielded promising answers to the key areas of theoretical debate 
in Latin American politics; and the research presented in the first part of this dissertation 
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contributes to this institutionalism literature. In fact, I conduct institutional analysis in Chapters 3 
and 4 of this study in order to assess the different institutional determinants of the rise of outsider 
politicians in presidential elections in Latin America. As will be shown below, this 
institutionalist approach produces important findings that challenge the conventional wisdom 
regarding the emergence of independent candidates. 
The focus of the political science discipline on political institutions, however, came at the 
price of “a diminution of interest in those selected few without whom political history can never 
be understood” (Wiatr, 1988: 91). Without disregarding the importance of institutions, the 
second part of this dissertation shifts the spotlight to the dynamics of political leadership in 
countries governed by outsider presidents. Bermeo correctly points out that “the quality of 
governance ultimately rests on the qualities of those who govern. If we ignore these qualities 
(…), we risk overlooking the essentially human dynamic of politics. Elites formulate preferences 
and weight constraints in accord with what they have been taught, where they have been, and 
where they think they might be going” (Bermeo, 2002: 205-206). This is exactly the approach I 
adopt in the second part of the dissertation, when I show that the socialization of the leaders and 
their previous political experience (or lack thereof) is essential to understand how they govern.3 
Studies of political leadership focus on three interrelated questions: who are the leaders; 
how do they make decisions; and, what effects do their decisions have? (Wiatr, 1977: 82). These 
are three prominent questions in this dissertation. By differentiating between outsider and 
traditional politicians, this study implicitly argues that it matters who the leaders are in a 
democratic system. My dissertation also assesses how outsiders govern despite the fact that they 
                                                 
3 Other studies in the American or Latin American context focus on the impact of personality traits on presidential 
leadership style (Arana Araya, 2014; Barber, 1992), but the link between political experience, political socialization 
and governing style is rarely established in the literature. 
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are devoid of political connections and political expertise. I also analyze the consequences of the 
arrival to power of outsider leaders for democratic governability and the functioning of 
democratic institutions. 
 
1.5 ROADMAP OF THE DISSERTATION 
As noted previously, the key aim of this dissertation is to provide a systematic, empirically 
oriented analysis to answer two questions: (a) What are the factors that determine the rise to 
power of outsider presidents? (b) Once these outsiders are elected, how do they impact 
democratic governability and institutional performance? In order to answer these questions, this 
research proceeds in the following way. Chapter 2 starts by proposing a rigorous definition of the 
term “political outsider”. Although the concept seems commonsensical, previous studies have 
defined “outsidership” in very different ways. While some scholars focus on the previous 
political experience of politicians, others characterize politicians who run with new parties as 
outsiders. In Chapter 2, I argue that both elements are essential in the definition of 
“outsidership”. An outsider is a newcomer politician who rises to power with no (or very limited) 
experience in politics and public administration and with a new party or electoral movement. I 
also discuss at length the operationalization of the term “political outsider” which is then used in 
all the empirical analyses of the dissertation.  
One of the key arguments of this dissertation is that outsiders are more likely to threaten 
democratic governability and to commit authoritarian excesses. Chapter 2 also provides the basic 
theoretical framework that explains why outsiders are more likely to behave undemocratically 
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and to bypass other institutions. I argue that there are three main factors that contribute to 
executive abuses when political outsiders reach the presidency: 1) the individual characteristics 
of the outsider, 2) the difficult socio-political context faced by outsiders, and 3) the strategic 
constraints faced by outsiders when they come to power. Outsiders tend to come to power in 
moments of deep sociopolitical crisis and economic decline, when citizens’ disenchantment with 
established parties and political institutions is at its peak. These are moments in which political 
experience and political skills are most essential. But outsiders lack the political socialization and 
the political connections that would help them to reach compromises and govern in these 
moments of crisis. The sociopolitical crisis also provides a “window of opportunity” for 
outsiders to commit executive abuses because citizens are less likely to sanction presidents when 
they abuse discredited institutions. Finally, outsiders are not disciplined by strongly organized 
parties so they have more leeway to commit authoritarian excesses. Since they are elected 
through electoral vehicles (which are often nothing more than empty shells), outsiders are not 
sanctioned or controlled when they take controversial or undemocratic decisions. This theoretical 
chapter sets the stage for the empirical chapters that follow.  
The empirical chapters of the dissertation are divided in two different parts, which 
address the two research questions in this study. Part 1 (Chapters 3-5) analyzes the contextual 
and individual-level factors that contribute to the rise of outsider presidents. Part 2 (Chapters 6-
7) assesses the consequences of the election of outsider presidents for democratic governability 
and institutional performance. 
The research on the determinants of the rise of outsiders proceeds from the general to the 
specific. Chapter 3 empirically tests the claim that the rise of outsiders is a peril of 
presidentialism (Linz, 1994; Suárez, 1982). Using a series of multivariate logistic regressions, I 
 18 
estimate the likelihood of outsider rise in presidential and parliamentary systems. In order to 
conduct this analysis, I built a database including biographical information on all the heads of 
government that arrived to power following parliamentary and presidential elections in all 
democratic countries in the period 1945-2010. Interestingly, the results cast doubts on the 
conventional wisdom. When other important economic and political factors are controlled for, 
the political system (presidential vs. parliamentary) is not a good predictor of outsider success. 
The negative finding reported in Chapter 3 generates a whole new series of questions. 
The fact remains that eight outsiders arrived to power in Latin America in the last 25 years, and 
many other independent candidates were narrowly defeated. Chapters 4 and 5 focus on the 
presidential systems of Latin America, and try to assess the individual and institutional factors 
that explain the sudden rise of outsider candidates in the region. Chapter 4 analyzes the 
institutional design characteristics that facilitate the rise of outsider candidates in presidential 
elections. Through a cross-national time series analysis, I find that the rise of outsiders is more 
likely when three factors are present: 1) legislative and presidential elections are not concurrent, 
2) voting is compulsory, and 3) the incumbent president is not up for reelection. 
Chapter 5 uses available survey data from LAPOP and Latinobarómetro surveys to 
analyze the individual-level determinants of the rise of outsiders in the region. The main 
conclusion of this chapter is that the vote for outsiders is a political vote capturing deeply held 
feelings of political disenchantment, rather than an economic vote of citizens dissatisfied with 
the economic performance of the incumbent government. My results suggest that outsiders are 
likely to be supported by people who do not trust political parties, citizens who are dissatisfied 
with the performance of democracy, and leftist voters disenchanted with the convergence of 
traditional parties on neoliberal policies. 
 19 
The second part of the dissertation shifts the focus of analysis to the consequences of the 
rise of outsiders for democratic governability and institutional performance. In line with the 
theoretical framework presented in Chapter 2, my expectation is that outsiders threaten 
governability and are more likely to commit executive abuses against other democratic 
institutions. Chapter 6 analyzes the impact of outsider presidents on executive-legislative 
confrontation. I argue that outsider presidents tend to face more serious and prolonged conflicts 
with the legislature for a series of reasons. First, outsiders tend to be minority presidents with 
very low support in the legislature. Second, outsider presidents lack the skills and resources that 
could help them to overcome this minority situation and reach deals with the most represented 
parties in the legislature. Third, outsiders are not punished by the citizenry when they confront 
the legislature because outsiders come to power in moments in which political institutions and 
politicians are very discredited. In this chapter, I show using cross-national time series data that 
outsider presidents are more likely to face protracted confrontation with the legislature over the 
approval of bills and over executive appointments. The empirical analysis also demonstrates that 
the probability of congress dissolution attempts by the president is much higher when the 
president is an outsider. 
The study of the link between outsider presidents, democratic governability, and 
institutional performance is problematic because the relationship might be spurious. It is indeed 
possible that an antecedent condition –economic and sociopolitical crisis– explains both the rise 
of outsiders and the institutional instability that follows. My dissertation takes this concern very 
seriously. In Chapter 6, I address this potential spuriousness in two different ways. First, I 
conduct confirmatory statistical analysis with propensity score matching. This procedure 
estimates the impact of outsiders on executive-legislative confrontation with a reduced sample in 
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which the negative cases match the key characteristics of the positive outsidership cases. This 
estimation confirms the deleterious impact of outsiders on executive-legislative relations. 
Second, I conduct an in-depth analysis of the case of Peru which compares executive-legislative 
confrontation during the 1980s (under the presidency of two career politicians –Belaúnde and 
García–) with executive-legislative confrontation in the early 1990s (under the administration of 
an outsider –Fujimori–). The three presidents faced a similar situation of severe economic crisis 
and sociopolitical turmoil. However, the level of executive-legislative confrontation was much 
higher under Fujimori. The outsider president went as far as dissolving the legislature in 1992, a 
clear authoritarian move (Conaghan, 2005). In sum, this dissertation strongly suggests that 
outsider presidents produce negative effects for democratic governability and institutional 
performance that go above and beyond what the crisis conditions that they inherit would have 
produced in their absence. 
The last empirical chapter of the dissertation (Chapter 7) continues to study the 
consequences of the rise of outsider presidents by analyzing the impact of outsiders on the 
composition and functioning of cabinets. An in-depth analysis of the case of Peru –comparing 
the administration of the outsider Fujimori to the administrations of traditional party politicians 
who preceded him– demonstrates that outsiders tend to appoint neophyte ministers who lack ties 
with the political establishment. This chapter suggests that cabinets formed by outsiders are less 
partisan and less politically experienced. The fieldwork I conducted in Peru also allows me to 
assess the consequences of this pattern for cabinet politics and governability. Chapter 7 shows 
that cabinets formed by outsiders are affected by two problems that threaten democratic 
governability: 1) loss of ministerial autonomy, 2) difficulty for the cabinet to work as a 
coordinated team. 
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The main contribution of this dissertation is to analyze the link between the election of 
outsider presidents and the performance of democratic institutions under presidentialism. The big 
message of this study is that outsider politicians pose a considerable threat to democratic 
governability and institutional performance in presidential systems. Outsiders tend to be elected 
in contexts of economic crisis and sociopolitical instability. However, they lack the political 
experience, connections, and skills to deal with this difficult situation in a democratic fashion. 
Outsiders are more likely to confront and bypass other democratic institutions because they lack 
a democratic socialization within longstanding parties, they are not constrained by strong and 
organized parties, and they often obtain political and electoral rewards by choosing an aggressive 
strategy. In the last 25 years, political outsiders have been more prone to engage in direct and 
repeated confrontation with the legislature, the judiciary, and the media. This is the first study to 
tease out the causal mechanisms behind these authoritarian excesses and to demonstrate 
empirically the negative “outsider effect” on democratic governability and institutional 
performance. 
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2.0  DEFINITION, RESEARCH DESIGN, AND THEORY 
There are very few comparative studies analyzing the causes or the consequences of the rise of 
outsider presidents. This theoretical and empirical gap is partly linked to the dearth of a clear and 
consensual definition of the phenomenon. Academic works on outsiders have mostly focused on 
one case –Fujimori and Chávez receiving most of the scholarly attention–, and have thereby not 
deployed serious efforts in defining the term “outsider.” The first contribution of this dissertation 
is to propose a rigorous definition and operationalization of “outsidership.” This 
operationalization effort then allows me to define the universe of cases of “outsidership” that will 
be analyzed in the empirical analyses in this study. The second key contribution of this 
dissertation is to analyze the causes and the consequences of the rise of outsider presidents in 
Latin America, which will allow me to test whether the election of outsider presidents constitutes 
a peril of presidentialism as argued by the critics of presidentialism (Linz, 1994; Suárez, 1982). 
The main argument in this dissertation is that independent presidents pose a serious threat to 
democratic governability and institutional performance. 
After providing a definition and operationalization of the term “outsider”, this chapter 
gives an account of the research design and the methods used to analyze empirically the factors 
that lead to the emergence of outsiders and the consequences of the rise of outsiders for 
democratic governability. The final section of this chapter provides the basic theoretical 
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framework that explains why outsiders are more likely to behave undemocratically and to bypass 
other institutions. Hence, this chapter sets the stage for the empirical chapters that follow. 
2.1 POLITICAL OUTSIDERS: DEFINITION 
The concept “outsider” seems commonsensical but the literature on Latin American 
presidentialism has not converged to a single and consensual definition of the term. In fact, 
scholars interested in the rise of political independents have tended to study this issue under the 
theoretical framework of “populism” or “neo-populism” (Armony, 2002; Barr, 2003; Cammack, 
2000; Crabtree, 1999; Freidenberg, 2007; Hawkins, 2010; Knight, 1998; Madrid, 2008; Panizza, 
2000; Roberts, 1995; Walker, 2008; Weyland, 1999). Others have preferred to use the term “anti-
politics” or “anti-party” politicians to describe leaders who climb to the highest office using an 
anti-establishment rhetoric during campaigns (García Montero, 2001; Kenney, 1998a). 
Many scholars interested in “outsiders” lump together this concept with the notion of 
“populist” and “anti-party politician” which has led to a conceptual muddle. This is evident in 
the definition of outsider offered by Linz in which the three dimensions are lumped together. 
According to Linz (1994: 26), outsiders are “candidates not identified with or supported by any 
political party, sometimes without any governmental or even political experience, on the basis of 
a populist appeal often based on hostility to parties and “politicians” (emphasis added). In his 
study of political outsiders in Bolivia, Mayorga (2006: 133) defines outsiders as “neopopulist 
and anti-political actors”. Other studies talk about “populist outsiders” (Doyle, 2011; Weyland, 
2003) or “antipolitical establishment outsiders” (Levitsky & Cameron, 2003) without clearly 
defining the concept of “outsider.” I use a different conceptual strategy by distinguishing these 
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three concepts –“populism”, “anti-politics”, and “outsiders”– as has been advocated by other 
scholars (Barr, 2009; Kenney, 1998a). In this dissertation, politicians will be defined as either 
“insiders” or “outsiders” depending only on their party system origins and the nature of their 
previous political experience. 
This conceptual and research strategy has many advantages. “Populism” is a highly 
contested concept which is difficult to operationalize. This conceptual fluidity has led some 
scholars to abandon the study of populism altogether, and to describe it as an “empty concept” 
(Lynch, 1999a).4 On the contrary, the concept of political outsider can be straightforwardly 
operationalized and measured by focusing on the previous trajectory of presidential candidates. 
Moreover, whether outsiders are populists or anti-establishment politicians is an empirical 
question which should not be assumed a priori by researchers. Even if all outsiders were 
populists, it could still be the case that some insiders were populists too. For instance, two 
Argentinean presidents –Menem and Kirchner– have been described as populist politicians 
despite being insiders since they had a long political career within the traditional Partido 
Justicialista before coming to power (Castorina, 2009; Leaman, 1999). Hence, it is important to 
distinguish the study of populists and outsiders. 
Given the conceptual confusion surrounding the concept, it is essential to propose a clear 
definition of the concept “political outsider” that will guide the empirical analysis that follows. 
Social science concepts are both multidimensional and multilevel (Goertz 2006; Sartori 1970). 
The basic level is the concept as used in theoretical propositions (e.g. capitalism, democracy, 
corporatism). In this dissertation, the basic level is “outsider” and I test several theoretical 
                                                 
4 In his work, Hawkins (2009, 2010) proposes an interesting way of measuring populist discourse through content 
analysis. However, his approach is not applicable to my research since it is almost impossible to obtain campaign 
speeches delivered by all candidates in presidential elections in Latin American countries in the period 1980-2010. 
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propositions related to this concept. For instance, I hypothesize in Chapter 6 that outsiders tend 
to have more conflictive relations with the legislature. The secondary level is made of the 
multiple constitutive dimensions of the basic level concept. In this case, the basic level concept 
“outsider” has two constitutive dimensions: 1) political inexperience and 2) rise to prominence 
through a new party. The indicator level provides specific information on how the constitutive 
dimensions identified in the secondary level can be operationalized by looking at empirical data. 
This third level will allow me to identify which presidents (and presidential candidates) fall 
under the concept “outsiders” when conducting the different empirical analyses in this 
dissertation. 
 
2.1.1 Secondary level: the constitutive dimensions of the concept “outsider” 
Two main “outsidership” dimensions have been identified in previous works. The first 
dimension is related to the characteristics of the politician’s party. Barr defines an outsider as 
“someone who gains political prominence not through or in association with an established, 
competitive party, but as a political independent or in association with new or newly competitive 
parties” (Barr, 2009: 33). Similarly, Kenney (1998: 59) uses “the term 'outsider' to refer to 
politicians who have become politically prominent from outside of the national party system, and 
the term 'insider' to refer to politicians who rise to political prominence from within the party 
system.” A working paper of the Inter-American Development Bank also looks at the party 
system origins of the candidates when categorizing presidential candidates as either “outsiders” 
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or “insiders” (S. Miller, 2011).5 Several studies of independent candidates in U.S. presidential 
elections do not specifically talk about “political outsiders” but they frame their studies in terms 
of “third party” candidates, suggesting that not being part of the established two-party system is 
their main distinguishing characteristic (Abramson, Aldrich, Paolino, & Rohde, 2000; 
Chressanthis & Shaffer, 1993; Gold, 1995; Peterson & Wrighton, 1998). In a similar vein, 
Seawright (2011) points out that the main characteristic of outsider candidates is that they do not 
belong to their country’s traditional parties.6 Finally, Weyland (1993: 23) characterizes the 
Brazilian president Collor de Mello –president between 1990 and 1992– as an outsider because 
of “his distance from national, more established political parties.” 
The second “outsidership” dimension focuses on the previous political career of 
presidents and prime ministers. Scholars often describe presidential candidates with no previous 
experience in politics or public administration as outsiders. In one of the rare large-N studies of 
the causes of outsider emergence in Latin America, Corrales (2008: 5) defines outsiders (or 
‘newcomers’) as “those who run for president with no prior electoral experience (running for 
political office) and no major public administration experience.” In a study of independent 
candidates in legislative elections in 34 countries around the world between 1945 and 2003, 
Brancati (2008: 650) similarly describes legislative candidates as outsiders when they have “no 
experience in government.” In a recent contribution, Samuels and Shugart (2010) also focus on 
the previous political career of presidents and prime ministers. They consider politicians with 
                                                 
5 Miller (2011: 2) defines an outsider as “a candidate who is not part of the traditional party system in the country.” 
6 Although Seawright (2011: 2) argues that outsiders “typically have little governing experience,” political 
inexperience is not a defining characteristic of “outsidership” in his analysis. 
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limited previous political experience (in the party, in the cabinet or in the legislature) as 
outsiders.7 
In sum, the concept “outsider” has two constitutive dimensions: 1) political inexperience, 
and 2) rise to prominence through a new party. Given these two dimensions, it is possible to 
conceptualize a positive pole (political outsiders) and a negative pole (political insiders). In the 
positive pole, we find presidential candidates that are both politically inexperienced and run with 
a new party or as independents. In the negative pole, we find “traditional” or career politicians 
who run with an established party. However, not all presidential candidates fall in these two 
poles. There is a “grey zone” between these two poles that needs to be conceptualized. Although 
politically inexperienced candidates tend to run in presidential elections with new parties, there 
are several examples of presidential candidates with no experience in politics or public 
administration who are recruited by established parties.8 For instance, the two last elected 
presidents in El Salvador –Antonio Saca from ARENA and Mauricio Funes from FMLN– ran as 
political neophytes but on the ticket of established parties.9 There are also presidential candidates 
with a long political career in established parties that decide to run under the banner of a new 
party. One of the best examples in the recent political history of Latin America is Álvaro Uribe  
–Colombian president between 2002 and 2010– who was a well-known figure in the Partido 
Liberal, and decided to run in the 2002 presidential elections as an independent. The dichotomy 
insiders vs. outsiders is not satisfactory because it hides these important distinctions. This 
discussion implies that there are four types of presidential candidates. “Insiders” are career 
                                                 
7 In addition to the political positions discussed by Samuels and Shugart (2010), I also look at the subnational level. 
In this work, I do not consider former governors as political outsiders. 
8 This strategy of recruiting politically inexperienced outsiders with “name recognition” is also often used by parties 
in legislative elections (Brancati, 2008). 
9 Both Antonio Saca and Mauricio Funes were popular radio and TV hosts who were recruited by the strongest 
parties in the country to run as presidential candidates. 
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politicians who run under the banner of established parties. “Outsiders” are politicians that have 
not had a political career and compete in presidential elections with a new party (e.g. Lugo in 
Paraguay). “Mavericks” are politicians that were political figures in already existing parties but 
that compete with a newly created party (e.g. Uribe in Colombia).10 “Amateurs” are politicians 
that are new to politics but compete in traditional parties (e.g. Mauricio Funes in El Salvador).11 
Figure 2.1 presents a typology of presidential candidates incorporating this conceptual 
refinement. 
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Figure 2.1. Typology of presidential candidates 
 
Amateurs and mavericks are presidential candidates who share one of the constitutive 
dimensions of political “outsidership” but lack the other one. Can we consider these types of 
                                                 
10 The term “maverick” was first used to refer to party renegades by Barr (2009). 
11 I borrow the term “amateur” from David Canon’s work on political amateurs in the US Congress (Canon, 1990, 
1993). 
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candidates as “diminished subtypes” (Collier & Levitsky, 1997) of the pure concept “outsiders”, 
or else should we exclude them completely from the domain captured by the concept? Theorists 
of social science concepts suggest two distinct answers to this question. Sartori (1970, 1984) 
holds a “necessary and sufficient” view of concepts, according to which all the constitutive 
dimensions are necessary and they are jointly sufficient for something to fit into the category. On 
the contrary, the “family resemblance” concept structure does not contain any necessary 
condition. A given object or phenomenon fits into a category if it is similar enough on the 
constitutive dimensions to be part of the family (Collier & Mahon, 1993). 
In this study, we define outsiders in a Sartorian fashion and we consider both constitutive 
dimensions as necessary for a candidate to be considered a political outsider. The reason for 
rejecting a radial conceptualization is mainly theoretical. In fact, Goertz (2006: 5) recommends 
the identification of “ontological attributes that play a key role in causal hypotheses, 
explanations, and mechanisms.” The main theoretical goal of this dissertation is to analyze the 
consequences for governability of the arrival to power of presidents that come from outside the 
political arena. Hence, it is important to exclude from the definition politicians who made a 
career in established parties before running for the presidency as independents (mavericks) or 
inexperienced politicians who run with established parties and benefit from the support of their 
party once they arrive to power (amateurs). Mavericks and amateurs often claim to be real 
outsiders and tend to run anti-establishment campaigns, but they still benefit from their political 
experience and partisan resources when they come to power. In that sense, they have more in 
common with insiders than with outsiders. Although analyzing the rise to power of mavericks or 
amateurs may be interesting in its own right, this dissertation will focus on outsiders who are 
both politically neophyte and run under the banner of a new party. 
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2.1.2 Indicator level: operationalization of the concept of political outsider 
The indicator level is “where the concept gets specific enough to guide the acquisition of 
empirical data” (Goertz, 2006: 62). In this section, I provide details about the empirical criteria 
that politicians need to fulfill in order to be categorized as outsiders. 
The first constitutive dimension of “outsidership” is political inexperience. Political 
experience can be acquired through different political positions or roles. The most common form 
of gaining political experience is by becoming elected to a national legislative body such as the 
lower house or the Senate. Legislators have a first-hand experience with the policy-making 
process. They also become politically socialized, as they often belong to parties that have to 
reach compromises and enter into coalitions to get some of their policies adopted. They also 
become familiarized with the “dirty” aspects of legislative politics (filibustering, pork, 
corruption) that may facilitate or stall the adoption of certain policies. Party leaders of nationally 
competitive established parties also accumulate significant political experience over the years.12 
Even when they are not members of any legislative body, party leaders gain political experience 
because they negotiate political deals with other parties and they take some of the strategic 
electoral and policy decisions of the parties they lead. Political experience can also be acquired 
through executive positions at the regional or national level. Heads of government, governors, 
mayors of major cities, and cabinet members have different responsibilities but they all have to 
interact with an array of political actors and make use of their political resources to try to obtain 
their goals and implement their desired policies. Finally, political experience can be acquired 
                                                 
12 Nationally competitive parties are parties that “have been at least competitive in national contests for executive 
office over several election cycles” (Lupu, 2011: 4). No politician that was a leader of one of these established 
parties in his previous career can be considered a real outsider (or appear as such in the eyes of the electorate). 
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through positions of prominence in public administration. High-ranked public officials (e.g. the 
head of the Central Bank or the National Audiovisual Council) work in close contact with 
political actors and try to influence policy decisions. In sum, presidential hopefuls fulfill the first 
constitutive dimension of political “outsidership” (political inexperience) if they have not 
occupied any of these four political positions before running for president. At this point, an 
important caveat is necessary. Some presidential candidates who had a very brief political 
experience before running for office will still be considered political outsiders in my study. The 
main objective of this dissertation is to assess whether presidents who are not career politicians 
have a negative impact on governability and institutional performance. It would be problematic 
to exclude some relevant cases because they had a very limited political experience before the 
campaign that brought them to power. Hence, in this dissertation, a president is considered as a 
“political outsider” when he had less than two years of political experience before reaching 
office –combining executive, legislative, party leadership, and public administration experience. 
The two-year rule is somewhat arbitrary, but reasonable. The objective is not to consider as 
“insiders” presidents who did not have a political career before coming to office but occupied a 
political position for a limited period of time immediately before the elections that took them to 
power –often as a building block to be able to run successful outsider campaigns in national 
elections–.13 
The second constitutive dimension of “outsidership” is the rise to political prominence 
outside of the national party system. There are three empirical indicators that satisfy this second 
                                                 
13 Two interesting examples are Rafael Correa in Ecuador and Marc Ravalomanana in Madagascar. Correa was an 
economist with no political experience when he briefly joined the cabinet as minister of finance in 2005. After less 
than a year in the cabinet, he broke with the government and positioned himself as one of the main contenders in the 
2006 presidential elections. Ravalomanana rose to prominence as the founder and CEO of a series of successful 
companies in Madagascar. In late 1999, he won the municipal elections and became mayor of Antananarivo as an 
independent. Less than two years after he became mayor, he won the presidential elections also as an independent. I 
consider that the political experience of these two candidates is too limited as to consider them political insiders.  
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dimension: running with a new party, running with an ad hoc electoral movement, and running 
as an independent. In this dissertation, I follow previous studies and define “new parties” as 
parties that are on the ballot for the first time in any given election (Harmel & Robertson, 1985; 
Hug, 2001). A new party is one that either results from a split from an existing party, or a party 
that is genuinely new –i.e. it emerges without any help from career politicians from existing 
parties– (Hug, 2001: 79-80; Tavits, 2006: 106). However, mergers and electoral alliances 
between already existing parties are not considered as new parties in this work even if they use a 
“party label” that is on the ballot for the first time (Hug, 2001). As indicated above, running with 
a new party is not the only way that a candidate can fit into this second constitutive dimension of 
“outsidership.” Many Latin American presidential candidates in the last twenty years have run 
with “electoral vehicles” that are empty shells whose only objective is to facilitate the election of 
certain individuals to positions of political authority at the local and national level. Levitsky and 
Cameron (2003) describe these types of electoral vehicles as “candidate-centered parties,” but 
the term “electoral movement” (Levitt, 2012) is more accurate because these movements are 
extremely personalized and they lack some of the key criteria necessary to be considered 
political parties, such as a clear program and a stable party organization (Key, 1942). In this 
dissertation, ad hoc electoral movements are defined as “personal vehicles for promoting or 
maintaining an individual candidate or leader” (Levitt, 2012: 92). Finally, some electoral systems 
allow independent candidates not affiliated with any political party or electoral movement to run 
for top executive positions. In line with my definition, politically inexperienced independent 
candidates will also be considered political outsiders. The three levels of the concept “political 
outsider” are presented graphically in Figure 2.2. 
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Figure 2.2. Constitutive dimensions and operationalization of the concept “political outsider” 
 
Following the proposed definition and operationalization, I have identified 16 cases of 
heads of government –in presidential and parliamentary systems– who arrived to power as 
“political outsiders”, considering all democratic elections in the period 1980-2010 (see Table 
2.1).14 This list of outsiders reveals that there are many more cases of outsider heads of 
government in presidential systems than in parliamentary systems. Eleven out of the sixteen 
outsider leaders emerged in presidential systems. The list also shows that outsiders have 
succeeded primarily in three regions of the world (Latin America, Eastern Europe, and Africa), 
where democracies are less consolidated and less institutionalized. The only two exceptions are 
                                                 
14 In this table, and in the remainder of this dissertation, I only include “pure outsiders”. Although interesting, the 
study of the rise of maverick and amateur candidates in national elections is beyond the scope of this study.  
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the emergence of an outsider in Venezuela in 1998 and in Italy in 1994. Chávez and Berlusconi 
emerged in comparatively more institutionalized and older democracies. 
Table 2.1. Outsider presidents and prime ministers (1980-2010) 
Country Election 
Year 
Elected President or PM Presidential 
System 
Cyprus 1988 Georgios Vasiliou YES 
Hungary 1990 József Antall NO 
Nicaragua 1990 Violeta Chamorro YES 
Peru 1990 Alberto Fujimori YES 
Estonia 1992 Mart Laar NO 
Italy 1994 Silvio Berlusconi NO 
Latvia 1995 Andris Skele NO 
Venezuela 1998 Hugo Chávez YES 
Peru 2001 Alejandro Toledo YES 
Ecuador 2002 Lucio Gutiérrez YES 
Madagascar 2002 Marc Ravalomanana YES 
Estonia 2003 Juhan Parts NO 
Benin 2006 Yayi Boni YES 
Ecuador 2006 Rafael Correa YES 
Paraguay 2008 Fernando Lugo YES 
Peru 2011 Ollanta Humala YES 
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I have also identified 34 cases of presidential candidates in Latin America who obtained 
more than 5% of the total votes running as outsiders in the period 1980-2010 (see Table 2.2).15 
This sample of cases will be used to construct the dependent and independent variables in the 
empirical chapters of the dissertation in order to analyze the causes and consequences of the 
arrival to power of outsiders. This list shows that the “outsider phenomenon” in Latin America is 
much broader than the list of elected outsiders in Table 2.1 suggests. Outsiders tend to obtain 
high scores in presidential elections across the region, which suggests that there is a deep 
dissatisfaction with the political establishment in many Latin American countries. Outsiders 
obtain especially good results in the Andean countries (Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela) 
where repeated performance failures by the governing parties have resulted in a severe crisis of 
democratic representation (Mainwaring, 2006; Mainwaring et al., 2006). Although I will focus 
on outsiders in power in this dissertation, viable outsider candidates who fall short of electoral 
victory can also have an impact on the political arena by threatening party system stability and 
by forcing established parties to address the political shockwaves of their sudden rise. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 A more exhaustive list of “non-traditional” presidential candidates in Latin America –including amateurs and 
mavericks– is available in my website: http://miguelcarreras.com/documents/outsiders_LA1980-2010.doc. 
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Table 2.2. Outsider presidential candidates in Latin America (1980-2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
COUNTRY OUTSIDERS 
Argentina 
2003: Ricardo López 
Murphy (RECREAR): 
16.35% 
Bolivia 
1989: Carlos Palenque 
(CONDEPA): 12.25% 
1993: Carlos Palenque 
(CONDEPA): 14.29% 
Max Fernández (UCS): 
13.77% 
1997: Ivo Mateo Kuljis 
(UCS): 16.11% 
2002: Evo Morales 
(MAS): 20.94% 
Felipe Quispe (MIP): 
6.09% 
Brazil 
1994: Enéas Canneiro 
(PRONA): 7.38% 
Chile 
1989: Francisco Javier 
Errázuriz (UCCP): 
15.43% 
1993: José Piñera 
Echenique (Independent): 
6.1% 
Manfred Max-Neef 
(Independent): 5.6% 
Colombia 
1990: Antonio Navarro 
Wolff (Alianza 
Democrática M-19): 
12.43% 
Ecuador 
1988: Abdala Bucaram 
(PRE): 17.61% 
Frank Vargas Pazzos 
(APRE): 12.63% 
1996: Freddy Ehlers 
(Movimiento Nuevo País): 
20.61% 
1998: Freddy Ehlers 
(Movimiento Nuevo País): 
14.75% 
2002: Lucio Gutiérrez 
(PSP): 20.32% 
2006: Rafael Correa 
(Alianza País): 22.84% 
Gilmar Gutiérrez (PSP): 
17.42% 
Nicaragua 
1990: Violeta Chamorro 
(UNO): 54.73% 
2006: Edmundo Jarquín 
Calderón (MRS): 6.3% 
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Table 2.2. (continued) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panamá 
1994: Rubén Blades 
(Movimiento Papa 
Egoró): 17.1% 
Paraguay 
1993: Guillermo 
Caballero (EN): 23.04% 
2003: Pedro Fadul 
(MPQ): 21.96% 
2008: Fernando Lugo 
(APC): 42.3% 
Lino Oviedo (UNACE): 
22.8% 
Perú 
1990: Mario Vargas Llosa 
(FREDEMO): 33% 
Alberto Fujimori (Cambio 
90): 29% 
2001: Alejandro Toledo 
(PP): 36.5% 
2006: Ollanta Humala 
(UPP): 30.06% 
Venezuela 
1993: Andrés Velásquez 
(La Causa Radical): 
21.95% 
1998: Hugo Chávez 
(MVR): 
56.20% 
Henrique Salas Römer 
(Proyecto Venezuela): 
39.97% 
2000: Francisco Arias 
Cárdenas (Independent): 
35.75% 
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2.2 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
Before providing an overview of the main theoretical contribution of the dissertation, this section 
briefly presents the research design and methodology that will be used to address these 
theoretical concerns. This study asks two main research questions. The first part of the 
dissertation analyzes the different contextual and individual level factors that are associated with 
the rise of outsiders in democratic polities. The second part of the dissertation seeks to explain 
the consequences of the rise of outsiders on a series of institutional and political outcomes, in 
particular the level of executive-legislative confrontation and the composition of cabinets. 
The goal of the first part of the dissertation is to understand and explain why outsiders 
obtain high voting support and often get elected in democratic elections. Chapters 3-5 seek to test 
theoretical hypotheses regarding the rise of outsiders through the quantitative analysis of 
contextual and individual-level data. Hence, in this part of the dissertation I rely almost 
exclusively on a series of quantitative cross-national analyses. The statistical analyses in 
Chapters 3 and 4 focus on institutional and contextual variables and attempt to identify cross-
national patterns in the success of outsider candidates in national elections. The statistical 
analysis in Chapter 5 looks at individual-level data corresponding to election-years in which 
outsiders were elected presidents in a Latin American country. The goal here is to identify 
statistically significant differences between respondents who support outsiders and respondents 
who support traditional politicians. These differences in turn can help us to understand and 
explain the key motivations that push individuals to vote for outsiders. 
In the second part of the dissertation, I study the consequences of outsiders for 
governability and institutional performance. In this section of the dissertation, I use a mixed-
method approach combining quantitative statistical analyses and qualitative information obtained 
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in the fieldwork I conducted in Peru between October and December of 2012. I follow the 
mixed-method strategy proposed by Lieberman (2005). This nested analysis strategy proposes to 
start with the quantitative models, and then move on to the case studies. Of course, the 
quantitative models have to be based on pre-existing knowledge of at least some cases. 
Alternatively, they can be based on previous findings solidly established in the literature. The 
quantitative models test whether the hypothesized relationship between a dependent and an 
independent variable exists. The results of the quantitative analysis dictate the strategy that 
scholars should follow in their case studies. If the large-N analysis produces robust and 
satisfactory results, the case study (or case studies) should be used to test the accuracy of the 
theoretical model. The qualitative information is useful to make sure that the statistical results 
are not spurious, and that the statistical findings are in fact due to the causal mechanisms 
advanced by the researcher. If the case study suggests that the theoretical model is correct, the 
analysis ends at this point. If the case study detects a theoretical flaw, the scholar has to revise 
the model. If the large-N analysis produces unsatisfactory results, the case study is used to do 
“model-building” and to try to establish a new and coherent theoretical framework. This 
qualitative work may lead to the abandonment or to the revision of the previous theoretical 
expectations.  
I follow the research strategy proposed by Lieberman (2005) in Chapter 6 of this 
dissertation which analyses the impact of outsiders on executive-legislative relations. Using a 
database on political processes, institutional conflicts, and scandals in Latin America (Pérez-
Liñán et al., 2008), the statistical analyses I conduct suggest that the likelihood of executive-
legislative conflict increases when the presidency is held by an outsider. This quantitative finding 
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is then corroborated with supporting qualitative evidence from the in-depth study of the case of 
Fujimori in Peru. 
The case study analyzes the governing style of Fujimori but also of the two non-outsider 
presidents who preceded him (Belaúnde and García). In fact, it is impossible to explain the 
consequences of the access to power of outsider presidents if these political amateurs are not 
systematically compared with more experienced party politicians. In order to assess whether 
outsiders are really a peril of presidentialism, I will compare political and institutional outcomes 
when an outsider was in power (Fujimori) and when traditional politicians were in power in 
these countries (Belaúnde and García). The cross-time research strategy is useful because it holds 
constant a series of cultural, social, and institutional factors that are difficult to control for in a 
small-N cross-national research design (Peters, 1998: 23-25). 
I will systematically compare the Belaúnde (1980-1985) and García (1985-1990) 
administrations with the Fujimori administration (1990-2000) in Peru. I selected the “negative” 
cases taking into consideration the “possibility principle” (Mahoney & Goertz, 2004). According 
to this principle, only negative cases where the outcome of interest is possible are relevant and 
should be selected in small-N analyses. In this case, the Belaúnde and the García administrations 
are relevant because these two presidents –like Fujimori– governed during periods of severe 
economic and sociopolitical crisis. These crisis conditions could have produced conflicts 
between the executive and the legislature, regarding the policies that needed to be adopted to 
tackle the crisis. Moreover, the economic meltdown and the political violence16 in both countries 
could have led Belaúnde and García to govern in a more assertive way, and to select more 
                                                 
16  The terrorist activity of the Shining Path guerrilla started during the administration of Belaúnde. 
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politically inexperienced ministers that could have been more easily controlled by the executive 
head. In other words, I selected two negative cases where the outcome of interest was possible. 
I selected the case of Fujimori for the in-depth qualitative analysis because he can be 
considered an extreme case, in the sense that the he was probably the most outsider of all the 
independent candidates who were elected in Latin America in the last 25 years. As already 
pointed out in the introduction, Fujimori was a complete unknown for the general public a few 
months before the elections that took him to power. He was a university rector with no 
experience whatsoever in the political arena. The electoral movement Fujimori created (Cambio 
90) was a few months old when this outsider won the presidential elections in 1990. He was not 
formally allied with any established political party during the campaign. Hence, Fujimori had no 
staff ready to occupy the different positions in the administration. By selecting an extreme case, I 
follow the recommendation made by Seawright and Gerring (2008) in a paper in which they 
discuss case selection. These scholars argue that in exploratory studies working on new topics it 
is beneficial to pick extreme cases because it is precisely in these extreme cases where the causal 
mechanisms are the most clear. If there is an effect of outsidership on democratic governability, 
it should be clear when analyzing the case of Fujimori. It is of course important not to take these 
cases as fully representative of the whole population. The arguments and causal mechanisms that 
emerge from these extreme cases then have to be tested with data from the other cases. This is 
the role of the large-N in my study. In the quantitative analyses in Chapter 6, the sample includes 
all Latin American outsiders in the period 1980-2007. 
Finally, Chapter 7 uses descriptive statistics and qualitative information collected in my 
fieldwork in Peru to study the impact of outsider presidents on the composition and functioning 
of cabinets. As in the previous chapter, I compare the administration of Fujimori to the 
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administrations of two traditional party politicians who preceded him as presidents (Belaúnde 
and García). Although ideally a mixed method approach similar to the one used in Chapter 6 
would provide a better test of my hypotheses, the cross-national biographical data of ministers in 
Latin America is extremely difficult to obtain. Hence, I decided to focus on the case of Peru 
(country for which I gathered all the relevant biographical data) to test these theoretical claims 
until the data for cabinet composition in the other countries becomes available.17 
More details on the methodology and the research design are provided in each specific chapter 
but Table 2.3 provides an overview of the data, research design, and methods used in the 
empirical analyses of the different chapters. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17 I am currently part of a multinational team of researchers who is gathering this information for all Latin American 
countries, but this information will be available only in a few years. 
 43 
 
 
Table 2.3. Data and methods used in the dissertation 
PART ONE. Causes of outsider rise 
Chapter Research question Sample Data Estimator 
Chapter 3 Are outsiders more likely to 
come to power through 
elections in presidential 
systems? 
All democratic 
countries in the world 
in the period 1945-
2010 
Samuels-Shugart 
(2010) database 
on political 
leaders 
(completed and 
modified by me) 
Random effects 
logisitic 
regressions 
Chapter 4 What are the institutional 
design characteristics that 
increase the likelihood of 
outsider success in Latin 
American presidential 
elections? 
All Latin American 
presidential elections 
in the period 1980-
2010 
Original database 
on political 
outsiders in 
presidential 
elections in Latin 
America 
Fixed Effects 
Variance 
Decomposition 
Model 
Chapter 5 What are the individual-level 
determinants of support for 
outsiders in Latin America? 
Eight nationally 
representative 
surveys conducted 
just before/just after 
the election of an 
outsider 
Latinobarómetro 
and LAPOP 
surveys 
Logistic and 
multinomial 
regressions 
 
PART TWO. Consequences of outsider rise 
Chapter Quantitative analysis 
to be conducted 
Sample Data Estimator 
Chapter 6 Are executive-legislative 
relations more conflict-prone 
when the president is an 
outsider? 
Quantitative 
Analysis: 
All Latin American 
countries in the 
period 1980-2007 
Main source of 
data: Pérez-
Liñán et al. 
database on 
“Latin American 
Political 
Processes” 
Random effects 
logisitic regression 
Qualitative Analysis: 
In-depth analysis of 
the Fujimori 
administration  
*Archival 
research 
* Interviews 
* Secondary 
literature 
 
Chapter 7 Do outsider presidents form 
more inexperienced cabinets? 
Does the cabinet function 
differently when the president 
is an outsider? 
Qualitative Analysis: 
In-depth analysis of 
the Fujimori 
administration  
*Archival 
research 
* Interviews 
* Secondary 
literature 
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2.3 THEORIZING “OUTSIDERSHIP” 
Modern representative democracies institute an effective system of “checks and balances.” This 
system implies that the executive power is not only accountable to the people –vertical 
accountability– but also to a series of institutions that oversee and control its actions –horizontal 
accountability– (Kenney, 2003; O'Donnell, 1998). One of the main threats to the quality of 
democracy in Latin America is that the executive is prone in many countries of the region to 
overstep its authority –as defined by the constitution– and bypass other institutions, such as the 
judiciary or the legislature, to attain its goals (O'Donnell, 1994). One of the main arguments of 
this dissertation is that the risk of executive excesses increases when the president is a political 
outsider. This section elaborates on how outsider presidents pose a more severe threat to 
democratic governability and institutional performance than traditional politicians. 
2.3.1 The “perils of presidentialism” literature 
The first wave of studies of political institutions after the beginning of the Third Wave of 
democratization was marked by the comparison between presidential and parliamentary systems 
by many prominent scholars. The democratization of many countries in different regions in a 
short timespan generated a series of timely research questions regarding the likelihood of 
efficient governability and democratic stability (and consolidation) under presidentialism and 
under parliamentarism. Many articles and books were published comparing these two systems. 
Titles such as Parliamentary Versus Presidential Government (Lijphart, 1992b) are 
characteristic of that period in the early 1990s. 
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The prevailing view of this first wave of research was that presidential regimes 
threatened democratic quality and consolidation. In particular, executive-legislative relations in 
presidential systems were described as prone to conflict. The separation of power was presented 
as a liability of presidential systems that threatened the consolidation of democratic regimes in 
Latin America. Executive-legislative relations were presented as more conflictive in presidential 
systems for four main reasons. First, presidential systems permit a dual democratic legitimacy. 
Both the president and the legislators in congress are popularly elected. According to this 
perspective, a disagreement between the executive and the legislative branch almost inevitably 
leads to a situation of deadlock. In the words of Lijphart (1992a: 15), the problem of executive-
legislative conflict “is the inevitable result of the co-existence of the two independent organs that 
presidential government creates and that may be in disagreement”. Second, the problem of 
executive-legislative conflict is aggravated by the temporal rigidity of presidential systems. The 
fixed term in office of the president and the fixed duration of the legislative period do not leave 
room for the readjustments that political events may require. In a parliamentary system, the 
prime minister can be changed at any time without creating a regime crisis. In presidential 
systems, the fixed term in office of the president increases the likelihood of deadlock, 
governability crises, and regime breakdown (Linz, 1990, 1994). Third, presidential elections 
generate a “zero-sum” or a “winner-takes-all” result. Whereas in parliamentary systems many 
parties may form broad coalitions after the election, presidential elections lead to outcomes in 
which one party wins and everybody else loses. The concentration of power in the executive 
gives the president little incentive to form coalitions (Lijphart, 1992a: 19). Finally, presidential 
systems produce a more conflict-prone political style in the part of the executive. In the words of 
Linz (1994: 19), “the feeling of having independent power, a mandate from the people (…) is 
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likely to give a president a sense of power and mission that might be out of proportion to the 
limited plurality that elected him”. This in turn may produce tensions between the presidents and 
the legislators of non-incumbent parties (see also O'Donnell, 1994). 
Other studies suggested that parliamentary democracies were more stable than 
presidential democracies. For instance, Stepan and Skach (1993, 1994) compared the democratic 
stability of countries that gained independence between 1945 and 1979, and found that countries 
that started independence as parliamentary systems were more likely to become or remain 
democracies than countries that started as presidential systems. 
The “perils of presidentialism” literature was rapidly discredited because many of its 
main arguments did not resist empirical assessments. A series of studies cast serious doubts on 
the arguments and findings of the “perils of presidentialism” literature in the early 1990s. 
Shugart and Mainwaring (1997) argue that the correlation between parliamentarism and 
democracy presented in the work of Stepan and Skach (1994) is doubtful because they do not 
control for key factors, such as income level, population size, and British colonial heritage. They 
show that presidentialism is more likely to be adopted in Africa and Latin America, regions that 
tend to be unstable for reasons that may be largely unrelated to the form of government. 
Although the evidence they present is not conclusive either, their data suggests that the link 
between regime type and democracy has been greatly exaggerated. However, the link still exists 
according to a more recent statistical analysis conducted by Cheibub (2002). Although Cheibub 
finds that presidential regimes are more unstable than parliamentary regimes, he also 
demonstrates that the causal mechanism put forward by Linz (1990) and Lijphart (1992a) is not 
valid. Using data from all presidential democracies that existed between 1946 and 1996, Cheibub 
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shows that minority governments and executive-legislative deadlock do not affect the survival of 
presidential democracies.  
Moreover, the argument that presidentialism is a system in which the winner takes all 
was also proven wrong. A large number of studies have shown that presidents tend to form 
multiparty coalitions when they are in a minority situation. Presidents often recruit cabinet 
members from the most represented parties in the legislature in exchange for the support of these 
parties for the president’s program in the legislature (Altman, 2000; Amorim Neto, 2006; 
Chasquetti, 2001; Deheza, 1998; Zelaznik, 2001). Actually, Cheibub et al. (2004) show that 
coalition formation is almost as likely in presidential systems as in parliamentary systems. 
2.3.2 The rise of outsiders: a neglected peril of presidentialism? 
The critics of presidentialism also pointed out the potential problems associated with the 
rise of outsiders. Linz (1994: 26) argues that “the personalized character of a presidential 
election makes possible, especially in the absence of a strong party system, the access to power 
of ‘outsiders.’” Independent candidates running without party support –or even against parties– 
may take advantage of the disenchantment of the voters with traditional parties. In presidential 
elections, voters consider the personal qualifications and positions of the candidates, in addition 
to the parties they represent. When traditional politicians are discredited, voters may evaluate 
more favorably the qualifications of independent candidates. Since voters can now be reached 
directly during electoral campaigns through mass media, the mediation of parties is no longer 
essential for presidential candidates. 
The rise of outsiders is considered as a threat by the critics of presidentialism for several 
reasons. First, independent candidates come to power with very limited administrative 
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experience. They often do not have any previous experience as ministers or state governors. 
They also lack a pool of persons with experience in office that can compensate for their 
amateurship (Linz, 1994; Suárez, 1982). Second, the rise of outsiders increases the risk of the 
personalization of power. Since independent candidates can appeal directly to the citizenry and 
govern through a small political clientele composed of cronies and friends, they may destabilize 
political institutions and threaten fragile party systems (Suárez, 1982). Third, outsiders come to 
power with weak support in congress, which increases the risk of executive-legislative conflict 
inherent in presidential systems (Kenney, 2004; Linz, 1994). None of these arguments has 
received empirical demonstration. This is one of the tasks I will undertake in my dissertation. 
The main contention of this dissertation is that outsider presidents pose a greater threat to 
governability and institutional performance than presidents who are career politicians and belong 
to established parties. Outsider presidents in Latin America have shown a greater tendency to 
overstep their authority and bypass other political and non-political institutions. They are less 
likely to reach compromises and form policy alliances with other parties. Chapters 6 and 7 of this 
dissertation will empirically demonstrate some of the pernicious effects of outsider presidents for 
democratic stability and institutional performance. Before getting into the specifics, however, the 
remaining of this chapter outlines a theoretical framework that helps explain the greater 
governability problems when outsiders are in power. I argue that there are three main factors that 
contribute to low institutional performance when political outsiders reach the presidency: 1) the 
individual characteristics of the outsider, 2) the socio-political context faced by outsiders, and 3) 
the strategic constraints faced by outsiders when they come to power. 
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2.3.2.1 Individual characteristics of outsiders and lack of democratic socialization 
 
The first factor that makes outsider presidents more likely to behave undemocratically 
and to bypass other political institutions is the individual characteristics of these amateur 
politicians and their lack of democratic socialization within political parties. As made clear in the 
definition, political outsiders have two problematic characteristics that career politicians don’t 
have: they are politically inexperienced and they lack links with established parties. The 
combination of these two characteristics significantly increases the risk of undemocratic 
behavior on the part of the administration. In fact, political parties play a key role in the 
recruitment and socialization of democratic political elites. In the words of Levitsky and 
Cameron (2003: 4), political parties “provide the foundation for a democratic political class.” 
Even if they have experienced serious political conflicts during their career, experienced party 
politicians tend to be imbued with a democratic culture. They are aware that political decisions 
often involve negotiations and compromises, both within and between parties. This give-and-
take nature of political decision-making is often negatively perceived by pundits and public 
opinion alike, but it is essential for the good functioning of a democratic polity. Party politicians 
become socialized with a series of implicit rules that govern the democratic game. They accept 
that elections can be lost and that policy proposals can be defeated if the majority so decides. In 
fact, losers’ consent is often mentioned as one of the key dimensions of democracy (Anderson, 
Blais, Bowler, Donovan, & Listhaug, 2005). 
 Outsiders are political amateurs who lack this democratic socialization within established 
political parties and, in some cases, do not have a commitment to democratic institutions. 
Levitsky and Cameron (2003: 5) point out that outsiders are less likely than insiders “to have 
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experience with (and be oriented toward) democratic practices such as negotiation, compromise, 
and coalition building.” Rospigliosi similarly argues that negotiating and building consensus in 
the congress requires “lots of skills and experience” which outsiders do not have.18 Outsiders do 
not necessarily see this as a problem. In fact, political outsiders tend to have a technocratic 
approach to politics which emphasizes fast results, and derides the long and painstaking 
negotiations in congress as a “waste of time.” 
 The classic study of American presidencies conducted by Neustadt (1990 [1960]) put 
strong emphasis on the political experience and the previous socialization of American 
presidents in explaining how successful they are in office. The comparison between Roosevelt 
and Eisenhower is revealing. Whereas Eisenhower was surprised that orders did not carry 
themselves out and that he needed to constantly negotiate compromises, Roosevelt was perfectly 
aware of the political game in Washington and was much more skillful at navigating the political 
arena. The relative insensitivity of Eisenhower to political affairs “can be explained, at least in 
part, by Eisenhower’s background. He lacked Roosevelt’s experience. Instead he had behind him 
the irrelevancy of an army record compiled for the most part outside Washington” (Neustadt, 
1990 [1960]: 138). A key argument made by Neustadt is that experienced presidents are more 
successful in office because they understand better and engage more productively with other 
political actors in the administration and in the opposition. This is also a key argument in this 
dissertation.19 
                                                 
18  Caretas, May 7, 1990 
19 This argument is not only valid for presidential regimes. In an interesting study of the regeneration of Communist 
parties in East Central Europe after the fall of Communist regimes, Grzymala-Busse (2002) shows that experienced 
political leaders are more successful in building inclusive party coalitions and in mobilizing actors within and 
outside their parties. 
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 The outsiders’ lack of democratic socialization within political parties is normally not 
compensated with a different sort of socialization during their previous professional career 
inviting to deliberation and consensus building once they come to power. Outsiders tend to come 
from very hierarchical and vertical organizations in which the common practice is to respect the 
decisions taken by those who occupy positions of authority. Their socialization does not prepare 
them to behave skillfully in the political arena, in which decisions often have to be negotiated 
and important concessions have to be made. Table 2.4 shows the professional profile of each of 
the outsider presidents in Latin America, showing both their profession and the top position 
reached in their profession. 
 
Table 2.4. Professional profile of outsider presidents in Latin America (1980-2012) 
Country Election 
Year 
Elected President Profession Top position 
reached 
Nicaragua 1990 Violeta Chamorro Publisher Newspaper director 
Peru 1990 Alberto Fujimori Academic University rector 
Venezuela 1998 Hugo Chávez Military Senior officer 
Ecuador 2002 Lucio Gutiérrez Military Senior officer 
Ecuador 2006 Rafael Correa Academic University professor 
Paraguay 2008 Fernando Lugo Catholic Church Priest Bishop 
Peru 2011 Ollanta Humala Military Senior officer 
 
 
Three outsiders (Chávez, Gutiérrez, and Humala) were military leaders of some stature. 
The military is probably one of the least democratic institutions if we consider the way decisions 
are taken. From an early age, military men are used to obeying orders and respecting decisions 
taken by those in a position of authority without consulting them. This professional culture 
undoubtedly influences the way outsiders with a military background govern.20 The other 
                                                 
20 According to Henry Pease García, Peruvian president Humala has a top-down approach to government decision-
making which is explained by his military background (interview, October 2012).  
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outsiders also come from professions in which decisions are normally taken by those at the top 
rather than negotiated. Lugo was a bishop in the Catholic Church, which is a very hierarchical 
institution. Fujimori was rector in the National Agrarian University in the five years prior to 
running as a presidential candidate. According to some biographical studies of Fujimori, 
decisions in this institution were taken unilaterally by the university authorities (Jochamowitz, 
1993). Thereby, this short experience of Fujimori as the head of a public university did not allow 
him to develop the skills necessary to negotiate with other political actors and build consensus.   
In sum, the individual characteristics of outsiders (political inexperience and lack of ties with 
established parties) make them more likely to behave undemocratically and to bypass other 
institutions when they come to power. This would be true even under “normal” political 
circumstances. However, as I discuss in the next section, the rise of outsiders tends to take place 
under exceptional circumstances (economic hardships and sociopolitical crisis). 
2.3.2.2 Socioeconomic and political context 
 
The context in which outsiders come to power is also an important factor which 
influences their political style. The election of outsiders to the presidency often takes place in 
moments of economic crisis in which citizens’ disenchantment with the political system in 
general (and political parties in particular) is at its peak. 
 The first example of outsider success in Latin America after the beginning of the Third 
Wave of democratization is Alberto Fujimori. The Peruvian president came to power in the midst 
of the most severe economic and sociopolitical crisis of Peru’s contemporary history. On the 
economic front, the two democratic administrations of the 1980s (Belaúnde between 1980 and 
1985 –Acción Popular– and García between 1985 and 1990 –APRA–) were unsuccessful at 
 53 
redressing a failing economy. The real GDP per capita in the 1980s in Peru dropped 28% in 10 
years from 5314 dollars in 1980 to 3839 dollars in 1990.21 The heterodox policies attempted by 
García during the late 1980s had catastrophic consequences, as they resulted in hyperinflation 
and a major increase in the foreign debt (Kenney, 2004: chapter 2; Murakami, 2012: 159-178). In 
addition to these economic problems, Peru suffered the rise of a violent insurgency (the Shining 
Path), and governmental efforts to defeat it were unsuccessful. The Shining Path was the 
deadliest insurgency in Peru’s modern history. Between 1980 and 1992, this terrorist group 
killed more than twenty-five thousand people (Gorriti, 1990; Kenney, 2004: 24). The failure of 
the Belaúnde and the García administrations to address this internal conflict undermined support 
for these presidents and the political system as a whole. The economic and security crises also 
had consequences at the societal level. The economic problems led to the destruction of 
businesses and jobs, and weakened organized labor. At the same time, Peruvians migrated 
massively from the sierra to Lima seeking economic opportunities and trying to escape the 
internal violence. This led to a rapid increase of the informal sector, which in turn led to the 
erosion of traditional party-society linkages (Cameron, 1997: 40-42). In sum, in the early 1990s 
Peru was facing a multifaceted crisis which was partly the result of the failure of established 
parties to govern effectively after the democratic transition. The disenchantment of Peruvian 
citizens with the political class paved the way for the election of a complete neophyte. 
 The context that led to the election of outsiders in other countries in the 1990s and 2000s 
may not have been as catastrophic, but in all cases the rise of outsiders was one of the 
consequences of a severe crisis of representation combined with serious economic problems. 
There are three important characteristics that describe the context in which outsiders come to 
                                                 
21 Calculated using the Penn World Tables. 
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power: 1) failed economic performance of governments led by established parties, 2) crisis of 
political representation, and 3) partisan dealignment. Concerning economic performance, both 
Ecuador and Venezuela suffered a long period of economic decline preceding the arrival to 
power of outsiders. While most Latin American countries achieved some per capita growth 
between 1990 and 2000, real per capita growth fell in Ecuador and Venezuela during this period 
–8% in Ecuador and 17% in Venezuela– (Philip & Panizza, 2011: 5). The neoliberal policies that 
were implemented in these countries to try to address these economic problems resulted in an 
increase in income inequality (Bulmer-Thomas, 1996). Neoliberal policies also contributed to a 
crisis in political representation. Roberts (2002b) argues that the deepening of social inequalities 
in Latin America during the neoliberal period has gone hand in hand with an erosion of class 
cleavages in the political arena. According to this important contribution, the transition from ISI 
(Import Substitution Industrialization) to neoliberalism led to a decline of mass-based, labor-
mobilizing parties, thereby producing a crisis of political representation in countries like 
Ecuador, Venezuela, and Paraguay. The crisis of political representation was accentuated by the 
broad consensus in all these countries on the desirability of neoliberal market reforms. Populist 
and left-leaning parties that traditionally supported more heterodox economic policies accepted 
the need for neoliberal reforms, thereby leaving an important part of the electorate (e.g. the 
working classes and the informal sectors in urban areas) unrepresented. Economic failures and 
unrepresentative governments ultimately led to a rapid decline in partisan attachments that paved 
the way for ambitious political outsiders.22 Support for political parties was extremely low in 
Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela in the years preceding the arrival to power of outsiders 
as can be observed in Table 2.5. 
                                                 
22 For a good analysis of partisan dealignment in Venezuela before the election of Chávez in 1998 see Morgan 
(2007). 
 55 
Table 2.5. Percentage of support for political parties before the election of outsiders 
Country Year Outsider elected 
Trust in political 
parties (%) 
Source 
Ecuador 2002 Lucio Gutiérrez 7.02 Latinobarómetro 
Ecuador 2006 Rafael Correa 8.68 Latinobarómetro 
Paraguay 2010 Fernando Lugo 17.07 LAPOP 
Peru 2011 Ollanta Humala 13.71 LAPOP 
Venezuela 1998 Hugo Chávez 15.50 Latinobarómetro 
Note: I consider as trustful individuals those who express “a lot” or “some” trust in political parties. 
This partisan dealignment was partly due to the failures of the governments in their attempts to 
redress the economy, but were also associated with the rampant corruption and citizens’ 
perceptions that governments were out of touch (Hagopian, 2005; Hawkins, 2010). In sum, 
political outsiders tend to come to power under difficult economic circumstances, and at a time 
in which the political class is extremely discredited and the party system is on the verge of 
collapse.  
The empirical analysis I conduct in Chapters 3-5 of this dissertation provides strong 
support for these arguments. The aggregate analyses show that outsiders tend to be more 
successful during economic crises, when growth is low (or negative) and inflation is high –this 
latter variable appears to be especially significant in the Latin American context–. The individual 
level models show that support for outsiders is high among dealigned and disenchanted voters. 
The survey data also suggests that voters dissatisfied with the convergence of all established 
parties on neoliberal economic policies were more likely to support outsiders in presidential 
elections. 
 This context of deep economic and sociopolitical crisis, as well as the disenchantment of 
the population with the political class, represents a window of opportunity for outsiders to 
commit excesses against discredited political institutions. Directly confronting the political class 
and bypassing other institutions –such as Congress, the judiciary, and political parties– may be a 
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smart strategic choice for outsider presidents, as the population is likely to turn against the 
discredited institutions and in favor of the presidents. The Fujimori example is again illustrative. 
During the first two years of the Fujimori administration (1990-1992), there was a deliberate 
campaign from the president to confront parties and politicians. Fujimori repeatedly pointed out 
that corrupt and self-serving politicians were responsible for everything that was going wrong in 
Peru. The Peruvian president channeled all the dissatisfaction of the citizenry in the direction of 
the political system and the traditional political class.23 As a result, Fujimori´s self coup in April 
1992 which dissolved Congress received massive public support (Kenney, 2004: 227). 
According to McClintock (1994: 24), the loss of legitimacy of democratic political institutions 
“enabled Fujimori to fulfill his authoritarian proclivities without fear of popular upheaval.” The 
outsiders that came to power after Fujimori learnt from the Peruvian experience in the 1990s. For 
instance, Chávez in Venezuela and Correa in Ecuador knew that political parties were very 
discredited institutions. They were perfectly aware that they could benefit politically from a 
direct confrontation with parties and other institutions, such as Congress and the judicial 
branch.24 This political calculus related to the context in which they come to power partly 
explains the anti-democratic excesses of the Chávez and Correa administrations (Brewer-Carías, 
2010; Corrales & Penfold, 2011; Philip & Panizza, 2011). 
 In order to understand popular support for undemocratic measures, it is important to take 
the context of economic crisis and sociopolitical debacle into account. Using insights from 
prospect theory, Kurt Weyland demonstrated that acceptance of painful market reforms (“the 
bitter pill”) was more likely in the domain of losses –i.e. in the midst of a deep economic crisis–. 
In other words, a risky move –even if painful in the short term– was accepted to overcome 
                                                 
23 Interview with Henry Pease García, Lima, October 2012 
24 Interview with Eduardo Dargent, Lima, October 2012 
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economic collapse and hyperinflation (Weyland, 1996, 1998a, 1998b). The same logic applies in 
the political arena. Given how discredited political institutions are when outsiders come to 
power, authoritarian excesses may be accepted as an unpleasant but necessary fix to a corrupt 
and inefficient political system. For instance, a poll in the immediate aftermath of the self-coup 
in Perú revealed that 33 percent of the population took the position that it was objectionable but 
necessary (Kenney, 2004: 227).25 
 In sum, a very unstable context of economic collapse and sociopolitical crisis provides a 
window of opportunity for outsiders to commit excesses and bypass other political institutions. 
However, the context in which they come to power is not the only element that affects the 
strategic calculations of political outsiders. A series of institutional factors affect the strategic 
constraints faced by outsiders, making them more prone to commit undemocratic excesses. 
2.3.2.3 Institutional factors and strategic constraints 
 
The strategic constraints faced by outsider presidents once they arrive to power differ 
significantly from the ones party politicians face. This difference also helps explaining why 
outsiders are more prone to commit excesses against other institutions and to threaten democratic 
governability. Politicians are self-centered individuals who pursue a series of goals, including 
vote-seeking, office-seeking, and policy-seeking (Strom, 1990). Politicians want to be elected (or 
re-elected) and they also want to achieve policy results when they are in office. Once they reach 
                                                 
25 Of course not all economic and political crises lead to outsiders. For instance, in spite of severe sociopolitical 
turmoil and economic collapse, no outsider was elected in Argentina in the 2002 presidential election. The empirical 
analysis in chapters 3-5 suggests that a context of crisis is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the rise of 
outsiders. In particular, a series of institutional factors are key to explain when crises lead to the emergence of an 
outsider candidate. 
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a position of authority, politicians normally aspire to deliver policy results that facilitate their re-
election or a good result for the party they represent in future elections. 
When they become presidents, political leaders may become very frustrated by the long 
and difficult negotiations that are required in a democratic polity, especially if the party of the 
president does not have a majority in Congress. Presidents often discover when they are in power 
that implementing the policies they advocated during the campaign is harder than they expected. 
Although this may be frustrating for the incumbent, deliberation and horizontal accountability 
are part of the democratic policy-making process. When the president faces a situation of 
gridlock, he may be tempted to simply overstep his constitutional authority and bypass other 
institutions. In fact, the abuse of power by the president is one of the main threats to democratic 
quality in Latin America (O'Donnell, 1994). However, the organizational and institutional factors 
that constrain the behavior of politicians differ, depending on whether the president is an outsider 
or a career politician. 
Party politicians are members of an organization –i.e. the political party– that constrain 
their ability to take controversial or undemocratic decisions. Established parties are concerned 
about the shadow of the future. A clear abuse of power (i.e. an attempt to illegally dissolve 
Congress) may negatively affect the reputation of the party for a long time, and may be harshly 
sanctioned by voters. Moreover, the other established parties may prefer not to ally in the future 
with a party that takes advantage of its power to attempt to notoriously overstep its authority and 
bypass other institutions. For all these reasons, it may be a bad strategy for an established party 
to make an undemocratic move even when it faces a situation of gridlock. Hence, the actions of 
party politicians in power are first held in check by the party they represent. Levitsky and 
Cameron (2003: 3) summarize this nicely: “Because they exist beyond a single election and must 
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compete on a national scale, parties develop longer-term priorities and broader goals than 
individual politicians do. To the extent that parties discipline politicians, then, they can reshape 
politicians' incentives in ways that induce them to act in a more farsighted and collective 
manner.” 
 The calculus for an outsider president is completely different. If they are not able to 
govern effectively the first time they are in office, there may be no political future at all. Since 
the parties through which outsiders arrive to power are often nothing more than empty shells, 
these parties have much less to lose when the president attempts authoritarian moves. Political 
outsiders in office are more likely to take risks because their political future is inextricably linked 
to the success they have (or appear to have) in office. When outsiders face obstacles in other 
political institutions, such as a situation in which they lack support in Congress, they are then 
more prone than non-outsiders to bypass these institutions and commit undemocratic excesses. 
 These strategic considerations are made more acute by the minority situation in which 
most outsiders find themselves.  A series of studies show that presidents with very low support in 
the legislature are more likely to have conflictive relations with other political institutions 
(Colomer & Negretto, 2005; Negretto, 2006). As will be detailed in Chapter 6, outsider 
presidents have considerably smaller legislative contingents than insider presidents. Some 
outsider parties are little more than electoral vehicles for the presidential campaign of an 
independent candidate. 
 In sum, outsiders have a different strategic calculus than career politicians when they 
come to power, and they are more likely to commit undemocratic excesses and to bypass other 
institutions when they face a gridlock situation. They are also more likely to get into gridlock 
situations in the first place which reinforces these anti-democratic tendencies. 
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2.4 SUMMARY 
In this chapter, I have shown the basic theoretical intuitions that guide this work. A series of 
individual, contextual, and strategic factors appear to create an “explosive cocktail” that makes 
anti-democratic actions much more likely when the president is an outsider. First, outsiders come 
to power during exceptional circumstances of severe economic decline and sociopolitical crisis, 
when citizens’ disenchantment with political institutions is at its peak. This context provides a 
“window of opportunity” for outsiders to bypass other institutions without paying a political or 
electoral cost –and sometimes even benefitting from the authoritarian moves–.  Second, the 
personal characteristics of the outsiders (political inexperience and lack of ties with political 
parties) deprive them of the skills and the resources necessary to govern democratically in a 
context of crisis when urgent measures are needed. Finally, outsiders face a strategic 
predicament that also pushes them to commit excesses. In fact, the political career of outsiders 
may come to a premature end if they are not able to provide quick policy results when they are in 
office. Moreover, outsiders are not disciplined by established political parties concerned about 
the “shadow of the future.” 
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3.0  OUTSIDERS: A PERIL OF PRESIDENTIALISM? 
Why do outsiders rise to political prominence? This question can be tackled from many different 
perspectives. In this study, I start by focusing on macro-institutional factors (presidentialism vs, 
parliamentarism) and then move on to micro-institutional factors (institutional design 
characteristics within presidentialism) and individual-level explanations. In line with the main 
theoretical concerns advanced in Chapter 2, this chapter assesses whether outsiders are really a 
“peril of presidentialism” as the conventional wisdom holds.26  
In other words, I analyze one of the major institutional factors that may have an impact 
on the rise of outsiders in democratic countries, i.e. the basic distinction between presidential and 
parliamentary democracies. Some early studies suggested that the rise of outsiders was a “peril 
of presidentialism” (Linz, 1994; Suárez, 1982) but this claim was never substantiated 
empirically. Here, I first present the different facets of the conventional wisdom explaining why 
the arrival to power of outsiders is more likely to occur in presidential systems than in 
parliamentary systems. Then, I test this argument using a database including biographical 
information on all the heads of government that arrived to power following parliamentary and 
presidential elections in all democratic countries in the period 1945-2010. Surprisingly, however, 
the results cast doubts on the conventional wisdom. When other important economic and 
                                                 
26 Other chapters of the dissertation (especially Chapters 6 and 7) focus on the related question of whether outsiders 
create a peril for presidentialism, by increasing the likelihood of executive abuses and governability problems. 
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political factors are controlled for, the political system is not a good predictor of outsider 
success. 
3.1 THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
In the wake of the euphoria generated by the Third Wave of democratization during the 1980s, a 
group of scholars studying Latin America were more pessimistic about the prospects for 
democratic consolidation of the countries in the region. These scholars argued that there were a 
series of “perils of presidentialism” that created obstacles for the healthy functioning of 
democratic regimes in Latin America (see Chapter 2). 
One of the purported perils of presidentialism according to this literature is the election of 
outsider presidents (Linz, 1994; Suárez, 1982; Valenzuela, 2004). This issue has been neglected 
until recently, and the main empirical implication –i.e. outsiders are more likely to come to 
power in presidential systems– remains untested to this day. 
This chapter first advances a series of theoretical arguments that led prominent scholars 
to expect that the rise of outsiders is more likely in presidential regimes than in parliamentary 
systems. In fact, they had good reasons to believe presidential systems are associated with the 
two constitutive dimensions of “outsidership”: political inexperience and rise to political 
prominence through a new party. 
 
 
 
 
 63 
3.1.1 Presidentialism and political inexperience 
The nature of presidential elections leads to a more personalized link between voters and 
candidates, which may facilitate the rise of political outsiders. According to Kitschelt (2000), 
there are three types of linkages between citizens and politicians in democracies. The first type is 
the programmatic linkage, which means that politicians make programmatic appeals to voters 
based on clearly identifiable policy packages developed by political parties. The second type is 
the clientelistic linkage, which is based on voter-leaders linkages through selective material 
incentives in networks of direct exchange. The third type is the charismatic linkage, which is 
based on the candidates’ personal skills and powers of persuasion. According to Kitschelt (2000: 
860), presidential systems “personalize competition for the highest office and attract ambitious 
politicians who are often distinguished only by their personal support networks buttressed by 
personal charisma or relations of clientelism but not by policy programs.” Since programmatic 
linkages are weaker in presidential systems, and voters tend to focus on candidates rather than 
parties, political outsiders with no political experience are less disadvantaged in presidential than 
in parliamentary elections. On the contrary, if voters are disenchanted with political parties and 
political elites, outsiders with no previous involvement in politics may benefit from this 
inexperience. Voters may see political outsiders as less corrupt and unscrupulous than career 
politicians. For instance, in a moment of partisan dealignment in Venezuela in the late 1990s 
(Morgan, 2007), a political outsider –Hugo Chávez– came to power in 1998 receiving the 
support of voters disenchanted with political corruption who perceived him as honest (Hawkins, 
2010).  
The same personalization argument was made in two pathbreaking studies emphasizing 
the “perils of presidentialism.” Suárez (1982) mentioned the advantages given to outsiders as one 
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of the main problems of presidentialism. This argument was based on the observation of many 
cases of successful outsiders in the presidential systems of Latin America during the twentieth 
century. In Suárez’ words, “presidentialism appears to increase the importance of individual 
politicians over the political system.” He also argues that this personalization allows political 
leaders who secure a political clientele to run successful presidential elections. In a very 
influential essay, Linz (1994) also contends that the personalized character of presidential 
elections facilitates the access to power of outsiders. Linz is more specific about the causal 
processes that lead to the rise of outsiders. The first important factor in Linz’ framework is the 
solidity of the party system. When the party system is weak, and citizens are disenchanted with 
all the parties in the system, anti-systemic options –e.g. outsiders– may emerge to capitalize on 
citizens’ discontent. The second factor –the most important one according to Linz– is 
presidentialism. The rise of outsiders is more likely in presidential systems because elections are 
more personalized. Voters have to decide which candidate has the better “personal” qualification 
to become the head of state irrespective of the candidate’s links with a particular party. The third 
factor is the candidates themselves. Wealthy and popular outsider candidates are more likely to 
obtain high scores in presidential elections.  
The importance of candidates’ individual characteristics for voting behavior in 
presidential elections has increased in the second half of twentieth century with the advent of the 
electronic media.27 In contemporary democracies, the number of political information recipients 
using TV as their preferred medium has clearly surpassed the number of those who rely on other 
media (e.g. the press) for political coverage. Television tends to focus on the personalities of the 
political leaders because it finds it easier to communicate information to viewers through the 
                                                 
27 According to King (2002), four attributes of party leaders or presidential candidates are particularly relevant: 
physical appearance, native intelligence, character or temperament, and political style. 
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images of the candidates than through abstract documents and complex policy debates 
(McAllister, 2007; Ohr, 2011). In turn, this way of presenting political information reinforces the 
“personalistic” linkage between candidates and voters which is inherent to presidentialism. For 
instance, studies of campaign coverage in the United States demonstrate that the focus of the 
media gradually shifted in the last fifty years from an in-depth coverage of the issues of the day 
to a “horserace” news coverage of presidential contests –discussing who’s ahead, campaign 
events, scandals, and political marketing– (Graber, 2009; Iyengar, Norpoth, & Hahn, 2004). In 
Linz’ words, “in the past (…) no candidate, even one who did a lot of ‘whistle-stop’ 
campaigning, could reach every voter. Today, perhaps in most countries, people can be reached 
through television” (Linz, 1994: 27). 
In the United States (the most analyzed presidential system), several studies have 
demonstrated that candidate assessments influence voting decisions in presidential elections even 
controlling for other key factors such as partisanship and economic evaluations. In a seminal 
contribution, Stokes (1966) was the first scholar to argue that candidates’ personal characteristics 
had a strong impact on electoral decisions. According to Stokes (1966: 27), “the fluctuations of 
electoral attitudes over these four elections [four presidential elections in the United States 
between 1952 and 1964] have to a remarkable degree focused on the candidates themselves.” 
Later studies reached similar conclusions, by showing that candidate evaluations matter both for 
individual voting behavior and for aggregate election results (Kelley & Mirer, 1974; A. H. 
Miller, Wattenberg, & Malanchuk, 1986). Wattenberg (1991) contends that electoral contests 
have become even more “candidate-centered” since the 1970s because the media focus has 
shifted from parties to candidates. The personalization of electoral contests in the United States 
may explain why a political “amateur” (Dwight Eisenhower) was chosen as the candidate of the 
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Republican Party in 1952 over a traditional politician. The leadership style of Eisenhower was 
seen as an asset by voters in the primary elections of the Republican Party. The high 
personalization of American elections may also explain why independent candidates such as 
George Wallace in 1968 and Ross Perot in 1992 and 1996 obtained relatively high scores in 
presidential elections (Abramson et al., 2000; Gold, 1995). Unfortunately, little is known about 
the impact of candidate evaluation on voting behavior in other presidential systems in Africa and 
Latin America. However, it is plausible that candidate evaluations will matter more in the 
context of less institutionalized party systems which have weaker partisan attachments (Blais, 
2011).28 
In sum, the conventional view is that the personalized nature of presidential elections 
facilitates the rise of politically inexperienced outsiders. “Political outsiders” may decide to run 
as independents or with newly created electoral vehicles because a direct and personal 
connection with voters may compensate for their organizational deficit. 
 
3.1.2 Presidentialism and new parties 
In the previous section, I presented one side of the conventional wisdom which suggests that the 
personalized nature of presidential elections increases the risk of the election of very 
inexperienced leaders as heads of government. As discussed in the previous chapter, the second 
key dimension of “outsidership” is the rise to political prominence through a new party. The 
                                                 
28 On the lack of party system institutionalization in Africa and Latin America, see Kuenzi & Lambright (2001) and 
Mainwaring & Scully (1995). 
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presidential system may also facilitate the rise of leaders running with new parties for three main 
reasons. 
First, the organizational efforts that are necessary for leaders to become contenders for 
the top executive position differ significantly in presidential and parliamentary democracies. 
Outsiders would need to create a formidable party organization and recruit viable legislative 
candidates in many districts in order to have a chance of becoming prime ministers –especially in 
plurality electoral systems with low district magnitude–. In fact, in parliamentary systems, prime 
ministers are always the leaders of parties with considerable representation in the legislature. 
Outsider candidates in presidential elections do not face equally insurmountable obstacles. 
Presidential elections are much more personalized, and independent candidates may win with 
very little support in the legislature (and without the support of any traditional party), especially 
in moments of deep economic and sociopolitical crisis that create a loss of confidence in the 
established parties. In fact, previous research shows that outsider presidents tend to have a much 
smaller legislative contingent than insider presidents (Negretto, 2006).  
The second, and related, factor is the impossibility of popular outsiders to transmit their 
charisma or popularity in parliamentary systems. In fact, legislative candidates may ride on the 
coattails of very popular outsiders irrespective of the type of political system, but the probability 
of them winning is always lower than the one for the charismatic candidate. Thus, the probability 
of an allied legislator winning a seat is always lower than the probability of the outsider winning 
a seat (or being elected president). This implies two things: (a) in presidential systems, outsiders’ 
parties are likely to receive less support in legislative than in presidential elections; and (b) 
outsiders are less likely to become prime ministers than directly elected presidents. 
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The third factor is the possibility to split the ticket in presidential elections. In 
presidential systems, voters normally have the possibility to vote for a legislative candidate of 
one party and for the presidential candidate of another party. Sometimes, this leads to a high 
discrepancy between the votes received by a party in concurrent legislative and presidential 
elections (Ames, Baker, & Renno, 2009; A. Campbell & Miller, 1957; G. Helmke, 2009). In 
parliamentary systems, on the contrary, voters cannot split the ticket and support one candidate 
for the head of government and another candidate for the legislative spot in their district. The 
prime minister tends to be the leader of the party that received most votes in the parliamentary 
elections. The possibility to split the vote facilitates the election of an outsider in presidential 
systems, because it allows ambitious politicians or popular public figures to run in presidential 
elections with a new party or a new electoral movement. These candidates may win, even if they 
are not associated with a single legislative candidate. 
In sum, the theoretical discussion in the last two sections provides a series of arguments 
in support of the intuition of the critics of presidentialism regarding the link between outsiders 
and presidential systems. 
 
3.1.3 Alternative explanations of outsider rise 
Before moving on to the empirical analysis, I will present some alternative explanations of 
outsider rise that have been mentioned in previous research. Factors that are not related to the 
type of political system (presidential vs. parliamentary) can also affect the likelihood of outsider 
rise by having an impact on the strategic choices of both candidates and voters. I will integrate 
these variables to my statistical model as control measures.  
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First, the rise of outsiders may be related to socioeconomic factors. The classical 
retrospective voting literature predicts that voters will punish incumbent parties when they suffer 
an economic crisis (Fiorina, 1981). In addition to explaining how the vote is distributed among 
the established parties, a pervasive economic crisis may contribute to the rise of outsider 
politicians. According to Mayorga (2006), socioeconomic problems constitute a “critical 
context” for the success of outsiders in the Andean countries. Corrales (2008) argues that voters 
suffering from economic anxieties are more prone to support newcomers in presidential 
elections. His empirical analysis shows that outsiders tend to be more successful when the level 
of inflation is high. In a similar vein, Benton (2005) argues that voters develop long and 
sophisticated economic memories. When both incumbent and non-incumbent traditional parties 
are blamed for economic hardship, voters are more likely to vote for small parties or outsider 
candidates in order to punish all the established political parties. 
Another key factor that may explain the rise of political outsiders is the weakness of party 
systems. In strong and institutionalized party systems political parties develop strong roots in 
society and there is a considerable degree of stability in party competition (low electoral 
volatility). Moreover, the existing political parties are seen as legitimate by voters. Finally, 
strong party systems are characterized by the existence of solid party organizations independent 
of individual leaders (Mainwaring & Scully, 1995). A stable party system with political parties 
that have developed strong ties with society makes the rise of a political outsider unlikely since 
voters feel attached to (and represented by) the existing parties. In the same vein, strong party 
organizations create obstacles for the rise of political outsiders within established parties. 
According to some scholars the decline of the party system is the main explanation of the 
emergence of outsider and populist politicians (Mayorga, 2006). In fact, the crisis of party 
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systems paves the way for the rise of political outsiders not connected with traditional and 
institutionalized parties, directly appealing to unorganized mass constituencies (Roberts, 2007).29 
The rise of political outsiders may also result from the legitimacy crisis affecting political 
institutions in developed and developing countries (Booth & Seligson, 2009; Norris, 1999; Pharr 
& Putnam, 2000). Studies show a decline in public confidence in the core institutions of 
representative democracy —including parliaments, the legal system and political parties— in 
both the newer democracies of Latin America and Eastern Europe and in many established 
democracies (Norris, 1999). Political independents may provide an electoral option to citizens 
who have lost faith in political institutions and political parties. In many cases, political outsiders 
gain prominence by using an anti-establishment and anti-party discourse. 
The issue of corruption is related to the legitimacy crisis. Several studies demonstrate that 
exposure to corruption leads to an erosion of political support (Anderson & Tverdova, 2003; 
Morris & Klesner, 2010; M. A. Seligson, 2002a). This disenchantment with political institutions 
may pave the way for the rise of political outsiders, who criticize corrupt practices and promise 
to fight against corruption if they are elected. 
There is also a structural factor that may affect the likelihood of outsider success: ethnic 
heterogeneity. In fact, a society deeply divided along ethnic lines may increase the probability of 
the rise of an outsider representing (or claiming to represent) the minority groups. For instance, 
Madrid (2005) shows that indigenous populations in Latin America have lagged behind the rest 
of the population according to different indicators of socioeconomic status, such as income, 
education, and life expectancy. Thus, in all likelihood, indigenous populations do not feel well 
represented by traditional catch-all parties and they may “switch their votes particularly 
                                                 
29 This argument leads to a potential endogeneity problem since the rise of outsiders is also one of the factors that 
accelerate the decomposition of the party system (Dietz & Myers, 2007). 
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frequently since they have little reason to establish enduring ties to political parties that fail to 
cater to their needs” (Madrid, 2005: 3). Hence, ethnic heterogeneity is likely to increase electoral 
volatility. This instability, in turn, paves the way for the rise of outsiders that appeal to these 
disadvantaged and unrepresented ethnic minorities. 
Comparisons between presidential and parliamentary systems also need to take into 
account other confounding factors that differentiate countries located in geographical areas 
where presidential systems predominate and countries located in areas where parliamentary 
systems predominate. Following Shugart and Mainwaring (1997), I control for two additional 
factors –income level and British colonial heritage– in my statistical analysis. 
Although there is no study analyzing the link between the rise of outsiders and the level of 
democracy, the empirical analysis in this chapter will also control for the quality of democracy. 
When democracy is robust, citizens may be less inclined to support an outsider because existing 
democratic institutions provide a channel for them to express their political demands and their 
political frustrations. Moreover, when the quality of democracy is high political institutions are 
more legitimate and voters are less tempted to vote for outsiders. Since countries with 
presidential systems tend to have less consolidated democracies than countries with 
parliamentary systems, controlling for the quality of democracy is also important to make sure 
that any correlation between outsidership and presidentialism that the statistical analysis might 
uncover is not spurious. 
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3.2 RESEARCH DESIGN 
3.2.1 Data 
The level of analysis in this chapter is elections in the world in the period between 1945 and 
2010. All national democratic elections conducted in presidential and parliamentary systems and 
leading to the popular selection (or the confirmation in office) of the head of government were 
included in the sample. Following conventional practice –and in order not to bias the results–, I 
include elections only in periods when countries had a Polity IV score equal to or higher than 5. 
Appendix A shows all the elections included in the database.  
In order to construct the dependent variables measuring “outsidership”, I built upon a 
database of presidents’ and prime ministers’ careers created by Samuels and Shugart (2010).30 
This database includes data on the political experience of presidents and prime ministers for all 
democratic countries in the period 1945-2005.31 It has information on whether the heads of 
government had been party leaders, cabinet members, and legislators before becoming presidents 
or prime ministers. It also includes information on how many years the heads of government 
occupied each role before arriving to power. I expanded this database by gathering additional 
biographical data about heads of government. I included three other variables in the database to 
have a more accurate picture of the previous political career of heads of government. The first 
variable measures whether heads of government occupied an executive position at the regional or 
local level before coming to power. The second variable measures whether heads of government 
                                                 
30 This database was used by these scholars in the third chapter of their book (Samuels & Shugart, 2010). It is 
available online: http://laderafrutal.com/academic/samuels-shugart.html. 
31 I extended the database until 2010. I also reorganized it to have one observation per election, instead of one 
observation per prime minister or president. 
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had already been presidents or prime ministers in the past.32 The third variable is labeled “other 
posts of political importance”, and considers politically relevant experience that is not included 
in the previous variables (e.g. the vice-presidency). These dummy variables are also 
accompanied by continuous variables that measure how long each head of government occupied 
these positions before arriving to power. Finally, I added a dummy variable measuring party 
origins coded as 1 if the president/prime minister came to power through a new party or electoral 
movement, and 0 otherwise. 
Following the definition and operationalization proposed in the previous chapter, 
presidents/prime ministers are considered “political outsiders” when they run with a new party or 
electoral movement and when they had no significant political experience before becoming head 
of government.33 The variable “outsider” is coded 1 when both of these conditions are satisfied 
and 0 otherwise.  
The main independent variable in the model is a dummy variable coded as 1 when the 
country has a presidential system of government. This variable was taken from the database of 
Samuels and Shugart (2010). I also include other independent variables in the model to test a 
series of alternative explanations. The election of outsiders may be due to the fragility of 
democratic institutions in some countries after difficult democratic transitions. In order to 
measure the quality of democratic institutions, I include the Polity IV score (Marshall, Jaggers, 
& Gurr, 2008) in the model. The rise of outsiders may also be associated with economic 
development or with the countries’ economic performance in the years leading to the national 
                                                 
32 Including this variable is important because “incumbent former outsiders” in presidential systems may be re-
elected without any kind of experience in the cabinet or in the legislature. However, it would be a mistake to 
consider them as outsiders if they are running as incumbent presidents. 
33 In line with the operationalization proposed in the previous chapter, politicians are considered as politically 
inexperienced if they had less than two years of political experience before the elections that brought them to power.  
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elections. In order to control for these effects in the statistical model, I include a measure of GDP 
per capita to capture economic development; and a variable measuring the mean two-year GDP 
growth (one year prior to election year plus the election year) to capture economic 
performance.34 These two variables come from Maddison  (2010). In order to control for 
inflation, I also include a logged measure of the inflation rate (average of the inflation rate of the 
year of the election and of the inflation rate of the year preceding the election). The inflation rate 
is calculated using the variation of the consumer price index from one year to the next. The 
historical inflation data was obtained from many online sources.35 
Controlling for the legitimacy of political institutions at the aggregate level is 
challenging.36 In this analysis, I control for the legitimacy of the political system by using a 
measure of the corruption perception index (Transparency International). This proxy is warranted 
because corruption is closely related to political legitimacy. Indeed, several studies demonstrate 
that exposure to corruption leads to an erosion of political support (Morris & Klesner, 2010; M. 
A. Seligson, 2002a). I operationalize perception of corruption in the period 1980-2012 by 
assigning a fixed number to each country averaging the values of the corruption perception index 
the countries received between 1995 and 2012.37 This index goes from 0 to 10 and a higher level 
means less corruption. It was reversed for the purposes of this data analysis, so that a higher level 
                                                 
34 The results reported below do not change if I use GDP growth of the year of the election as a measure of 
economic performance. 
35 These online sources include: http://www.rateinflation.com/; http://www.eclac.org/estadisticas/; 
http://www.inflation.eu/; http://www.tradingeconomics.com/; and http://inflationdata.com/.  
36 Some scholars have used average aggregate survey responses to legitimacy questions as a proxy for trust in 
political institutions (Doyle, 2011). This is problematic in our case for several reasons. First, survey data exists only 
for certain periods and certain countries. Hence, including such a variable would force me to reduce the sample size 
dramatically. Second, it is difficult to code legitimacy from survey responses because we include countries from 
different regions which are included in different surveys (Afrobarometer, Asian Barometer, Eurobarometer, 
Latinobarómetro, etc.). Since different surveys ask slightly different questions and code answers differently, it 
would be difficult to come up with a reliable legitimacy index using survey data. 
37 The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) is released annually by Transparency International. It measures the 
perceived level of public-sector corruption in 180 countries and territories around the world. 
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reflects more corruption, rather than less. This variable is only included in models 2 and 4 in 
Table 3.3, which estimate the impact of presidentialism on the rise of outsiders in the period 
1980-2012. 38 
Finally, the statistical model includes measures of British colonial heritage and ethnic 
fractionalization. The former variable is a dummy one coded as one if a country was colonized 
by Britain and 0 otherwise. The data on ethnic heterogeneity was taken from the fractionalization 
dataset compiled by Alberto Alesina et al. (2003). 
3.2.2 Model estimation 
Given that the dependent variable in the analysis is binary, logistic regression is the most suitable 
statistical method of analysis. However, the empirical analysis is conducted with cross-sectional 
time series data. Hence, I will first estimate a series of random effects logistic regressions. The 
random effects logistic regression has many advantages because it takes the unique structure of 
the data into account. First, the error term in the model is partitioned into error across countries 
and error across time within countries. Second, the standard errors of the estimates are corrected 
to take into account repeated observations for each country. Third, this procedure produces 
robust parameter estimates in situations where countries have valid data in some years but not 
others –i.e., unbalanced data– (Pendergast et al., 1996). Since the outcome analyzed (election of 
an outsider) is a rare event –see Table 3.1 below–, I also run two additional models using a rare 
events logistic regression as the estimator. This estimator develops corrections for the biases in 
logistic regression that occur when predicting or explaining rare outcomes (G. King & Zeng, 2001). 
                                                 
38 The level of corruption in a country tends to remain stable over the years, so assigning a fixed number is justified. 
Indeed, the average standard deviation of the CPI index within countries in the period 1995-2012 in the 63 countries 
included in this analysis is only 0.41 in the 0-10 index.  
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3.3 OUTSIDERS AND PRESIDENTIALISM 
3.3.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 3.1 shows the number of instances of presidents or prime ministers that came to power as 
political outsiders. 
Table 3.1. Descriptive statistics: outsiders in presidential and parliamentary elections (1945-2010) 
Type of political system 
Number of elections 
in the sample 
Number of 
outsiders elected 
Outsiders’ success rate 
Presidentialism 166 8 4.8% 
Parliamentarism 428 5 1.2% 
 
The first finding of this chapter is that the election of outsiders is uncommon, both in 
presidential and in parliamentary systems. However, the descriptive statistics also suggest that 
rise to power of outsiders is much rarer in parliamentary systems. Every twenty presidential 
elections, there is one instance of a political outsider being elected to the presidency. The arrival 
to power of political outsiders through parliamentary elections is much more infrequent (one 
instance every 100 elections). Still, the fact that outsiders win elections in only 5% of 
presidential elections shows that the phenomenon is not as widespread as sometimes assumed by 
the “perils of presidentialism” literature (Linz, 1994).39 
An analysis of bivariate regressions between presidentialism and “outsidership” again 
suggests that the rise of outsiders is more common in presidential systems. The coefficients for 
the variable “presidentialism” are positive and statistically significant in the two models 
                                                 
39 An analysis of a bivariate regression between presidentialism and “outsidership” again shows that the rise of 
outsiders is more common in presidential systems. The coefficient for the variable “presidentialism” is positive and 
statistically significant in the bivariate regression. The bivariate regression is not presented here but is available 
upon request. 
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presented in Table 3.2 (random effects logistic regression and rare events logistic regression). In 
the absence of any controls, presidentialism appears to be a good predictor of the rise of 
outsiders to the highest political office. Predicted probabilities calculated on the basis of a 
bivariate logistic regression indicate that the predicted probability of the rise of an outsider prime 
minister after parliamentary elections is 1.6%, while the predicted probability of the election of 
an outsider candidate in presidential elections is 5.1%. These figures are very similar to the ones 
revealed in the descriptive statistics. 
 
Table 3.2. The impact of presidentialism on the rise of outsiders (bivariate logistic regressions) 
 
VARIABLES (1) 
Random Effects 
Logistic Regression 
(2) 
Rare Events  
Logistic Regression 
   
Presidentialism 1.394* 1.201** 
 (.794) (.546) 
Constant -5.068*** -4.125*** 
 (.872) (.410) 
   
Observations 575 575 
Number of countries 67 67 
 
Is the pattern revealed in Table 3.2 somehow indicative of a causal relationship? In other 
words, is “outsidership” caused by presidentialism or is it related to some other characteristic of 
countries that have a presidential system of government? It is important to control for other 
structural or dynamic factors given that presidential systems have been adopted primarily in less 
developed countries with more fragile democratic institutions –as can be observed in Appendix 
A most presidential systems are located in Africa and Latin America– and more prone to suffer 
economic crises. In order to illustrate this problem, it is useful to go back to a series of seminal 
works by Stepan and Skach (1993, 1994). These scholars compared the democratic stability of 
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countries that gained independence between 1945 and 1979. They found that countries that start 
independence as parliamentary systems were more likely to become or remain democracies than 
countries that started as presidential systems. However, these conclusions were later challenged 
by other scholars (Shugart & Mainwaring, 1997) who showed that the correlation between 
parliamentarism and democracy presented in the work of Stepan and Skach is doubtful because 
they do not controls for key factors, such as income level and British colonial heritage. In order 
to avoid a similar problem, the next section will present the result of a multivariate analysis 
assessing the impact of presidentialism on the rise of outsider candidates. 
 
3.3.2 Results and analyses 
I estimated the impact of presidentialism, economic development, economic performance, 
democratic quality, corruption, and ethnic fractionalization on the election of outsiders with a 
series of logistic regression models. Table 3.3 presents the results. 
Surprisingly, the results do not support the conventional wisdom. The rise of outsiders is 
not causally related to the type of political system. On the contrary, the results suggest that other 
political and economic factors must be taken into account to explain the rise of outsider political 
leaders. 
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Table 3.3. The impact of presidentialism on “outsidership” (multivariate logistic regressions) 
 
VARIABLES (1) 
Random Effects 
Logistic Regression 
(2) 
Random Effects 
Logistic Regression 
(3) 
Rare Events  
Logistic Regression 
(4) 
Rare Events  
Logistic Regression 
     
Presidentialism .483 .147 .415 .130 
 (.667) (.699) (.558) (.596) 
GDP per capita (logged) .599 1.271 .494 1.058 
 (1.110) (1.328) (1.188) (1.558) 
Economic growth (mean 3 years) -.196*** -.135* -.177** -.118 
 (.066) (.077) (.087) (.086) 
Polity IV score -.396* -.373 -.387* -.346 
 (.238) (.260) (.233) (.275) 
British colonial heritage -1.596 -1.009 -1.088 -.573 
 (1.086) (1.173) (1.122) (1.199) 
Ethnic fractionalization 2.247 1.469 2.088 1.301 
 (1.471) (1.536) (1.630) (1.835) 
Inflation  .340  .304 
  (.379)  (.310) 
Corruption  .248  -.207 
  (.293)  (.282) 
Constant -2.838 -4.196 -2.257 -3.427 
 (3.831) (4.274) (3.347) (3.999) 
     
Observations 517 310 517 310 
Number of countries 63 60 63 60 
 
The multivariate analyses presented in Table 3.3 suggest that presidentialism is not a 
good predictor of the election of political outsiders. Models 1 and 2 predict the impact of 
presidentialism on the rise of outsiders with random effects logistic regressions. Models 3 and 4 
assess the link between the political regime and the election of outsiders with rare events logistic 
regressions. The second and the fourth models in Table 3.3 include two variables (inflation and 
corruption) which are only available for the period 1980-2010. Hence, these models have a lower 
number of observations.40 As expected, the coefficient for “presidentialism” is positive in all the 
models, but it does not reach standard levels of statistical significance. Hence, the election of 
                                                 
40 This is not very problematic in this case because the number of observations is still relatively high, and also 
because the vast majority of outsiders (both in presidential and in parliamentary systems) came to power after 1980. 
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outsiders to the top executive position is not primarily explained by the nature of the political 
system (presidential vs. parliamentary). 
The models in Table 3.3 show that one structural factor (the level of democratization) and 
one dynamic factor (economic performance) are better predictors of political “outsidership”. The 
mean three-year GDP growth (two years prior to election year plus the election year) is a 
negative and statistically significant predictor of “outsidership” in three of the four models 
presented in Table 3.3.41 This suggests that outsider candidates are more likely to be successful 
in presidential and parliamentary elections when countries are going through periods of sustained 
economic crisis. This finding is in line with previous studies that show that economic adversity 
increases the likelihood of outsider success in presidential elections (Corrales, 2008). The models 
in Table 3.3 also reveal that the rise to power of outsider politicians is associated with the 
solidity of democratic institutions. In fact, the coefficient for the Polity IV score is negative and 
statistically significant in models 1 and 3, and is close to statistical significance in models 2 (P 
value=0.153) and 4 (P value=0.209). The evidence is not fully conclusive but the election of 
outsiders appears to be easier when the quality of democratic institutions is low.42 
Most of the other coefficients in the model have the expected direction but they do not 
reach standard levels of statistical significance. The rise of outsiders appears more likely in 
countries where corruption is high and where society is ethnically divided, and during periods of 
                                                 
41 If GDP growth on election year is used to measure economic conditions the results are even stronger. This 
alternative measure produces a negative and statistically significant coefficient in the four models reported in Table 
3.2, suggesting that this finding is robust. These additional models are not presented here but they are available upon 
request from the author. 
42 The effect is potentially endogenous since –as will be demonstrated in future chapters of this dissertation– 
outsiders are also more likely to threaten the quality of democracy than traditional party politicians. However, this is 
unlikely because the Polity IV measure included in the regressions reflects the quality of democracy in the election 
year. Democracy measures such as Polity IV or the Freedom House score normally take some time to reflect the 
undemocratic tendencies of outsider presidents. In any case, the effect of the “presidentialism” variable remains 
insignificant when the Polity IV variable is not included in the models. 
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high inflation. But the lack of statistical significance of the coefficients associated with these 
variables suggests that these relationships are weak at best. 
In sum, the pattern suggested in the descriptive statistics presented in the previous section 
is not confirmed by the multivariate analysis. The critics of presidentialism overlooked that 
presidential systems have other characteristics that make them more prone to political instability 
and the rise of outsiders in the first place. Most presidential systems are located in the developing 
world and are more likely to suffer serious and politically destabilizing economic crises. 
Moreover, many countries with presidential systems democratized during the Third Wave and 
still have more fragile democratic institutions (as revealed by lower Polity IV scores). These 
structural conditions undoubtedly also affect public trust in democratic institutions and facilitate 
the rise of independent candidates that run successful campaigns capitalizing on citizens’ malaise 
with the political class. More robust democracies may also have developed institutional 
mechanisms to channel political discontent. Finally, support for established parties may be less 
volatile where the quality of democracy is good. Of course, outsider candidates sometimes 
participate in national elections in high-quality democracies (e.g. George Wallace and Ross Perot 
in the United States) but they almost never get elected. 
Even considering the factors mentioned in the previous paragraph, the lack of a link 
between presidentialism and the rise of outsiders is surprising. This unexpected finding might be 
associated with the “presidentialization” or “personalization” of parliamentary systems that has 
marked the post-World War II era. The “presidentialization” argument holds that modern 
democracies are increasingly following a presidential logic of governance, through which 
leadership is becoming more centralized and more powerful. The power resources of prime 
ministers vis-à-vis other institutions and their own parties are constantly increasing. Party leaders 
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also develop a personal linkage with voters and are more autonomous from their own parties in 
parliament (B. Farrell, 1971; Foley, 1993; Poguntke & Webb, 2005). Another essential part of 
this process is the personalization of electoral processes. There has been a growing emphasis on 
leadership appeals in election campaigning in parliamentary systems at the detriment of more 
programmatic or partisan appeals. One of the main factors producing this personalization of 
politics is the changing structure of mass communications. Television naturally tends to focus on 
personality rather than policies or programs in order to reduce the complexity of political issues 
and generate more interest from the audience (D. M. Farrell & Webb, 2000; Mughan, 2000; 
Poguntke & Webb, 2005: 14-15). The personalization of electoral processes in parliamentary 
systems may have eroded some of the differences that existed between parliamentary and 
presidential elections. Since parliamentary elections have become very personalized, 
parliamentary systems also face the possibility of having a charismatic outsider as prime 
minister. If voters know that parliamentary elections are ultimately a way to select a prime 
minister they may also vote for the party of the candidate they prefer, even if it is a new party 
that only serves as an electoral vehicle for an ambitious political entrepreneur. For instance, the 
party created by Berlusconi (Forza Italia) obtained enough support in the 1994 parliamentary 
elections as to allow this charismatic outsider to form a government. The relatively high number 
of outsiders in Eastern Europe in the 1990s (see Table 2.1) suggests that this possibility is even 
higher in parliamentary systems with weak democratic institutions and suffering from economic 
hardships.43 
                                                 
43 Since the literature on parliamentarism underscores the contemporary "presidentialization" of parliamentary 
systems, I also run the models in Table 3.3 for the period 1945-1980 to test whether the conventional wisdom is 
supported in this restricted sample. The variable “presidentialism” remains insignificant in this restricted sample, 
which suggests that presidentialism is not a good predictor of the rise of outsiders –even prior to the increased 
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In addition to the fact that parliamentary elections have become more personalized, other 
factors may contribute to the rise of outsiders in parliamentary systems. The formal requirements 
to run for president are more stringent, costly, and time-consuming than the requirements to run 
for a legislative seat. Some countries even allow legislators to run as independents without the 
support of any political party. For instance, Andris Šķēle (a political outsider and a business 
oligarch) obtained a seat as an independent in the 1995 parliamentary elections in Latvia. He 
subsequently became prime minister between 1995 and 1997 because the main political parties 
could not agree on a government coalition. The case of Berlusconi also illustrates the low 
barriers to entry in parliamentary systems. Berlusconi announced his decision to enter politics on 
January 26 1994, just two months before the general election that made him prime minister. 
Berlusconi negotiated a coalition between his newly created movement (Forza Italia) and the 
already existing Pollo delle Libertà/Polo del Buon Governo coalition composed of many center-
right parties; and he became a legislative candidate within this broad coalition (Burgess, 1994; 
Donovan, 1994). Running as a presidential candidate would probably have required Berlusconi 
to clear some additional bureaucratic hurdles such as registering his Forza Italia movement as a 
new national party and register his candidacy to become president –which is harder to do than 
becoming a candidate for a legislative seat. 
A final factor that may facilitate the rise of outsiders in parliamentary systems is 
coalition-making. As noted in the literature comparing the nature of presidential and 
parliamentary systems, one key difference between these two types of political systems is that 
the executive can be divided in a parliamentary system; whereas presidential systems can be 
described as “winner-take-all” (Lijphart, 1992b; Linz, 1990). In other words, outsiders can come 
                                                                                                                                                             
personalization of parliamentary elections–. However, there are few stable presidential systems before 1980 so the 
evidence is not entirely conclusive. These additional models are available upon request.  
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to power in parliamentary systems by leading a multiparty coalition, even if their parties or 
movements only obtain a small plurality of the votes. For instance, Forza Italia only obtained 
21% of the popular vote in the 1994 national elections in Italy but that was enough for 
Berlusconi to become prime minister by leading a center-right coalition. In a similar vein, Juhan 
Parts (a political outsider) became prime minister of Estonia in 2003 by surprisingly gaining a 
majority among the right-of-centre parties in the elections. However, his new political party (Res 
Publica) only obtained 24.62% of the popular vote. In all likelihood, the low scores obtained by 
Berlusconi and Parts would not have sufficed for these candidates to become heads of 
government in a presidential system. 
3.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This chapter casts serious doubts on the argument made by the critics of presidentialism 
regarding the link between presidential systems and outsider leaders. The results demonstrate 
that the type of political system (presidential vs. parliamentary) has no impact on the probability 
of the election of an outsider. The statistical analysis suggests that other factors, such as the 
quality of democratic institutions (as measured by the Polity IV score) and the economic 
performance of the incumbent governments in the years preceding the national elections, are 
better predictors of the arrival to power of political outsiders. 
The critics of presidentialism argued that one regime type (parliamentarism) was clearly 
superior to the other (presidentialism). The findings in this chapter are in line with a large 
literature which suggests that these broad claims are not empirically grounded. Presidential 
systems come in very different forms and face very different challenges. It is essential to assess 
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variations within the presidential regime type to explain many political and institutional 
outcomes (Shugart & Carey, 1992; Shugart & Mainwaring, 1997). These differences within 
presidentialism might carry most of the explanatory weight in the explanation of outsider rise. 
The next two chapters will explore some of these contextual and institutional factors within 
presidentialism which are associated with the emergence of independent politicians in national 
elections. 
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4.0  INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND OUTSIDER RISE 
The previous chapter demonstrates that the claim made by the critics of presidentialism 
regarding the higher likelihood of outsider rise in presidential systems is unfounded. Outsider 
candidates tend to emerge in fragile democracies and during situations of economic hardship, 
regardless of whether the regime is parliamentary or presidential. Although interesting, this 
negative finding generates a whole new series of questions. The fact remains that eight outsiders 
arrived to power in Latin America in the last 25 years, and many other independent candidates 
were narrowly defeated. This chapter and the next one will focus on the presidential systems of 
Latin America, to assess the individual-level and institutional factors that explain the sudden rise 
of outsider candidates in the region. 
I begin by assessing whether a series of institutional factors influence the success of 
outsiders in presidential elections. If the type of political system cannot explain the emergence of 
outsider politicians, can we find some institutional characteristics within presidential systems 
associated with outsider success? Such a strategy was followed by Shugart and Carey in a 
pathbreaking book: Presidents and Assemblies (1992). 
 
The most important contribution of that book was an innovative approach that moved 
away from the presidentialism vs. parliamentarism research design. According to the authors, 
presidential systems are not all alike. Different presidential systems have different institutional 
arrangements (presidential powers, party systems, electoral systems, electoral cycles), each of 
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which has implications for democratic stability, governability, representativeness, and 
accountability. The authors assess the strengths and weaknesses of various forms of presidential 
systems. They also evaluate how these institutional characteristics influence the prospects for 
cooperation between presidents and assemblies. For instance, in chapter 8 the authors evaluate 
the legislative and non-legislative powers of presidents. They conclude that “relatively strong 
assemblies should be associated with stable and effective government relative to strong presiden-
cies” (Shugart & Carey, 1992: 165).  
This approach paved the way for a new generation of studies on executive-legislative 
relations. In their pathbreaking contribution, however, Shugart and Carey did not address the 
issue of the rise of outsiders. Neither did the new generation of institutionalist scholars interested 
in Latin American political institutions. The explanation I put forward in this chapter identifies a 
series of institutional factors that reduce the cost of running for higher office for outsiders. This 
analysis demonstrates that the rise of political outsiders is determined by institutional design 
characteristics, such as concurrent elections, compulsory voting rules, and reelection provisions. 
4.1 THEORY: INSTITUTIONAL DETERMINANTS OF OUTSIDER SUCCESS 
In this chapter, I draw from works analyzing the shape of the party system and the formation of 
voters’ preferences in order to build a theory emphasizing the possible causes of outsider success 
in presidential elections. I also draw from some case studies analyzing the emergence of 
individual political outsiders in Latin American countries.  
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Most previous research has focused on the socioeconomic and sociopolitical context that 
leads to the success of outsiders or anti-establishment parties in presidential elections. For 
instance, it has been shown that outsiders or minor parties are more successful when support for 
national political institutions is low (M. A. Seligson, 2002b) and when established parties 
repeatedly fail to address the economic problems of the citizenry (Benton, 2005). This chapter 
aims at discovering the institutional design characteristics that contribute to the rise of outsiders 
by influencing the decision of rational independent challengers to enter the electoral race. 
4.1.1 Institutional design and the rise of outsiders 
Several institutional design characteristics affect the probability that outsiders will participate in 
the elections, and their likelihood of success. I will review these different factors and propose 
hypotheses on how they impact the emergence of independent candidates. These hypotheses will 
be tested in the empirical section below.  
The first important factor to consider is the electoral system. Electoral systems regulating 
the election of the president must determine a threshold of legitimacy considered sufficient for 
the chief executive to form an authoritative government. Plurality systems allow for a mobile 
threshold of legitimacy, whereas the majority and mixed systems adopt a rigid threshold of 
legitimacy (Shugart & Taagepera, 1994). When no candidate achieves this rigid threshold a 
runoff election is organized with the two most voted candidates in the first round. The choice 
between a plurality and a majority-runoff system has a direct impact on the effective number of 
presidential candidates (Jones, 1999). In plurality systems, presidential candidates from new or 
minor parties know that they are not likely to obtain enough votes to win the election. Hence, 
plurality systems tend to create broad party coalitions behind the front-runner. Minor parties 
 89 
exchange their support in these electoral coalitions for political favors (pork, cabinet posts) after 
the election. In the same vein, the opposition tends to coalesce behind one principal challenger. 
On the contrary, majority elections in two rounds discourage the coalescence of political forces. 
Even minor parties that have minimal chances of winning the election participate. When they are 
eliminated from the race, the losing candidates have more leverage to negotiate their support in 
the second round against political privileges after the election (Shugart & Carey, 1992; Shugart 
& Taagepera, 1994). Moreover, with majority runoff, parties tend to specialize. Some parties 
enter the electoral race with the objective of winning the second round even though they know 
they have no chances of winning the first round (Schlesinger & Schlesinger, 1990). Political 
outsiders tend to rise to power through new and non-institutionalized parties. As discussed 
above, this type of party makes a series of calculations before entering the presidential race. I 
contend that political outsiders are more likely to participate in a presidential election under a 
majority-runoff system in which they can hope to win the second round even if they are sure to 
lose the first round. Let us imagine a two-party system disrupted by the rise of an outsider. If an 
independent candidate makes it to the second round, the losing party may form a strategic 
alliance with the outsider to avoid the victory of the other traditional party. For instance, Schmidt 
(1996) argues that the rise of Fujimori in the 1990 elections in Peru was facilitated by the 
majority-runoff system, which allowed Fujimori to win the elections despite finishing second in 
the first round. The incumbent party (APRA) supported Fujimori after being eliminated from the 
race in the first round. Finally, outsiders may obtain better scores under majority-runoff systems 
because the voters may issue a warning or a protest vote against the performance of traditional 
parties without really losing their ballot since they can vote for their preferred candidate in the 
second round. Such arguments yield the following hypothesis: 
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H4.1: Political outsiders are more likely to emerge under majority-runoff systems than under 
plurality systems. 
Another aspect of the rules governing presidential elections that may have an impact on 
the rise to political prominence of outsiders is the electoral cycle. In this regard, the main 
distinction established in the literature is between concurrent and non-concurrent elections. 
Concurrent elections occur when presidential and legislative elections take place on the same 
day. Elections are non-concurrent when presidential and legislative elections are held on 
different dates (Jones, 1995). I argue that political outsiders are more likely to emerge under non-
concurrent than under concurrent elections for two main reasons.  First, when elections are 
concurrent established parties are likely to be much more actively engaged in the campaign since 
they want to secure as many seats as possible in the legislature. When legislators campaign in 
their districts, they become indirect agents of the national campaign of the candidate representing 
their party in the presidential elections. Lacking a strong political apparatus, it is harder for 
political outsiders to compete with the candidates of established parties when presidential and 
legislative elections are held simultaneously. Second, concurrent elections have an indirect 
impact on outsider rise by affecting the number of parties. Several works have shown that the 
timing of elections has an impact on the number of relevant parties in the nation (Jones, 1994) 
(Jones, 1994; Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997b; Shugart & Carey, 1992). According to these 
studies, concurrent elections are associated with two-party dominance. On the contrary, non-
concurrent elections increase the number of competing parties. Multiparty systems increase the 
incentives for outsiders to participate in the elections since they do not need as many votes as in 
a two-party system to get elected or to reach the second round. At the same time, in a multiparty 
system voters may be more inclined to vote for an independent candidate, because they do not 
 91 
feel that they are wasting their ballot by doing so. The second hypothesis of this chapter follows 
from this argument: 
H4.2: Political outsiders are more likely to emerge when presidential and legislative elections 
are non-concurrent.  
The electoral laws of many Latin American countries include compulsory voting 
provisions. Compulsory voting has been defined as “a system of laws and/or norms, mandating 
that enfranchised citizens turn out to vote, and usually specifying penalties for noncompliance” 
(Jackman, 2001). Compulsory voting may be related with the rise to political prominence of 
outsider politicians. According to the “exit, voice, and loyalty” model of political behavior 
(Hirschman, 1970) disaffected individuals who are not satisfied with the performance of political 
parties or do not feel represented always have the possibility to “exit” the system by abstaining. 
Compulsory voting forces all these disaffected citizens –who would otherwise abstain– to 
participate in the election. These voters with anti-party sentiments may decide to support 
political outsiders in the election either because they want to issue a protest vote against 
traditional parties or because they consider that outsiders will perform better than the other party 
options.44 The third hypothesis of this chapter follows from this discussion: 
H4.3: Political outsiders are more likely to emerge when voting is compulsory. 
Morgenstern and Siavelis (2008) identify another institutional variable that is possibly 
related with the rise of outsiders or, as they call them, “free-wheeling independents”: reelection 
provisions. Many Latin American countries have recently adopted reelection provisions 
(Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela). Until now, all incumbent presidents seeking 
                                                 
44 In the same vein, compulsory voting may affect the electoral fortunes of third parties as has been shown in a 
recent study (Bélanger, 2004). My argument in the previous paragraph is an adaptation of the argument Bélanger 
makes about third parties. 
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reelection have been successful. Incumbents have an advantage because they can distribute pork 
and because they have easier access to state resources and more exposure in the media. It follows 
from this argument that reelection provisions should discourage outsiders from participating in 
presidential elections. The following hypothesis follows from this argument: 
H4.4: Political outsiders are more likely to emerge in countries that ban reelection. 
4.1.2 Alternative explanations of the rise of outsiders in Latin America 
Factors that are not related to the institutional design can also affect the likelihood of success of 
political outsiders by having an impact on the strategic choices of both candidates and voters. 
The alternative explanations considered here are basically the same that I presented in the 
previous chapter as I am looking at a very similar dependent variable.45 In line with the review of 
relevant academic literature conducted in Chapter 3 (section 3.1.3), the alternative explanations 
of the emergence of independent candidates which are considered in this analysis are the 
legitimacy crisis affecting countries in Latin America, political corruption, electoral volatility, 
economic conditions (both economic growth and inflation), and ethnic heterogeneity. Hence, the 
specification of the statistical analysis in this chapter is similar to the model presented in chapter 
3 although with some small adjustments.46 
                                                 
45 Since I was able to gather more detailed data about Latin American elections, in this chapter the dependent 
variable is the percentage of support obtained by outsiders rather than a dummy variable measuring whether the 
outsider was elected or not. 
46 I exclude a few variables which were meant to control for differences between parliamentary and presidential 
regimes but are irrelevant (e.g. British colonial heritage) or are not theoretically justified (income level) when the 
sample is made of presidential regimes in Latin America only. 
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4.2 RESEARCH DESIGN 
4.2.1 Data 
The level of analysis in the statistical model below is presidential elections in Latin America in 
the period between 1980 and 2010. The election results were obtained from on-line sources 
including the Elections Results Archive of Binghamton University, the Election Guide of the 
International Foundation for Electoral Systems, and the Adam Carr's Election Archive. I only 
include elections in periods when countries had a Polity IV score equal or higher than 6.47  
The dependent variable in this study is the percentage of votes captured by outsiders 
during the aforementioned elections. In the only previous example of an empirical analysis 
seeking to explain the success of outsiders in presidential elections across the region, Corrales 
(2008) focused exclusively on candidates that obtained more than 10% of the vote. In this 
analysis, I lower this threshold since I gathered biographical information on all presidential 
candidates that obtained more than 5% of the vote. I do not take into account the candidates that 
obtained less than 5% of the vote in order to exclude the non-viable candidates that run knowing 
that their likelihood of success is minimal or inexistent. In a seminal contribution, Schlesinger 
(1994: 7) argues that his theory of political parties “is applicable only to those parties that have a 
realistic chance of winning elections over time”. My institutional theory of the rise of outsiders 
                                                 
47 Included in the sample are the elections in Argentina 1983, 1989, 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007, Bolivia 1985, 1989, 
1993, 1997, 2002, 2005, 2009, Brazil 1989, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, Chile 1989, 1993, 1999, 2005, 2009,  
Colombia 1982, 1986, 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, Costa Rica, 1982, 1986, 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 
2010, Dominican Republic 1982, 1986, 1990, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, Ecuador 1979, 1984, 1988, 1992, 1996, 
1998, 2002, 2006, Honduras 1989, 1993, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2009, Mexico 2000, 2006, Nicaragua 1990, 1996, 
2001, 2006, Panama 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009, Peru 1980, 1985, 1990, 2001, 2006, Paraguay 1993, 1998, 2003, 
2008, El Salvador 1989, 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009, Uruguay  1989, 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009 and Venezuela 1983, 
1988, 1994, 1998, 2000, 2006. 
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similarly applies only to candidates that realistically hope to rise to political prominence by 
obtaining significant support in presidential elections, and not to those who seek other goals 
(personal prestige or psychological rewards). Using the 5% threshold allows me to distinguish 
between relevant outsiders and trivial newcomers.  
The dependent variable in the empirical analysis comes from an original database on 
political outsiders in Latin America.48 In line with the definition and the operationalization 
proposed in Chapter 2, I code as an outsider any candidate that has no previous political 
experience and comes from outside of the established party system. To create the database of 
political outsiders in Latin America I collected information from many on-line sources. To gather 
information on successful candidates, I used mainly the on-line collection of political 
biographies provided by the CIDOB (Centro de Investigación de Relaciones Internacionales y 
Desarrollo). Others sources used (especially to gather information on unsuccessful candidates) 
include the Biography Reference Bank, the Biography and Genealogy Master Index, Lexis-Nexis 
Academic, ProQuest Newsstand, and the New York Times on-line archive. I also used the 
Encyclopedia of Latin American History and Culture (Kinsbruner & Langer 2008). 
The independent variables related to institutions come from existing databases. The data 
concerning the type of rules in place for the election of the president (plurality vs. 
majority/runoff) were obtained through a database built by Pérez-Liñán for his study on this 
issue (Pérez-Liñán, 2006). The data on compulsory vote was obtained from the IDEA 
compulsory voting database available online.49 
To control for the effect of economic crisis on the rise of outsiders, I include a variable 
measuring the mean three-year GDP growth (two years prior to election year plus the election 
                                                 
48 See the list of all the outsider candidates in Latin American presidential elections in Table 2.2. 
49 http://idea.int/vt/compulsory_voting.cfm 
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year) coming from data in Maddison (2010). The growth rates for the years 2008-2010 were 
obtained from the last edition of the CIA World Factbook available online.50 I also control for 
inflation, which may have an independent impact on the rise of outsiders, regardless of economic 
growth. The inflation data comes from CEPALSTAT (the online database of the Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean –a UN institution–). I used the variations in 
the consumer prices index (annual average) as my measure of inflation. The data on ethnic 
heterogeneity was taken from the fractionalization dataset compiled by Alberto Alesina et al. 
(2003). 
The data to test the legitimacy crisis argument was obtained from different sources. First, 
I use age of democracy (i.e. number of years since Polity IV score is > 6) as a proxy to test 
whether citizens become disillusioned with political parties when they cannot fulfill the 
expectations created by democratization. I operationalize perception of corruption by assigning a 
fixed number to each country averaging the values of the corruption perception index the 
countries received between 1995 and 2009.51 This index goes from 0 to 10 and a higher level 
means less corruption. It was reversed for the purposes of this data analysis, so that a higher level 
reflects more corruption, rather than less. 
Finally, I added a measure of the lagged performance of outsiders (percentage of votes 
captured by full outsiders in the previous election) since the success of outsider candidates may 
be overdetermined by the previous rise of an independent candidate that destabilized the party 
system.52 
                                                 
50 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ 
51 The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) is released annually by Transparency International. It measures the 
perceived level of public-sector corruption in 180 countries and territories around the world. 
52 Levitsky and Cameron (2003) show that after the success of Fujimori, Peruvian politicians quickly learned that 
they no longer needed political parties to advance their political careers, which led to an explosion of independent 
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4.2.2 Model estimation 
The analysis of pooled cross-sectional time-series data is challenging since ordinary least squares 
(OLS) assumptions of homoskedasticity and uncorrelated error terms are likely to be violated 
(Stimson, 1985). Although OLS estimates are unbiased in the presence of autocorrelation, these 
estimates are not efficient, which may contaminate tests of statistical significance. 
In order to overcome these problems, I assessed the impact of different institutional and 
contextual factors on the rise of political outsiders through a series of panel analyses.53 First, I 
run the fixed effects and the random effects models. Then, I performed the Hausman test which 
produced a highly significant test statistic (Prob>chi2 = 0.000). Hence, I rejected the random 
effects model and continued to work with the fixed effects setup. However, fixed effects models 
cannot estimate the effect of time-invariant variables, and produce very inefficient estimates of 
variables that rarely change. When such variables are introduced in the model as independent 
variables, “the fixed effect will soak up most of the explanatory power of these slowly changing 
variables. Thus, if a variable (…) changes over time, but slowly, the fixed effects will make it 
hard for such variables to appear either substantively or statistically significant” (N. Beck, 2001: 
285). The FEVD estimation technique developed in Plümper and Troeger (2007) is designed for 
PTSCS/Panel data consisting of data on independent variables that rarely or never change 
                                                                                                                                                             
candidates in different elections at the national, regional, and municipal level. Gutiérrez Sanín (2007) uses a similar 
argument to explain the recent emergence of independent candidates in Colombia. 
53 The methodology recommended by Beck and Katz (1996) (i.e. panel corrected standard errors -PCSE- with a 
lagged dependent variable in the specification of the model) is inappropriate for this data. First, the panel is very 
unbalanced. Second, the cross-units (countries) significantly outnumber the time points. Third, lagged dependent 
variables are generally inappropriate for models that include time-invariant or rarely-changing explanatory variables 
(Achen, 2001). 
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through time. As my main independent variables are institutional factors that change very slowly 
this estimation technique is appropriate.54 
As a final step, I estimated two more models in order to assess the robustness of my 
results. Serially correlated errors can lead to an incorrect estimation of panel data models. In this 
case, the problem is not likely to be very damaging because of the irregular nature of the time-
series aspect of the research design (one observation per presidential election). However, I 
conducted a Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data which provided a significant test 
statistic (prob>F = 0.02) suggesting that autocorrelation may affect some of the results. Hence, I 
run the FEVD model incorporating an ar(1) correction as a robustness check. Finally, I 
performed a modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity in fixed effects models, which 
produced a significant test statistic (prob>chi2 = 0.00) suggesting that there is heteroskedasticity 
across units (countries). Then, as another robustness check, I run the FEVD procedure with panel 
corrected standard errors in the third stage. If the results of the basic FEVD model are robust to 
the incorporation of these corrections, we can be confident on their robustness. 
                                                 
54 This estimator was criticized in a recent issue of Political Analysis. The main criticism leveled against this 
technique is that the standard errors of the time-invariant variables are too small, which leads to incorrect 
conclusions (Breusch, Ward, Nguyen, & Kompas, 2011; Greene, 2011). However, the latest xtfevd ado file in Stata 
generates a correct estimation of the standard errors (N. Beck, 2011; Plümper & Troeger, 2011). Assuming the 
standard errors are calculated correctly, the consensus is that the FEVD estimator remains the most appropriate 
technique for panel models with time-invariant variables. 
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4.3 RESULTS 
I estimated the impact of institutional, economic, and contextual factors on the rise of political 
outsiders with a series of panel data models including data from an original dataset on political 
outsiders in Latin America (Table 4.1). 
 
Table 4.1. Panel data models: determinants of vote for outsiders in Latin American elections (1980-2010) 
 
 (1) 
(FEVD Model) 
(2) 
(FEVD Model with 
AR(1) correction) 
(3) 
(FEVD Model with 
PCSE) 
    
Runoff -4.15 
(3.15) 
-6.55 
(4.29) 
-4.15 
(4.35) 
Concurrent elections -8.10** 
(3.90) 
-8.39** 
(4.13) 
-8.10* 
(4.64) 
Compulsory Vote 8.18** 
(2.50) 
7.42*** 
(1.34) 
8.18*** 
(1.57) 
Incumbent Running -8.53* 
(4.36) 
-8.25** 
(3.06) 
-8.53* 
(4.65) 
GDP Growth .37 
(.47) 
.66 
(.40) 
.37 
(.33) 
Inflation 5.87** 
(1.69) 
3.99** 
(1.61) 
5.87** 
(2.21) 
Ethnic Heterogeneity 19.63** 
(7.42) 
26.29*** 
(5.29) 
19.63** 
(8.82) 
Age of Democracy .39*** 
(.08) 
.12 
(.19) 
.39* 
(.21) 
Corruption 4.29** 
(1.31) 
3.02** 
(.85) 
4.29*** 
(.96) 
Lagged vote for Outsiders -.09 
(.11) 
-.07 
(.07) 
-.09 
(.24) 
    
Number of groups (countries) 17 17 17 
Number of observations 92 75 92 
R2 .64 .73 .64 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The results provide support for three of the four hypotheses advanced in this chapter. 
Surprisingly, the results run against the conventional wisdom that plurality electoral systems are 
more stable and less likely to foster the creation of new political forces built by political 
outsiders. The coefficient for this variable does not reach statistical significance in any model, 
which suggests that the share of votes captured by outsiders is not influenced by the electoral 
formula. In other words, the incentives structure of presidential candidates does not seem to 
operate in the way suggested by most of the literature (Shugart & Carey, 1992; Shugart & 
Taagepera, 1994). The results, however, are consistent with the findings of Kenney (1998b) who 
analyzed electoral reforms in Colombia, the Dominican Republic, and Peru; and concluded that 
the transition from plurality to majority-runoff had a limited effect on the number of presidential 
candidates in those countries. In unstable and volatile party systems, potential presidential 
candidates may even be encouraged to participate in systems in which they need only a plurality 
of the votes to win. 
The model strongly supports the hypothesis that holding presidential and legislative 
elections concurrently reduces the likelihood of success of outsider candidates. Based on the 
regression results, holding elections concurrently reduces the share of votes obtained by 
outsiders by about 8.1%. In other words, the likelihood of outsider success is significantly 
reduced when elections are held at the same time. In fact, traditional parties are likely to be 
omnipresent during political campaigns if multiple positions are at stake, thereby leaving less 
space for newcomers in the political arena. 
The hypothesis on compulsory voting is also strongly supported by the data. Compulsory 
voting significantly increases the likelihood of outsider success. According to the results, when 
voting is compulsory the share of votes obtained by outsider candidates increases by about 8%. 
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As mentioned above, this may be linked to the fact that unmotivated and dissatisfied citizens are 
nonetheless obliged to vote, which increases the likelihood of support for independent candidates 
who attack the corruption and inefficiency of traditional political parties. This finding calls into 
doubt the conventional wisdom that higher turnout is always better. Forcing unmotivated citizens 
out of their houses appears to contribute to the electoral success of outsider candidates. 
The final institutional hypothesis held that outsiders are less likely to rise when 
presidential reelection is permitted. Presidents have an incumbency advantage because they can 
mobilize pork and state resources which may discourage the participation of political outsiders 
and reduce the share of votes captured by outsiders if independent candidates participate in the 
election. Again the model confirms my theoretical expectation. When incumbent presidents 
participate in the election the percentage of votes obtained by outsiders is likely to decrease by 
about 8%, magnitude similar to the other two primary independent variables. 
Despite the loss of some observations in model 2, and the incorporation of corrections for 
first order autocorrelation and for panel heteroskedasticity in models 2 and 3, the three 
institutional variables that work as predicted in the basic FEVD model keep the expected sign 
and remain statistically significant in the robustness models.  
As for the control variables, the results suggest that GDP growth is unrelated with 
outsider success in Latin American presidential elections. As will be shown again in the next 
chapter, short-term economic pains are not enough to push citizens to support outsider candidates 
in Latin America. On the contrary, inflation appears in most of the models as a strong predictor 
of the rise to political prominence of political outsiders. This variable is robust to the PCSE 
correction. This finding is in line with previous research showing the salience of inflation in the 
political choices of Latin American citizens (Weyland, 2002). The statistical results then suggest 
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that economic growth does not necessarily prevent the rise of an independent candidate in 
presidential elections, especially if growth is accompanied by inflation or by an increase in 
poverty.55  
I also ran several additional models to account for the possibility of an interaction 
between the institutional factors presented above and these two economic variables (economic 
growth and inflation). Moreover, in a recent contribution Hawkins presents a model of the rise of 
Chavismo in Venezuela and shows that the variables measuring economic growth “matter only 
when considered in combination with perceived corruption” (Hawkins, 2010: 160). Hence, I also 
tested a model with an interaction between growth and corruption. The results of these models 
are presented in Appendix B. Two main conclusions can be derived from these models. First, the 
results of the empirical analysis presented in this chapter are robust to the inclusion of these 
interaction terms. Second, none of the interaction terms that were tested in these models is 
statistically significant. This suggests that the institutional factors have an independent effect on 
the share of votes obtained by outsiders which is not affected by political corruption or economic 
performance 
Ethnic fractionalization increases the likelihood of outsider success in Latin America. In 
purely fractionalized societies political outsiders would obtain 20% more votes than in purely 
homogeneous societies. Although these two extremes do not exist, the results suggest that in 
Latin America political outsiders are more likely to rise to political prominence in deeply divided 
societies. 
                                                 
55 I also tried per capita GDP growth instead of GDP growth but the results did not change. The variable measuring 
growth remains an insignificant predictor of the rise of outsiders. The results of this model are not reported but are 
available upon request. 
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The relationship between the emergence of outsiders and previous outsider success is not 
confirmed by the data. This result appears to suggest that there is not path dependence in the 
performance of presidential candidates in Latin America. On the one hand, outsiders may emerge 
in contexts, such as Venezuela, where candidates from traditional parties have competed 
successfully for a long time. On the other hand, the meteoric rise of an outsider may lead the 
traditional political class to react in order to avoid the emergence of another outsider. The case of 
Paraguay after the victory of Lugo in 2008 exemplifies this latter pattern.  
The crisis of legitimacy is often hailed as one of the most serious obstacles to democratic 
consolidation in Latin America. Dissatisfaction with democratic institutions should materialize 
over time, when it becomes clear that the high expectations brought about by democratization are 
not fulfilled by democratic regimes (Przeworski, 1991). The age of democracy is a good proxy 
for this effect. Each additional year since the democratic transition increases the probability of 
voting for outsider candidates by 0.39%.56 Traditional political parties may enjoy a certain 
prestige after authoritarian regimes, and they may be legitimized by their contribution to the 
democratic transition. But as the socioeconomic expectations associated with the democratic 
transition are disappointed, and as new generations of voters participate in the elections the 
likelihood of voting for outsider politicians in presidential elections gradually increase.   
The legitimacy crisis of Latin American democracies appears to be aggravated by the 
widespread corruption in the region. According to the statistical results, corruption is positively 
associated with the performance of outsiders in presidential elections. This finding is not 
surprising in light of the efforts made by many outsider politicians to denounce the corrupt 
practices of traditional political parties. 
                                                 
56 This finding is robust when I leave out of the analysis the countries that were democratic at least since the 1960s 
(Colombia, Costa Rica, and Venezuela) and have much higher values than the rest of the countries for this variable. 
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4.4 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The first conclusion to be drawn from this chapter is that institutional design within presidential 
systems makes a difference in terms of outsider emergence. Outsider challengers are not less 
rational than career politicians. Independent candidates always evaluate the costs of running and 
the likelihood of victory before entering the race. They only participate in presidential elections 
when there are limited barriers for entry, and when the possibility of success (however defined) 
exists.  
The results in this chapter cast doubts on the conventional wisdom that a plurality system 
automatically decreases the number of presidential candidates. In a highly uncertain and volatile 
electoral environment, such as the one that exists in many Latin American countries, a plurality 
system may not discourage the participation of political outsiders. The rest of my findings are 
more in line with my theoretical intuitions. When elections are concurrent, the electoral 
campaigns tend to be dominated by the strongest parties, which are likely to be very active in the 
whole country in order to gain as many seats in the legislature as possible, thereby limiting the 
possibilities of political outsiders who do not have a strong apparatus to back their campaigns. 
On the contrary, non-concurrent elections are more personalistic, and independent candidates 
with limited resources are more likely to make a breakthrough. 
In the same vein, independent candidates tend not to trifle away their political capital by 
participating in presidential elections in which the incumbent runs for reelection. As the 
incumbent has a clear advantage during the campaign because he has easier access to the media 
and he can engage in clientelistic practices, outsider challengers are less likely to run. 
Finally, compulsory voting has an impact on the share of votes obtained by outsiders by affecting 
the voting behavior of the electorate. When dissatisfied citizens –who would otherwise abstain– 
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are obliged to turn out and vote, they tend to express their disenchantment by voting for political 
outsiders with an anti-establishment discourse. If outsider challengers perceive this effect, they 
are also more likely to participate when (enforced) compulsory voting rules exist. 
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5.0  WHO VOTES FOR OUTSIDERS IN LATIN AMERICA?57 
The two previous chapters have discussed the institutional determinants of the rise of outsider 
presidents. Although the type of political system (presidentialism vs. parliamentarism) does not 
explain the election of outsider politicians, a series of micro-institutional factors (within 
presidentialism) are linked to the outsider phenomenon. These findings are interesting because 
they suggest that certain institutions can facilitate the emergence of independent candidates 
running with new parties. 
 However, so far I have only considered the supply side of the outsider phenomenon. The 
present chapter will explore the demand side. Institutional factors make it easier for outsiders to 
run in presidential elections, but they do not explain popular support for these candidates. If 
viable outsider candidates participate in presidential elections, why and when do they attract 
strong popular support? Why do voters abandon established party options and choose to vote for 
neophyte outsider contenders? 
 
I will analyze the individual-level factors that push voters to support outsiders. The 
availability of good survey data in Latin America has increased in the past two decades, which 
gives scholars the opportunity to analyze the determinants of voting behavior in the region. 
However, little is known about the sources behind the strength of political outsiders. Who votes 
                                                 
57 This chapter is based on a paper co-authored with Ignazio de Ferrari (De Ferrari & Carreras, 2012). 
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for outsiders and why? Do outsiders benefit from the legitimacy crisis that affects traditional 
political parties in Latin America? 
Logit models are estimated to explore the individual-level factors associated with the vote 
for outsiders in presidential elections in Latin America. I use individual-level data from eight 
different election surveys conducted in six countries by Latinobarómetro and LAPOP. The 
analysis reveals that the rise of outsiders is associated with the crisis of representation that affects 
many Latin American democracies. Citizens who feel unrepresented by established political 
parties are more likely to vote for outsiders. Moreover, under some specific conditions, citizens 
holding authoritarian attitudes may have a greater tendency to support independent candidates.  
This chapter is organized as follows. First, I present the main argument of this chapter 
linking the rise of outsiders in Latin America to the pervasive crisis of representation in the 
region (especially in the Andean region). Second, I review the previous literature on the vote for 
new parties and outsiders in order to identify relevant alternative explanations. Third, I describe 
the data that will be used in the analysis and the model estimation. Finally, I present the 
empirical results which suggest that the rise of outsiders can be understood in terms of a “crisis 
of representation.” 
5.1 CRISIS OF REPRESENTATION AND OUTSIDERS IN LATIN AMERICA 
Several Latin American countries have undergone a severe crisis of democratic representation in 
the last two decades (Mainwaring et al., 2006). This crisis of representation has two distinct 
aspects. The first one is a widespread disenchantment with democratic institutions –particularly 
political parties– in Latin America after the Third Wave of democratization. The second one is 
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the underrepresentation of certain societal or ideological segments of the population during the 
period of the “Washington consensus”. The main argument of this chapter is that individuals 
who have become disenchanted with traditional party options and are not represented 
ideologically by the established parties are more likely to support outsider candidates.  
It has become a leitmotiv for scholars who study political parties to talk about the crisis 
of parties in fragile democracies. In the words of a prestigious scholar, “parties are not what they 
once were” (Schmitter, 2001). Political parties in Third Wave democracies have a hard time 
carrying out their basic functions (electoral structuration, government formation, and interest 
aggregation). In new democracies, political parties face an electoral competition that changed 
dramatically with developments in the mass media. In order to survive in this new media 
environment, parties often choose to develop appealing catch-all programs with very vague 
promises that are hard to keep after they come to power. This leads to citizens’ disillusionment 
with established parties in the long run, and it paves the way for an increase in electoral volatility 
in fragile democracies (Mainwaring & Zoco, 2007). Moreover, political parties are less able to 
provide a stable political identity to citizens because they fail to develop strong organic links 
with civil society through associations and movements as they did in the past (Schmitter, 2001). 
In Latin America, market reforms in the 1990s have produced a weakening of intermediary 
organizations such as labor unions, thereby depriving political parties of some organic ties with 
the population (Roberts, 2002a). In sum, political parties in new democracies have failed to 
develop a “programmatic linkage” with certain segments of the population along clear 
ideological lines.58 
                                                 
58 On the concept of “programmatic linkage”, see Kitschelt (2000) and Lawson (1980). 
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The “crisis of parties” also affects more consolidated democracies and for similar 
reasons. Citizens in advanced democracies have become more critical of democratic institutions, 
and the attachments between voters and parties have gradually weakened (Norris, 1999). As a 
title of a book suggests, political parties are losing their partisans in Western Europe and other 
developed democracies (Dalton & Wattenberg, 2000). However, although the trends may be 
similar, the degree of citizens’ malaise and its implications pose a much greater concern in Latin 
America than in consolidated democracies in industrialized countries. As Hagopian (2005: 321) 
rightly points out, “levels of public support for democracy are far lower in the newer Latin 
American democracies than in the established democracies of the Trilateral region, and 
skepticism about government in the Trilateral countries has not produced the same degree of 
regime instability.” Although citizens are less identified with political parties than in the past in 
established democracies, the existence of deep-seated sociopolitical cleavages has prevented the 
collapse of party systems and has kept electoral volatility at relatively low levels (Bartolini & 
Mair, 1990; Lipset & Rokkan, 1967; Mair, 1997). 
Citizens’ satisfaction with (and attachment to) political parties has been very low in all 
Latin American countries in the last two decades. A 2004 report from the United Nations 
Development Program concluded that Latin American countries are suffering from a severe 
crisis of confidence (UNDP, 2004). This is a relatively new political reality. Until the 1990s the 
electorates of many Latin American countries were reasonably aligned with established parties. 
For instance, Paul Lewis (1980: 145-150) described Paraguay in the 1970s as a country in which 
“party identification is practically universal” and is almost always a “lifetime commitment”. 
Strong party identifications also existed in Colombia for most of the twentieth century, until the 
recent collapse of the party system (Dix, 1987; Gutiérrez Sanín, 2007). Lupu (2011: 3) also 
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reports high levels of partisan attachment in Argentina and Venezuela until the 1990s. However, 
in the last two decades, many Latin American countries have gone through a process of partisan 
and electoral dealignment (Hagopian, 1998; Klesner, 2005; Levitsky & Cameron, 2003; Morgan, 
2007). In fact, data from the Latinobarómetro surveys between 1995 and 2006 show that 
political parties have become the least trusted institutions among a long list of public and private 
institutions in Latin America. Only 19% of respondents express support for political parties in 
the region (Lagos, 2008). There are two main reasons that can explain citizens’ disenchantment 
with political parties in the region. The first factor is the gap between citizens’ expectations and 
government performance in Third Wave democracies in Latin America. In the aftermath of 
democratization, Latin American citizens had high expectations that were not limited to changes 
in the political system. They also expected socioeconomic changes that would bring higher 
prosperity and a better quality of life to all segments of society. These high –and somewhat 
unrealistic– expectations set the stage for political dissatisfaction later on (Przeworski, 1991). In the 
decades following democratization, many Latin American governments failed to provide 
economic security and public security to their citizens (Hagopian, 2005). On the one hand, the 
widespread implementation of market reforms and neoliberal policies brought about a much 
needed macroeconomic stabilization but imposed a high social cost on the most unprivileged 
segments of Latin American societies (Bulmer-Thomas, 1996; Kingstone, 2011). On the other 
hand, nearly all Latin American countries have experienced a significant —and in some cases 
dramatic— increase in the levels of crime since the Third Wave of democratic transitions. For 
authors like Bergman (2006), the rise of criminal violence represents a redoubtable threat to the 
stability of democratic institutions in the region. Other studies show that citizens exposed to 
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crime have lower levels of trust in democratic institutions (Carreras, 2013; Ceobanu, Wood, & 
Ribeiro, 2011; Fernandez & Kuenzi, 2010). 
Policy failures certainly contribute to explain the malaise of Latin American citizens with 
political parties. But this is not the whole story. Citizens’ disenchantment with political parties 
also results from a feeling of moral failure associated with the perception of widespread 
corruption in government institutions. In the words of Hawkins (2010: 94), “legitimacy is 
ultimately a normative attribute of the regime, and only significant moral failures can weaken 
this legitimacy enough for it to become a true crisis.” This argument is corroborated by empirical 
studies that demonstrate that perception of corruption is negatively associated with trust in 
democratic institutions (Morris & Klesner, 2010; M. A. Seligson, 2002a). Since corruption 
affects regime legitimacy, it can also increase the likelihood of outsider success in presidential 
elections. In fact, Hawkins (2010) argues that the widespread corruption of Venezuela’s political 
class is the main factor leading to the election of a populist outsider (Chávez) in 1998 
presidential elections. In a recent study of party system collapse in Peru and Venezuela, 
Seawright (2012) reaches similar conclusions. Using experimental evidence, he shows that 
corruption scandals increase voters’ level of anger, which in turn increases voters’ degree of risk 
acceptance and leads to a greater likelihood of success for anti-systemic outsiders. 
Citizens’ disenchantment with political parties has clear implications for the vote for 
outsiders and anti-systemic candidates. It appears clear from previous literature that anti-party 
sentiments can have an impact on voting behavior. Several studies suggest that anti-partyism is 
among the strongest predictors of support for third parties and outsider candidates. Using 
individual-level electoral survey data from Canada, Britain, and Australia, Bélanger (2004) 
demonstrates that dealigned voters in these countries support minor parties to voice antiparty 
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sentiments. Previous research has also shown that weak partisans are also more likely to support 
outsider candidates in presidential elections in the United States (Gold, 1995; Peterson & 
Wrighton, 1998). In Latin America, anti-party sentiments are often exploited by outsiders who 
campaign with a clear anti-establishment rhetoric, promising to put an end to the reign of 
inefficient and corrupt parties—often referred as partidocracia (Cameron, 1997; Hawkins, 2010; 
Kenney, 2004; Philip & Panizza, 2011). 
Previous research has also demonstrated that low support for democratic institutions 
(another clear sign of a crisis of democratic representation) is associated with the vote for 
outsiders in American presidential elections (Gold, 1995; Peterson & Wrighton, 1998). In a 
similar vein, Doyle (2011) finds that political distrust (i.e., lack of trust in democratic 
institutions) is positively associated with support for populist candidates in Latin American 
presidential elections.59 
The discussion so far has focused on the performance failures and the corruption of Latin 
American governments. There is another important aspect of the crisis of representation in Latin 
America, namely the political underrepresentation of certain societal or ideological segments of 
the population during the neoliberal era in the region. Three recent analyses of party system 
collapse in Latin America argue that the unresponsiveness of the party system to the preferences 
of citizens with leftist ideological commitments during the neoliberal period is one of the driving 
forces behind the rise of outsiders and anti-systemic electoral movements (Morgan, 2011; 
Roberts, 2012; Seawright, 2012). In fact, under the influence of global neoliberal pressures, most 
Latin American countries implemented a series of painful economic reforms during the 1990s 
(Kingstone, 2011). In many cases, leftist and populist parties that had traditionally defended 
                                                 
59 Although I focus on outsiders - rather than populists - there is a fair amount of overlap between the populist 
candidates identified by Doyle and the candidates I categorize as outsiders.  
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statist and protectionist policies put forward these reforms. It is worth mentioning, for instance, 
the cases of the Partido Justicialista in Argentina, the Partido Liberación Nacional in Costa 
Rica, the Partido Colorado in Uruguay, and Acción Democrática in Venezuela. In a seminal 
contribution, Stokes (2001) shows that many Latin American presidential candidates in the early 
1990s ran anti-neoliberal campaigns, but rapidly violated their mandate and implemented 
“neoliberalism by surprise” when they arrived to power. The most paradigmatic examples of this 
pattern are Fujimori in Peru and Menem in Argentina. 
As a result of the implementation of these market reforms by leftist and populist parties, 
the ideological differences between the main established parties in many Latin American 
countries blurred, creating a vacuum on the left of the political spectrum and leaving many leftist 
voters virtually unrepresented. In more institutionalized party systems, this space on the left was 
quickly filled by reinvigorated or new leftist parties, such as Frente Amplio in Uruguay (Luna, 
2007) and Partido Acción Ciudadana in Costa Rica (Booth, 2007). In more fluid party systems, 
leftist voters abandoned old parties to support political outsiders. In a study of partisanship in 
Venezuela during the collapse of the party system, Morgan (2007) demonstrates that leftist 
voters were more likely to abandon the traditional parties in the critical 1998 elections. She finds 
that “frustration with the parties’ indistinguishable positions likely prompted Venezuelans, 
especially those on the left, to look outside the old system for parties that might speak for them” 
(Morgan, 2007: 85).  
The discussion in this section generates clear expectations regarding the link between the 
crisis of representation and the vote for outsiders. Once outsider candidates are in the race in 
Latin American presidential elections (for the reasons discussed in the two previous chapters), 
their stronger supporters should be citizens who are disenchanted with democracy and 
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established political parties, and leftist voters who were left unrepresented during the 
Washington consensus. Voting for an outsider provides a channel for disgruntled and 
unrepresented citizens to voice their frustration with the political system. The three hypotheses in 
this chapter follow from this discussion: 
 
H5.1: Citizens who hold anti-party sentiments are more likely to vote for outsiders 
H5.2: Citizens who are not satisfied with the functioning of democracy are more likely to vote for 
outsiders 
H5.3: Leftist voters are more likely to vote for outsiders in Latin American elections60 
5.2 ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS OF THE VOTE FOR OUTSIDERS 
Before proceeding to the empirical analysis to test these hypotheses, this section presents two 
alternative explanations of the vote for outsider candidates. The literature suggests two additional 
factors that might motivate citizens to vote for outsider candidates: negative economic 
evaluations, and authoritarian attitudes. 
One of the most robust findings in the literature on electoral accountability is that the 
vote for incumbent parties is associated with economic performance, both in developed and 
developing countries (Lewis-Beck, 1988; Pacek & Radcliff, 1995). Voters punish incumbents if 
they presided over poor economic times, and reward them if the economic situation improved 
                                                 
60 While the first two hypothesis should apply broadly, the third hypothesis is more context-dependent. I argue that 
leftist voters were more likely to support outsiders in Latin America in the last two decades because they were left 
unrepresented by the widespread adoption of neoliberal policies. If, in a different context, centrist or rightist voters 
were left with no voice in the party system they would be the ones more likely to support anti-systemic candidates. 
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during their term. Latin America is no exception to this finding. In analyzing 21 Latin American 
elections in the 1980s, Remmer (1991) shows that crisis conditions – high inflation and low GDP 
growth –undermine support for incumbents in the region.  
The economic voting literature suggests that economic hardship may hurt the incumbent 
parties, and favor new parties or outsiders. Bélanger and Nadeau (2010) demonstrate that the 
support for third parties is negatively correlated with long-term income in Canada, both at the 
regional and at the national level. Similarly, Tavits (2008) shows that electoral support for new 
parties in fifteen Eastern European countries increases when unemployment is high.  
In the Latin American context, Queirolo (2013) argues that the rise of leftist parties since 
the late 1990s was caused by the intent of voters to punish political parties unable to improve the 
economic well-being of their electorates. Citizens perceived most established parties as 
responsible for economic downturns and high unemployment rates. Hence, voters started to 
support those in the “untainted opposition,” which in most cases were leftist politicians. 
Outsiders can also be characterized as “untainted politicians” so it is important to assess whether 
a relationship exists between the vote for outsiders and citizens’ economic evaluations. 
Another factor that may explain citizens’ support for outsider candidates is authoritarian 
attitudes. A series of early studies demonstrated that persons who held authoritarian viewpoints 
were more likely to support candidates whose profile, ideology, or personality was perceived to 
be more authoritarian (Milton, 1952; Wrightsman Lawrence, Radloff, Horton, & Mecherikoff, 
1961). For instance, a survey analysis revealed that respondents who scored higher on an 
authoritarianism scale were more likely to support General MacArthur as candidate for the 1952 
presidential elections in the United States (Milton, 1952; Wrightsman Lawrence et al., 1961) 
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In the same vein, more recent studies show that citizens with authoritarian predispositions 
are more inclined to vote for extreme-right parties in Western Europe (Lubbers & Scheepers, 
2000, 2002) and for former authoritarian rulers in Latin America and Eastern Europe (Deegan-
Krause, 2006; A. L. Seligson, 2002; Seligson & Tucker, 2005). Latin American outsider 
candidates tend to have an anti-systemic discourse and to run aggressive campaigns. They often 
reject traditional political institutions – such as political parties, Congress, the Judiciary, and the 
Constitution – and advocate a major overhaul of the political system (Hawkins, 2010; Kenney, 
2004; Weyland, 1993). This message may resonate well among voters who have authoritarian 
attitudes and want a strong leader. In fact, using LAPOP data Azpuru (2011) has shown that 
Latin American citizens with authoritarian predispositions are more likely to support “caudillo 
rule”. Moreover, outsiders tend to obtain high scores in presidential elections in moments of deep 
economic and sociopolitical crisis (Corrales, 2008; Mayorga, 2006). It is well-known that “threat 
conditions” activate authoritarian predispositions (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009; Stenner, 2005). 
Hence, the empirical analyses below will also control for the possibility that authoritarian 
attitudes explain the vote for outsiders in Latin America. 
5.3 DATA AND MODEL ESTIMATION 
This section introduces the data and methods that I use to test the hypotheses outlined in the 
previous section. I employ individual-level data for eight presidential elections in six Latin 
American countries between 1995 and 2010. I estimate pooled binomial logit models, and 
country-level binomial logistic regression models. This section starts by presenting the data and 
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showing how the dependent variables and the main predictors are measured. This is followed by 
a description of the model estimation methods. 
5.3.1 Data 
Until very recently, cross-national election studies in Latin America were based on the analysis 
of aggregate-level data (Benton, 2005; Samuels, 2004). However, in the last few years a shift 
towards using individual-level data has taken place, as new data has become publicly available 
(Cortina, Gelman, & Lasala Blanco, 2008; Singer, 2011). This is a positive development, since 
using individual-level data has the distinct advantage of allowing individual-level covariates to 
be controlled for, hence making estimates more precise and less confounded. 
  In line with this new scholarship, this chapter uses individual-level data coming from 
surveys that were conducted immediately before or immediately after an election in which an 
outsider obtained a significant share of the votes (more than 5%). There are two major sources 
for survey data in Latin America: Latinobarómetro and LAPOP. The Latinobarómetro survey is 
conducted every year since 1995 in every Latin American country. The same basic questionnaire 
is administered in every country every year; but some questions vary from year to year. Sample 
sizes fluctuate between 1000 and 1200 respondents per country. LAPOP surveys are conducted 
every two years in each Latin American country. The same questionnaire is administered in each 
country every other year. The first wave was conducted in 2004. 
The analysis in this chapter draws on both sources of data. I used the list of outsider 
candidates in Latin America presented in Table 2.2 as the sample of relevant cases to study. 
Unfortunately, I had to eliminate from this sample all the cases of outsider candidates running 
before 1995 because there is no comparable survey data before that date. In the period 1995-
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2010, there are fifteen cases of outsiders in Latin America who obtained a significant share of the 
votes in presidential elections (more than 5% of the vote). However, questions about voting or 
vote intention can give an inaccurate representation of actual voting behavior if they are asked 
much earlier or much later than the election date. If vote intention is measured a long time before 
the election, respondents may not be fully informed or may not have made up their minds. 
Moreover, the rise of outsiders is often a sudden phenomenon that crystallizes very late in the 
electoral process, as it was clear in the Fujimori emergence often characterized as a “tsunami” 
(Schmidt, 1996). On the other hand, surveys conducted more than a couple of months after the 
election can be misleading because respondents may start confusing their voting decisions in 
different electoral processes as the temporal distance from the last election increases. Hence, I 
checked for all these fifteen cases whether surveys (either Latinobarómetro or LAPOP) were 
conducted up to two months prior to or after presidential elections. As can be seen in Table 4.1, 
there are relevant surveys conducted for nine of the fifteen outsiders that were able to compete 
successfully in presidential elections in Latin America in the period 1995-2010. In this analysis, I 
will assess the main determinants of outsider support in this sample of cases. With the exception 
of Fujimori’s first election, and Lucio Gutiérrez’ 2002 victory, the empirical analysis in this 
chapter covers the most paradigmatic cases of outsider candidates. 
The dependent variables in the empirical analysis measure vote intention in presidential 
elections. Latinobarómetro uses the standard formulation: “If there was an election 
tomorrow/this Sunday, which party would you vote for?” LAPOP asks for the names of the 
specific candidates. The dependent variable is coded as 1 if the respondent votes for an outsider 
candidate and coded as 0 if the respondent votes for other established opposition parties (“no 
answer” and “don’t know” are coded as missing). 
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Table 5.1. Outsider presidential candidates in Latin America (1995-2010) 
 
COUNTRY YEAR AND NAME OF 
OUTSIDER 
VOTE  
OUTSIDER 
REASON FOR INCLUSION/ 
NON-INCLUSION 
    
INCLUDED IN THE ANALYSIS 
Bolivia 
2002: Felipe Quispe (MIP) 
2002: Evo Morales (MAS) 
6.1 
20.9 
LTB survey 1 month before election 
LTB survey 1 month before election 
Ecuador 
1996: Freddy Ehlers (MUPP) 
2006: Rafael Correa (AP) 
20.6 
22.8 
LTB survey 1 month before election 
LTB survey during election month 
Nicaragua 
2006: Edmundo Jarquín Calderón 
(MRS) 
6.3 LTB survey 1 month before election 
Paraguay 2008: Fernando Lugo (APC) 42.3 
LAPOP survey 2 months before 
election 
Peru 
2001: Alejandro Toledo (PP) 
2006: Ollanta Humala (UPP) 
36.5 
30.1 
LTB survey during election month 
LAPOP survey 2 months after 
election 
Venezuela 1998: Hugo Chávez (MVR) 56.2 LTB survey 1 month before election 
NOT INCLUDED IN THE ANALYSIS 
Argentina 
2003: Ricardo López Murphy 
(RECREAR) 
16.35 
Voting behavior question not asked 
in LTB 2003 
Bolivia 1997: Ivo Kuljis (UCS) 16.1 LTB survey 5 months before election 
Ecuador 
1998: Freddy Ehlers (MUPP) 
2002: Lucio Gutiérrez (PSP) 
14.8 
20.3 
LTB survey 5 months after election 
LTB survey 5 months before election 
Paraguay 2003: Pedro Fadul (MPQ) 21.9 
Voting behavior question not asked 
in LTB 2003 
Venezuela 
2000: Francisco Arias Cárdenas 
(Independent) 
35.7 LTB survey 6 months before election 
 
The explanatory variables are measures of government’s economic performance, 
confidence in parties, authoritarian attitudes, satisfaction with the way democracy works, and 
ideology. In order to capture the level of voters’ support for the political system in general, and 
for parties in particular, I use two different measures. First, I look at levels of satisfaction with 
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democracy. This variable is coded on a scale from 1 (not satisified) to 4 (very satisfied) – I treat 
it as a continuous variable. Second, Latinobarómetro and LAPOP have questions on confidence 
in parties. This variable is also coded on a scale from 1 (not satisfied) to 4 (very satisfied). Since 
my intention is to assess the propensity of citizens deeply disenchanted with traditional parties to 
vote for outsiders, I recode this variable into a dummy, in which 1 represents no confidence in 
parties, and 0 represents some and a lot of confidence. However, I also present the results of the 
main model using the continuous variable of “confidence in parties” to make sure that the results 
are not purely driven by the codification of the variable. 
I measure voters’ ideological self-positioning by recoding the standard 10-point left-right 
scale into four dummy categories – ‘right’, ‘center’, ‘left’ and ‘no ideology’ (coded as 1 for those 
respondents who cannot position themselves on the scale). I choose ‘center’ as the reference 
category.  
Regarding the performance of the government, I use a standard sociotropic economic 
voting question61: “Do you consider the country’s present economic situation to be better, about 
the same, or worse than 12 months ago?” I recode this variable into three dummies – ‘worse’, 
‘same’, and ‘better’ (‘same’ is the reference category in all models). 
In order to measure voters’ attitudes towards authoritarian government, I use the 
following question: “With which of the following statements do you agree most? A) Democracy 
is preferable to any other kind of government. B) Under some circumstances, an authoritarian 
government can be preferable to a democratic one. C) For people like me, it doesn’t matter 
                                                 
61 According to most studies of economic voting, assessments of the national economy generally trump pocketbook 
considerations (see Duch & Stevenson, 2008; Kiewiet, 1983). 
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whether we have a democratic or non-democratic regime”. I recode this variable into a dummy, 
coded as 0 if the respondent answered A and 1 if the respondent answered B or C.62  
The models also control for gender, age, education, marital status, religion and socio-
economic status. Details of how each variable is coded can be found in Appendix C. 
5.3.2 Model estimation 
As my primary theoretical concern is distinguishing the vote for an outsider candidate from the 
vote for any other candidate, the analyses discussed in the following section employ binomial 
logit analysis. In addition to mirroring my theoretical concern, binomial logit analysis has the 
added advantage of producing concise tables of coefficients and standard errors that can be easily 
presented.63 
The statistical analysis below is presented in two tables. The first table (Table 5.2) 
presents the results of a pooled model which includes data from the six outsider cases analyzed 
in this chapter. The second table (Table 5.3) includes individual logistic regressions for each 
election-year. Relying on both types of models increases the validity of the results. The pooled 
models have the advantage of being more efficient, while the single level models are useful to 
identify whether the effect of one particular predictor is driven by the idiosyncrasies of one or 
two cases. The same predictors are included in both sets of models. 
The pooled models presented below include data from the two sources used in this paper 
(Latinobarómetro and LAPOP). For the type of models that I run, pulling together surveys from 
                                                 
62 The wording of the question is the same in Latinobarómetro and LAPOP. 
63 I also estimated multinomial logistic regression models for the three cases in which outsiders compete both 
against opposition candidates and against government parties – i.e. Bolivia in 2002, Nicaragua in 2006, and 
Paraguay in 2008. Appendix D presents the results of these models, which largely confirm the effects detected in the 
logistic regressions below. 
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different sources is not a problem as long as the questions included are identical or equivalent, 
which is the case in this analysis. In recent years, important works that use individual-level data 
have pooled together surveys from different sources (Duch & Stevenson, 2008 is the finest 
example). 
 
5.4 RESULTS 
In this section I present the results of the empirical models. I find that voters who do not trust 
political parties and who identify themselves as leftists are more likely to vote for outsiders. I 
also find that, in some contexts, voters with authoritarian attitudes are more likely to support 
outsiders. Table 5.2 displays the results of the pooled binomial logit model. Table 5.3 display the 
results of the logistic regressions analyzing the vote for outsiders in single elections. 
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Table 5.2. Binomial logit models of the vote for outsiders (pooled models) 
 
 (1) (2) 
   
No confidence in parties (dummy) .36***  
 (.07)  
Confidence in parties (continuous)  -.20***  
  (.04) 
Positive economic evaluation -.15 -.15 
 (.11) (.11) 
Negative economic evaluation .10 .10 
 (.07) (.07) 
Authoritarian attitudes .28*** .28*** 
 (.06) (.07) 
Satisfaction with democracy -.32*** -.32*** 
 (.04) (.04) 
Left .52*** .52*** 
 (.08) (.08) 
Right -.62*** -.61*** 
 (.09) (.09) 
No ideology -.12 -.12 
 (.10) (.11) 
Age -.01 -.01 
 (.02) (.02) 
Gender (male) .35*** .34*** 
 (.07) (.07) 
Education -.06*** -.06*** 
 (.02) (.02) 
Catholic -.25*** -.24*** 
 (.09) (.09) 
Socioeconomic level -.01 -.01 
 (.03) (.03) 
Unemployment -.34*** -.34*** 
 (.12) (.12) 
Constant -.25 .27 
 (.20) (.20) 
   
Number of Elections 6 6 
Observations 5181 5181 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5.3. Binomial logit models of the vote for outsiders (individual models) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Ehlers 1996 Chávez  
1998 
Toledo  
2001 
Morales 
2002 
     
No confidence in parties .55** .24* .21 .57*** 
 (.25) (.14) (.22) (.15) 
Positive economic evaluation .14 -.06 .66** -.25 
 (.39) (.24) (.31) (.30) 
Negative economic evaluation .06 .19 .02 .40** 
 (.27) (.16) (.20) (.16) 
Authoritarian attitudes .20 .65*** -.49** -.10 
 (.25) (.16) (.22) (.15) 
Satisfaction with democracy -.04 -.23*** .22** -.24** 
 (.15) (.08) (.12) (.10) 
Left -.03 .81*** -.34 .26 
 (.31) (.22) (.28) (.17) 
Right -.50 -.65*** -.41** -1.28*** 
 (.33) (.18) (.23) (.22) 
No ideology -.25 -.29 -.44 -.19 
 (.43) (.27) (.29) (.27) 
Age .01 -.03 .05 -.08 
 (.09) (.06) (.07) (.05) 
Gender (male) .06 .49*** .07 .56*** 
 (.25) (.15) (.19) (.15) 
Education .08 -.01 -.04 -.09* 
 (.09) (.05) (.07) (.05) 
Catholic -.24 .07 .01 -.49*** 
 (.36) (.22) (.34) (.17) 
Socioeconomic level .26 .17** .09 -.28*** 
 (.16) (.09) (.12) (.07) 
Unemployment -.49 -.08 -.41 -.22 
 (.76) (.31) (.36) (.19) 
Constant -2.77*** -.18 -.21 -.83 
 (.89) (.15) (.58) (.45) 
     
Observations 718 846 500 1874 
Pseudo R2 .03 .11 .03 .10 
             Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5.3. (continued) 
 
 (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Correa  
2006 
Jarquín 
2006 
Humala  
2006 
Lugo 
2008 
     
No confidence in parties .34* .88*** .52*** .17 
 (.19) (.32) (.17) (.15) 
Positive economic evaluation -.20 .24 -.39* -.16 
 (.24) (.44) (.22) (.33) 
Negative economic evaluation -.13 .48 .35** .56*** 
 (.20) (.34) (.17) (.18) 
Authoritarian attitudes -.02 .05 .68*** -.51*** 
 (.18) (.31) (.15) (.15) 
Satisfaction with democracy .17 -.29 -.37*** .02 
 (.12) (.18) (.12) (.11) 
Left .48** -.42 1.27*** .44*** 
 (.24) (.36) (.20) (.23) 
Right -.52** -.75* -.55** -.41** 
 (.25) (.41) (.22) (.19) 
No ideology -.19 -.19 -.01 -.18 
 (.25) (.55) (.21) (.19) 
Age -.02 -.51*** -.04 .09 
 (.06) (.14) (.05) (.06) 
Gender (male) .18 .19 .57*** .03 
 (.18) (.31) (.15) (.14) 
Education .09 -.03 -.12** .08 
 (.06) (.10) (.05) (.05) 
Catholic .002 -.18 -.40** 1.05 
 (.25) (.30) (.18) (.29) 
Socioeconomic level .03 .24 .01 -.07 
 (.11) (.16) (.06) (.08) 
Unemployment .89 1.04** -.49* .13 
 (.81) (.47) (.29) (.35) 
Constant -2.05*** -1.08 -.42 -2.13*** 
 (.52) (.77) (.50) (.53) 
     
Observations 701 585 1042 875 
Pseudo R2 .03 .11 .13 .06 
             Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The main argument in this chapter is that the crisis of democratic representation in Latin 
America is associated with the high electoral support received by outsider candidates. One of the 
clearest signs of this crisis of representation in the region is partisan dealignment. Whether the 
reason for citizens’ disenchantment with political parties in Latin America is policy failure, 
moral failure, or –as it is more likely– a combination of both factors; the empirical analysis 
presented above clearly shows that the emergence of outsider candidates provides an outlet for 
this dissatisfaction. Table 5.2 shows that voters who do not trust political parties are considerably 
more likely to vote for outsiders than for established opposition parties. Similarly, Table 5.3 
reveals that voters with no confidence in parties are more likely to vote for outsiders than for 
government parties.64 All in all, there is very strong evidence suggesting that citizens with anti-
party sentiments are more likely to vote for outsiders than for candidates of established parties. 
Tables 5.2 and 5.3 also reveal that ideology is an important determinant of the vote for 
outsiders in Latin America. In line with Hypothesis 5.3, Table 5.2 shows that voters on the left 
are more likely to vote for outsiders than voters on the right, the center, and non-ideological 
voters. While it is reasonable to expect that non-ideological voters (i.e. voters who cannot place 
themselves in the left-right scale) would be most likely to support outsiders, the results do not 
confirm this pattern. On the contrary, they clearly suggest an ideological, rather than a non-
ideological, vote for outsiders. The results from Table 5.3 reveal that this relationship is quite 
consistent across the different cases of "outsidership” analyzed in this chapter. Voters on the left 
of the political spectrum were more likely to vote for outsiders Chávez, Morales, Correa, 
                                                 
64 Only in two cases (Toledo in 2001 and Lugo in 2008), the results cast doubt on the link between low confidence 
in parties and vote for outsiders over opposition candidates. In both cases, the coefficient has the expected sign but 
falls short of statistical significance. This is probably due to the fact that in these elections there were other anti-
establishment parties (e.g. UNACE in Paraguay) which captured some of the protest vote against traditional parties, 
thereby weakening the link between anti-party sentiments and vote for the outsider candidate. 
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Humala, and Lugo.65 In many Latin American countries, outsider candidates appear to have 
given voice and representation to segments of the population that were hurt by market reforms 
but could not find any credible party option on the left of the political spectrum.  
The final expectation in this chapter is that the vote for outsiders is related to citizens’ 
dissatisfaction with the way democracy works in their countries. The empirical results provide 
partial support for this hypothesis. The coefficient for ‘satisfaction with democracy’ in Table 5.2 
is signed in the expected direction. Voters who are satisfied with the way democracy works in 
their countries are less likely to support outsiders. However, a closer look at the individual 
models in Table 5.3 shows that this relationship holds in three cases only. Venezuelan, Bolivian, 
and Peruvian voters who were satisfied with the way democracy worked in their countries were 
significantly less likely to support outsiders Chávez, Morales, and Humala than traditional 
opposition parties. Overall, these results suggest that the vote for outsiders in Latin American 
presidential elections is more strongly associated with specific distrust in political parties and the 
political establishment than with diffuse distrust in democratic political institutions.66 
As for the alternative explanations, the results indicate that economic perceptions are a 
weak predictor of support for outsiders. None of the coefficients measuring economic 
perceptions in the pooled models is statistically significant. However, the results from the 
country models presented in Table 5.3 suggest a more nuanced finding. In five out of the eight 
models, negative economic evaluations do not influence the vote for outsiders. But in the three 
other cases (Morales in 2002, Humala in 2006, and Lugo in 2008), the coefficient is statistically 
significant and signed in the expected direction. In these three elections, citizens with negative 
                                                 
65 In the case of Morales, the coefficient has the expected direction but falls just short of statistical significance 
(P>|z| = .122). 
66 On the distinction between specific and diffuse political support see Easton (1965, 1975). 
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economic perceptions were more likely to support an outsider politician.67 In sum, mistrust in 
parties is a better predictor of support for outsiders than standard measures of economic 
evaluation. This suggests that the vote for outsiders is grounded on a deep-seated disenchantment 
with the political class, rather than a simple negative assessment of the recent economic 
performance of the incumbent government.  
The empirical results also estimate the impact of voters’ authoritarian attitudes on support 
for outsiders. Table 5.2 suggests that voters who hold authoritarian attitudes are more likely to 
choose outsiders over other traditional opposition parties – the effect is statistically significant at 
the 1 percent level. However, the effect visible in the pooled model does not hold in all the 
individual cases (see Table 5.3). In fact, the expected relationship between authoritarian attitudes 
and vote for outsiders only holds for Chávez in 1998 and Humala in 2006. This result is not 
entirely surprising because both leaders had a long military career before running for president. 
Chávez had even been involved in a failed military coup in 1992. This finding is consistent with 
previous research in political psychology which demonstrates that voters possess different 
personality traits and orientate their assessment of candidates according to the principle of 
likeness (Caprara, Schwartz, Capanna, Vecchione, & Barbaranelli, 2006). Hence, outsiders who 
had a military career before entering the political arena are especially appealing to voters with 
authoritarian predispositions.  
In two cases, the results show that voters with authoritarian predispositions were actually 
less likely to support outsiders (Toledo in 2001 and Lugo in 2008). This can be explained by the 
political context faced by these two outsiders. The case of Toledo is hardly surprising given the 
                                                 
67 The results of the multinomial models in Appendix D suggest that voters with negative economic evaluations are 
less likely to vote for the incumbent party, but not necessarily more likely to vote for an outsider (over a traditional 
opposition party). When the incumbent party is not in the race, citizens’ economic evaluations do not predict the 
vote for an outsider candidate (or only weakly do so). 
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fact that he emerged as an outsider in the late 1990s in opposition to the authoritarian regime of 
Fujimori. Even though he rose to power as an outsider, Toledo was a well-known supporter of 
democracy during the Fujimori regime. Lugo also emerged as the leader of a coalition opposed 
to the incumbent Partido Colorado, which had been in power during the long authoritarian period 
in Paraguay until the end of the 20th century and was still engaged in semi-authoritarian 
practices. He was also running against Lino Oviedo, a retired army general. It makes sense then 
that Lugo was supported by voters with democratic inclinations. In sum, the impact of 
authoritarian attitudes on support for outsiders is contingent on the profile of the outsiders 
themselves and on the nature of the other candidates (and parties) in the race. 
 
5.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter demonstrates that a series of individual-level factors have an impact on the 
propensity to vote for outsider candidates in Latin American presidential elections. More 
specifically, I showed that citizens who do not trust political parties are much more likely to vote 
for outsider presidential candidates. The results also show that leftist voters are more likely to 
vote for outsiders than voters who place themselves on the right and on the center of the political 
spectrum, and voters who have no political ideology. In terms of government performance, the 
findings indicate that economic evaluations are not a strong predictor of support for outsider 
candidates in presidential elections.   
This chapter identifies factors that are always good predictors of the vote for outsiders 
(lack of confidence in parties, leftist orientation), and factors that influence support for outsiders 
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differently depending on the context in which these independent candidates emerge, and 
depending on the personal characteristics of the candidates. More specifically, I demonstrate that 
authoritarian predispositions increase support for outsiders only when the outsiders had a 
military career before entering politics. 
The main conclusion of this chapter is that the crisis of representation that swept Third 
Wave democracies in Latin America paved the way for the emergence of outsider candidates not 
associated with a discredited political class. The policy and moral failures of established parties 
after the democratic transitions increased citizens’ disenchantment with the political status quo 
and allowed ambitious outsiders to mount successful and appealing presidential campaigns. 
Moreover, the results of the empirical analysis presented above suggest that outsiders provided 
leftist voters with a representation channel that was closed during the neoliberal period when 
parties that where traditionally on the left of the political spectrum adopted painful market 
reforms. 
So far, this study has analyzed the different institutional, contextual, and individual-level 
factors that are associated with the rise of outsider candidates in national elections. One of the 
main findings of the first part of the dissertation is that institutional characteristics within 
presidentialism matter to explain the emergence of independence candidates, while the broad 
distinction between presidentialism and parliamentarism is not a good predictor of outsider rise. 
Hence, I concluded that the claim that the rise of outsiders is a peril of presidentialism is not 
empirically supported by the available data. 
However, the critics of presidentialism described the rise of outsiders as a “peril of 
presidentialism” for another reason. Regardless of whether their rise to power had anything to do 
with the presidential system, authors such as Linz (1994) and Suárez (1982) considered the 
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election of outsiders as a threat for democratic stability and governability. According to these 
scholars, outsiders are problematic because they have little administrative or political experience 
when they come to power; and because they are more likely to commit excesses and centralize 
power. The argument was basically that outsiders constituted a threat for presidentialism, in 
addition to being a peril of presidentialism. 
In spite of the tendency of Latin American presidents to centralize power and 
prerogatives, this argument was overlooked by students of Latin American political institutions. 
In line with the theoretical framework introduced in Chapter 2, the next two chapters will tackle 
this important question. I will assess whether the election of outsiders threatens democratic 
governability and institutional performance in Latin American presidential systems. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 131 
6.0  OUTSIDERS AND EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE CONFLICT 
In June 1990, the presidential elections in Peru produced a shocking result. Alberto Fujimori, a 
university professor that was virtually unknown by the broader public six months before the 
election, was elected president. This unexpected electoral result led to a minority president who 
did not have enough support in the legislature to implement his policy agenda. In April 1992, 
Fujimori argued that emergency measures were needed to combat terrorism and to restructure the 
state and the economy. In order to overcome the gridlock created by the opposition in the 
legislative body, Fujimori decided to shut down Congress (Kenney, 2004). This example shows 
that executive-legislative relations may become strained when the executive power is held by a 
political outsider. Outsider presidents are more likely to face situations of institutional paralysis, 
and in some extreme cases this situation may result in the dissolution of the legislative body by 
the executive branch. This chapter will analyze the impact of outsider presidents on executive-
legislative relations by conducting a large-N quantitative analysis and an in-depth qualitative 
assessment of the conflictive interbranch relations under Fujimori.  
One of the defining features of presidentialism is the fact that both the chief executive 
and the legislature are popularly elected. Moreover, the terms of office of both president and 
assembly are fixed (Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997a: 14-18; Shugart & Carey, 1992: 18-27).68 One 
                                                 
68 By contrast, only the members of parliament are elected in a parliamentary system; and they are in charge of 
selecting the chief executive (prime minister). 
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of the questions that have most interested scholars of Latin American presidential systems is the 
type of relationship that is established between presidents and assemblies. Since both the 
president and the legislature are key democratic institutions in presidential systems, executive-
legislative relations have an impact on government efficiency, governability, and democratic 
stability (Jones, 2012; Morgenstern & Nacif, 2002; Shugart & Carey, 1992). 
Executive-legislative conflict is one of the “perils of presidentialism” identified by Linz 
(Linz, 1990, 1994). According to this scholar, the dual democratic legitimacy in presidential 
systems is problematic. Both the president and the Congress have popular legitimacy since they 
are elected in democratic elections. It follows that “a conflict is always latent and sometimes 
likely to erupt dramatically; there is no democratic principle to resolve it” (Linz, 1994: 7). I 
argue that the risk of executive-legislative confrontation is more acute when the president is an 
outsider who has no political experience and lacks support in Congress. 
The link between outsider presidents and executive-legislative conflict has not been 
sufficiently studied. In fact, the comparative study of the consequences of political outsiders has 
been neglected by the literature. This is the first study that seeks to assess the political 
consequences of the arrival to power of outsider politicians. 
In this chapter, I will first propose a theory of the link between outsiders and executive-
legislative confrontation which builds on the general theoretical framework presented in chapter 
2. Then, I will review the relevant literature that has addressed issues related to executive-
legislative conflict in order to identify a series of alternative explanations. My arguments 
regarding outsiders and executive-legislative confrontation will then be empirically tested using 
data from the original database of political outsiders that I described in Chapter 2. In the final 
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section of this chapter, I conduct an in-depth analysis of executive-legislative relations in Peru 
under Fujimori to assess the validity of the causal mechanisms I propose. 
6.1 THEORY: OUTSIDERS AND EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE CONFRONTATION 
The increased risk of executive-legislative conflict has been presented as one of the 
disadvantages of presidentialism. According to Lijphart (1992a: 15) the problem of executive-
legislative conflict “is the inevitable result of the co-existence of the two independent organs that 
presidential government creates and that may be in disagreement”. In fact, unlike the mechanism 
of legislative no-confidence in parliamentary systems, there is no institutional means of resolving 
a confrontation between the executive and the legislative branches of government, which may 
lead to deadlock and paralysis. The problem of executive-legislative conflict is aggravated by the 
temporal rigidity of presidential systems. The fixed term in office of the president and the fixed 
duration of the legislative period do not leave room for the readjustments that political events 
may require (Linz, 1990). 
The main argument of this chapter is that this problem of presidential systems is 
exacerbated when a political outsider is in power. I contend that the rise of outsiders has 
deleterious consequences for executive-legislative relations. The rise of political outsiders has 
also been identified as one of the perils of presidentialism (Linz, 1994). The arrival to power of 
independent candidates may increase the level of executive-legislative confrontation for four 
main reasons.  
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6.1.1 Outsiders as minority presidents 
The rise of outsiders increases the likelihood of a minority president, i.e. a president supported 
only by a minority of the legislators in Congress. In fact, outsiders arrive to power through a new 
party that is often nothing more than the electoral vehicle they use during presidential elections. 
However, once in power outsiders have to face the opposition of the established parties in the 
legislature. The lack of presidential majorities imperils government stability and significantly 
increases the likelihood of executive-legislative gridlock (Linz, 1990, 1994). However, more 
recent studies have shown that interbranch cooperation is not automatically impaired when the 
president is in a minority situation (Cheibub, 2002; Negretto, 2006). 
The greatest potential for executive-legislative conflict exists when the president’s party 
is unable to sustain a veto, and when no cabinet coalition holding a majority of seats in the 
legislature is formed (Negretto, 2006). Outsider presidents often find themselves in this exact 
situation, as Negretto shows in his contribution (Table 1 in Negretto, 2006). Two outsider 
presidents included in his analysis (Fujimori and Chávez) lacked the support of both the median 
and the veto legislator (see also Colomer & Negretto, 2005). Table 6.1 shows the percentage of 
seats in the lower chamber of Congress held by the president’s party when the president is an 
outsider (compared to the average percentage in the period 1980-2010 in each country). 
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Table 6.1. Percentage of seats of outsiders’ parties in the legislature 
Outsider Presidents 
Percentage of Seats of the President’s 
Party in the Legislature (First Year in 
Office) 
Average Percentage of the 
President’s Parties in the Legislature 
in Each Country (1980-2010) 
   
Lucio Gutiérrez 
(Ecuador: 2003-2005) 
 
2% 22% 
Rafael Correa 
(Ecuador: 2007-?) 
 
1% 22% 
Violeta Chamorro 
(Nicaragua: 1990-1996) 
 
55.4% 48.9% 
Fernando Lugo 
(Paraguay: 2008-2012) 
 
36.3% 47.8% 
Alberto Fujimori 
(Perú: 1990-2001) 
 
17.8% 44.5% 
Hugo Chávez 
(Venezuela: 1998-2013) 
 
22.2% 45% 
      Source: Database “Legislatures in Latin America” (Pérez-Liñán et al., 2011) 
 
As can be observed in the table, outsider presidents have considerably smaller legislative 
contingents than insider presidents. Some outsider parties are little more than empty shells 
serving as an electoral vehicle for an independent candidate. Hence, some outsiders –such as 
Gutiérrez, Correa, Fujimori, and Chávez– clearly fall in the worst case scenario identified by 
Negretto. 
 
6.1.2 Lack of political experience and democratic socialization 
Outsiders tend to lack a political and democratic socialization that would lead them to reach out 
to other political forces and seek compromises. In fact, political parties in democratic countries 
play a key role in the recruitment and socialization of democratic political elites. In the words of 
Levitsky and Cameron (2003: 4), political parties “provide the foundation for a democratic 
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political class.” Even if they have experienced serious political conflicts during their career, 
experienced party politicians tend to be imbued with a democratic culture. They are aware that 
political decisions often involve negotiations and compromises, both within and between parties. 
This give-and-take nature of political decision-making is often negatively perceived by pundits 
and public opinion alike, but it is essential to the good functioning of a democratic polity. Party 
politicians become socialized with a series of implicit rules that govern the democratic game. 
They accept that elections can be lost and that policy proposals can be defeated if the majority so 
decides. Outsiders are political amateurs who lack this democratic socialization within 
established political parties and, in some cases, do not have a commitment to democratic 
institutions. Levitsky and Cameron (2003: 5) point out that outsiders are less likely than insiders 
“to have experience with (and be oriented toward) democratic practices, such as negotiation, 
compromise, and coalition building.” 
 This lack of political experience and democratic socialization has a direct impact on 
executive-legislative relations. In presidential systems, the president often needs to cooperate 
with Congress in order to enact some of its policies, especially when he is in a minority situation. 
Outsiders may be less inclined to undertake the necessary negotiations which can lead to an 
institutional paralysis. Even if they actively pursue agreements with the legislature, outsider 
presidents may lack the political skills and the connections necessary to build stable support for 
their policies in the legislature. Outsider presidents are likely to lack ties with traditional parties. 
As a consequence, their cabinets tend to be constituted by members of their personal networks of 
support (cronies) with very limited previous experience in public administration. In the words of 
Shugart and Carey (1992: 33): “political outsiders are likely to be less disposed than ‘insiders’ to 
coalition building.” Using a database on political coalitions created by Altman (Altman, 2000; 
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Altman & Castiglioni, 2008), we can evaluate the composition of the first cabinet of three 
outsiders (Alberto Fujimori, Hugo Chávez, and Lucio Gutiérrez) who were in a clear minority 
situation.69 Despite having only 18% support in the legislature, only three of fourteen ministers 
in the first Fujimori cabinet were partisans. In a similar vein, Chávez’ first cabinet had a 
considerable number of independent ministers (six out of nineteen). More importantly, the 
“partisan” ministers belonged to the party of the president (Movimiento Quinta República) or to 
parties that were allied to Chávez (Patria Para Todos and the Communist Party). But these 
parties combined only had 24% of the seats in the legislature. The Venezuelan outsider was not 
willing or able to reach out to other parties in the opposition with a greater legislative contingent. 
Finally, Gutiérrez had a majority of partisan ministers (11 out of 15), but the three forces 
represented in the cabinet (Partido Sociedad Patriótica 21 de Enero, Movimiento Pachakutik, 
and Movimiento Popular Democrático) amounted only to 20% of the seats in the legislature 
which shows his inability to negotiate a deal with the major opposition parties.  
There is a broad consensus in the literature that presidents use cabinet choices as strategic 
tools to get their policy agenda through the legislature (Alemán & Tsebelis, 2010; Cheibub et al., 
2004; Martínez-Gallardo, 2011; Raile, Pereira, & Power, 2011). Minority presidents often strive 
to build majority or near-majority cabinet coalitions in order to compensate for their weakness in 
the legislature  (Amorim Neto, 2002; Deheza, 1998). This tendency of minority presidents to 
construct multiparty coalitions to promote their legislative agendas can be observed by analyzing 
a database on cabinet composition in Latin America built by Amorim Neto (2006).70 Out of the 
82 Latin American presidents who governed as minority presidents in the period 1980-2000 (i.e. 
presidents that had less than 50% support in the legislature), 59 built majority or near-majority 
                                                 
69 I thank David Altman for generously sharing this database. 
70 I thank Otavio Amorim Neto for generously sharing this database. 
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coalitions recruiting a high number of partisan ministers (at least 45% of cabinet members with a 
partisan profile). The decision taken by most outsiders to form non-partisan cabinets is clearly 
not the standard reaction of minority presidents. 
Given that appointing cabinet members from the most represented parties in the 
legislature is essential to establish stable legislative coalitions when the president’s party is in the 
minority, the inability of outsider presidents to form broad-based coalitions is detrimental to 
executive-legislative relations. To compensate for this weakness, outsiders tend to engage more 
often in patronage and pork in order to build temporary legislative coalitions (Siavelis & 
Morgenstern, 2008). But these coalitions are much more volatile and are less successful at 
preventing repeated episodes of executive-legislative confrontation.  
 
6.1.3 Public tolerance for executive excesses 
Another factor that may explain a higher risk of executive-legislative confrontation when the 
president is an outsider is the popular support for executive abuses. As shown in the theoretical 
framework in Chapter 2 (and confirmed in the empirical findings of the previous chapters), 
outsiders tend to come to power in difficult moments of economic and sociopolitical crisis. In 
that context, citizens tend to be disenchanted with political institutions and distrust political 
parties. Outsiders are seen as saviors who can clean up the corruption and inefficiency of 
traditional parties and politicians. 
Political outsiders are then more likely to engage in authoritarian excesses against these 
discredited institutions and they are less concerned about cooperating with the legislature. In 
fact, they suspect that the legislature will side with them in case of institutional paralysis and 
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blame the legislators for all the problems. Since they are less likely to pay a political price for 
their excesses, outsiders should engage more frequently in undemocratic behaviors which 
generate interbranch conflicts. 
6.1.4 Outsiders are not constrained by organized parties 
When traditional parties are in power, they are concerned about the “shadow of the future”. An 
authoritarian excess by the president may negatively affect the reputation of the party for a long 
time. For instance, a traditional party that tries to bypass Congress (or even dissolve the 
legislature) may be harshly sanctioned by voters. Moreover, the other established parties may 
prefer not to ally with a party that abuses its power and engages in unconstitutional moves. 
Hence, it may be a bad strategy for an established party in power to directly confront Congress 
even when it is temporarily unable to govern because it lacks support in the legislature. As a 
result, established parties tend to constrain their own party leaders to make sure that they remain 
within the democratic rules of the games. This pressure exerted by party organizations on their 
own leaders facilitates cooperative executive-legislative relations. 
The calculus for an outsider president is completely different. If outsiders are not able to 
govern effectively the first time they are in office, they may not have any political future at all. 
Since the parties that take outsiders to power are often nothing more than empty shells, these 
parties have much less to lose when the president attempts audacious moves –e.g. a Congress 
dissolution attempt–. In sum, political outsiders in office may be more prone to take risks 
because their political future is inextricably linked to the success they have in office. When 
outsiders lack support in Congress, they are then much more likely than non-outsider presidents 
to engage in authoritarian excesses and to bypass the legislature. 
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These arguments yield the following hypotheses: 
H6.1: Executive-legislative confrontation is more likely when the president is an outsider. 
H6.2: Congress dissolution attempts are more likely when the president is an outsider. 
6.2 ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS OF INTERBRANCH CONFLICTS 
The literature on comparative presidentialism has identified several other possible explanations 
for executive-legislative conflict. In a seminal piece, Mainwaring (1993) argues that presidential 
systems and multipartism are a “difficult combination” which is inimical to stable democratic 
governance for three main reasons. First, the risk of executive-legislative deadlock is more acute 
because the president is likely to lack stable support in the legislature in a fragmented system 
with many relevant parties. Second, in multiparty systems competition tends to be centrifugal 
which makes compromise and cooperation between the different parties (and between the 
different branches of government) more difficult to achieve. Finally, the formation of interparty 
coalitions to deal with these problems is difficult in presidential systems. On the one hand, the 
commitment of individual legislators to support an agreement negotiated by the party leadership 
is not assured. On the other hand, in multiparty presidential systems party leaders have incentives 
to distance themselves from the president in office when elections approach, which increases the 
likelihood of executive-legislative deadlock.  
A split in the president’s party may also increase the level of confrontation between the 
executive and the legislative branches of government. When the presidential party is divided, the 
different factions have conflicting incentives. While they may want to cooperate on certain 
issues, they also have incentives to attack the other factions in order to attract voters to their own 
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faction (Katz, 1986; Morgenstern, 2001). This is especially true when elections approach if the 
electoral system allows or encourages different factions to participate in the race as happened in 
Uruguay or Colombia until recent electoral reforms. Moreover, intraparty rivalries often result 
from ideological differences. According to Morgenstern (2001: 243) “the factions are 
ideologically disposed to competition”. Hence, when the president’s party is divided into 
factions, the administration is less likely to obtain support from its own party for key bills, 
increasing the likelihood of interbranch conflict. 
In his book on presidential crises –defined as “extreme instances of executive-legislative 
conflict” (Pérez-Liñán, 2007: 7)–, Pérez-Liñán identifies two other factors that may produce 
confrontation between the two branches of government: political scandals and popular protests. 
Pérez-Liñán (2007: chapter 4) discusses the role of the media in communicating scandals that 
increase popular dissatisfaction with democratic presidents. The liberalization that followed the 
Third Wave of democratization increased the freedom of the press and permitted the creation of 
a right environment for the politics of scandal. These political scandals often produce popular 
protests that lead to an increase in executive-legislative confrontation. Deep public 
dissatisfaction may result in popular uprisings against the president. Analyzing elected presidents 
in Latin America between 1978 and 2003, Hochstetler (2006) argues that street protests are the 
main determinant of presidential failures, which is a partner phenomenon to the executive-
legislative confrontation analyzed here. Media scandals and popular protests have an impact on 
executive-legislative relations most notably because they lead to a decrease in presidential 
approval (Pérez-Liñán, 2007: 114-124). Scholars of American politics have shown that declines 
in the level of presidential approval may create hurdles in executive-legislative relations. 
Presidential popularity influences the success of presidential policy initiatives (Rivers & Rose, 
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1985). Congress tends to be more reluctant to support bills proposed by an unpopular president. 
In fact, legislators may be concerned about reelection and decide whether they support the 
president based on the latter’s approval ratings (Edwards, 1976; Neustadt, 1964). 
Executive-legislative relations may also be more conflictive when the rule of law is weak. 
One of the key dimensions of the rule of law is the establishment of “networks of responsibility 
and accountability which entail that all public and private agents, including the highest state 
officials, are subject to appropriate, legally established controls on the lawfulness of their acts” 
(O'Donnell, 2004: 36). In countries where the rule of law is weak and the judiciary is not an 
effective umpire, political players (both in the executive and in the legislature) are more likely to 
commit abuses and unlawful acts because they know that they are less likely to be held 
accountable. These excesses in turn make executive-legislative confrontation more likely. 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to control for this alternative explanation in the quantitative 
analysis. The existing databases of judicial independence cover only some of the countries 
included in this analysis (e.g. La Porta, López-de-Silanes, Pop-Eleches, & Shleifer, 2004) or a 
limited time period (e.g. Howard & Carey, 2004), so including this variable in the analysis would 
do more harm than good. However, it is important to keep this explanation in mind when we 
analyze the results. 
6.2.1 Presidential dissolution of congress 
This chapter also studies the impact of outsider presidents on executive attempts to dissolve the 
legislature. A congress dissolution attempt or autogolpe (self-coups) can be considered as an 
extreme manifestation of executive-legislative confrontation. Congress dissolutions weaken 
mechanisms of horizontal accountability. According to Cameron (1998: 126), autogolpes 
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threaten democratic governability “by broadening the scope for executive abuses of power and 
destabilizing the self-correcting mechanisms that inhere in a functioning system of checks and 
balances.” Only a limited number of studies have looked into this issue, but they have produced 
interesting findings. 
The first important conclusion of this literature is that the closure of congress is a rare 
event, which is attempted by presidents only under exceptional circumstances. According to 
Pérez-Liñán (2005: 52), in the post-Third Wave Latin American democracies “most cases of 
[interbranch] dissolution have involved the removal of the president from office rather than the 
closure of congress” (see also Helmke, 2010: 743). This is mainly due to the fact that, since 
democratization, Latin American constitutions have gradually removed constitutional tools used 
by authoritarian presidents to dissolve congress. This has created an institutional imbalance 
which favors legislatures because constitutions normally retain impeachment mechanisms. 
Moreover, the likelihood of military intervention in support of the executive during an 
interbranch crisis has been considerably reduced since the democratic transitions (Pérez-Liñán, 
2005). 
However, there have been five instances of congress dissolution in Latin America after 
the democratic transitions, as detailed in Table 6.2. As the table shows, Latin American 
presidents have used two main mechanisms to dissolve congress: 1) self-coup or 2) an indirect 
dissolution through a Constituent Assembly dominated by the president. Moreover, there have 
been several other instances of presidents threatening to dissolve the legislature. 
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Table 6.2. Congress dissolutions in Latin America (1980-2014) 
COUNTRY YEAR PRESIDENT MECHANISM 
Colombia 1991 César Gaviria 
Congress dissolved by a 
Constituent Assembly 
 
Peru 1992 Alberto Fujimori 
Self-coup 
 
Guatemala 1993 Jorge Serrano 
Self-coup 
 
Venezuela 1999 Hugo Chávez 
Congress dissolved by a 
Constituent Assembly 
 
Ecuador 2007 Rafael Correa 
Congress dissolved by a 
Constituent Assembly 
 
 
The existing literature suggests several explanations for this phenomenon. Kenney (2004) 
offers the most detailed analysis of Fujimori’s self-coup in Peru. The central argument in 
Kenney’s book is that minority presidents with weak support in the legislature tend to face much 
more acute executive-legislative crises, which in turn increases the likelihood of a congress 
dissolution attempt by the president. This argument is corroborated in the final chapter of 
Kenney’s book with information from constitutional crises in many Latin American countries 
during the 20th century. 
In a similar vein, Pérez-Liñán (2006: 137) points out that runoff elections can produce an 
“outcome inversion.” The artificial majority created by the second round of the election creates a 
false sense of legitimacy for the election winner, while simultaneously upsetting the losing party 
which is likely to have more seats in the legislature. Hence, an “outcome inversion” might 
considerably increase the risk of institutional instability and congress dissolution attempt by the 
executive. 
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Helmke (2010) proposes a different explanation of institutional instability focusing on the 
strategic behavior of three institutional actors (the executive, the legislature, the judiciary). These 
institutions weigh the pros and cons of initiating an interbranch conflict. A severe institutional 
conflict between these branches is more likely when there is a clear imbalance of institutional 
powers because the concentration of institutional powers in one of the branches increases the 
stakes of interbranch disagreement.71 The president is also more likely to initiate an “attack” on 
the legislature when this “target” branch is perceived as illegitimate by the public. 
Another factor that may explain congress dissolution attempts by the president is 
“constitutional fluidity.” Constitutional fluidity refers to a situation in which a constitutional 
assembly has been elected and places itself above the constitutional rules regulating the process 
of dissolution (Pérez-Liñán, 2005). On several occasions, Latin American presidents have used 
this mechanism to dissolve legislatures in which they had minority support (see Table 6.2). 
In sum, the existing literature has related congress dissolution attempts by the executive to a 
series of institutional factors (minority presidencies, institutional imbalances, constitutional 
fluidity, and democratization). Without disregarding the importance of these factors, I expand on 
the conventional wisdom by showing that the previous career and political socialization (or lack 
thereof) of the president is key to understand authoritarian excesses. 
                                                 
71 For a similar argument, see Pérez-Liñán (2006). 
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6.3 RESEARCH DESIGN 
6.3.1 Data 
The data on executive-legislative confrontation comes from a database on political processes in 
Latin America compiled by a team of researchers of the University of Pittsburgh (Pérez-Liñán et 
al., 2008). The unit of analysis in the database is the administration-year. This database was 
created using the Latin American Weekly Report (LAWR) as the source of information on 
political scandals, popular protests, and institutional conflicts in the region. LAWR presents 
itself as providing ''timely and concise risk-oriented briefing”.72 Hence, LAWR is attentive to 
interbranch conflicts that can be politically destabilizing. However, because of its weekly format, 
LAWR reports only the most important events. Since I am interested in serious and politically 
destabilizing executive-legislative conflicts -and not in the disagreements over policies between 
the incumbent government and the opposition that constitute the normal political process-, this 
bias toward more dramatic events is in fact an advantage (Hochstetler, 2006). 
The first dependent variable in this study is based on one of the variables in this database 
coded 1 if there was a visible episode of executive-legislative confrontation during the year and 0 
otherwise. An executive-legislative confrontation includes different types of episodes, including 
a conflict related to the approval of bills, a confrontation in which the Congress or the President 
question their authority or ability to legislate, and a conflict related to the impeachment of 
ministers. 
                                                 
72 http://www.latinnews.com/lwcILWR_2315.asp 
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In order to test the second hypothesis regarding Congress dissolution attempts, I use a 
different variable from the political processes database (Pérez-Liñán et al., 2008) as the 
dependent variable. I use a variable measuring whether there was any threat of dissolving the 
legislative assembly during a given year. The variable is coded as 1 if the president attempted to 
close Congress and 0 if there was no threat of dissolution.  
The variable “threat of congress dissolution attempt” captures both trial balloons in which 
presidents seek to assert their power vis-à-vis the legislature and more serious dissolution 
attempts in which presidents take more concrete steps to dissolve the congress. The dissolution 
threats issued by Jaime Roldós Aguilera (president of Ecuador between 1979 and 1981) in 1980 
and the threats issued by Rafael Caldera (president of Venezuela between 1994 and 1999) in 
1994 are good examples of the former scenario. Both of these presidents faced strong opposition 
in the legislature when they reached the presidency. In order to send a message to the congress 
and consolidate their position, Roldós and Caldera publicly threatened to close the congress if 
the opposition parties made it impossible for them to govern (Hurtado, 1990; Semana, 1994). 
However, they did not carry out these threats. On the contrary, other presidents such as the 
outsiders Fujimori, Chávez, and Correa implemented these dissolution threats by taking active 
steps to close the congress and reorganize the political system.  
The main independent variable in this study comes from an original database on political 
outsiders. In line with the operationalization discussed in Chapter 2, I code as an outsider any 
president that has no previous political experience and comes from outside of the established 
party system. A list of all the outsider presidents in this analysis is presented in Table 6.3. 
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Table 6.3. Outsider presidents included in the statistical analysis 
COUNTRY OUTSIDERS 
Ecuador 2003-2005: Lucio Gutiérrez (PSP):  
2006-: Rafael Correa (Alianza País) 
Nicaragua 1990-1996: Violeta Chamorro (UNO) 
Perú 1990-2001: Alberto Fujimori (Cambio 90) 
2001-2006: Alejandro Toledo (Perú Posible) 
Venezuela 1998-: Hugo Chávez (MVR) 
 
 
I use a measure of the effective number of seat-winning parties in the legislature in a 
given year to test Mainwaring (1993)’s argument on the link between multipartism and 
executive-legislative deadlock. The information on the effective number of seat-winning parties 
in the legislature was obtained from the Electoral System Design Project database (Carey & Hix, 
2008).  
I use two variables from the political processes database to assess whether political 
scandals and popular protests have an impact on the risk of executive-legislative relations (Pérez-
Liñán et al., 2008). The first variable measures whether the administration was involved in a 
corruption scandal in a given year. The variable takes a value of 0 if the administration was not 
involved in a corruption scandal, a value of 1 if there was one corruption scandal, and a value of 
2 if more than one corruption scandal erupted. The second variable is a dummy measuring 
whether the administration was affected by social protests during the year. 
Another variable from the political processes database (Pérez-Liñán et al., 2008) allows 
me to control for the possible effect of factionalism in the president’s party on the level of 
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confrontation between the executive and the legislative power. I use a dummy variable from the 
database coded as 1 if the president’s party is described as being divided into factions by the 
Latin American Weekly Report in a given year, and coded as 0 if the president’s party is not 
divided into factions. 
Finally, I control for the effect of economic crisis on executive-legislative relations. I 
include a variable measuring per capita GDP growth coming from the Penn World Tables 
(Heston, Summers, & Aten, 2009). I also control for inflation, which may have an independent 
impact on executive-legislative relations, regardless of economic growth. The inflation data 
comes from CEPALSTAT (the online database of the Economic Commission for Latin America 
and the Caribbean –a UN institution–). I used the variations in the consumer prices index (annual 
average) as my measure of inflation. 
6.3.2 Model estimation 
Given that both dependent variables are binary, logistic regression is the most suitable statistical 
method of analysis. Table 6.5 below presents the results of a first series of models which assess 
whether executive-legislative conflict is more likely when the president is an outsider.  The first 
model in Table 6.5 is a standard logistic regression. However, the empirical analysis is 
conducted with cross-sectional time series data. Hence, I estimated a random effects logistic 
regression. The random effects logistic regression is appropriate in this case because it takes the 
unique structure of the data into account. First, the error term in the model is partitioned into 
error across countries, and error across time within countries (random error). Second, the 
standard errors of the estimates are corrected to take into account repeated observations for each 
country (Pendergast et al., 1996). 
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A congressional dissolution attempt is a rare event in Latin America, as can be seen in the 
Table 6.4. 
Table 6.4. Frequency of Dissolution Attempts in Latin America (1980-2007) 
 Frequency Percentage 
Dissolution Attempt 10 3.44% 
No Dissolution Attempt 281 96.56% 
 
This table shows that in only 3.4% of the administration-years in the sample there was an 
attempt of congressional dissolution. Standard logistic regressions are not appropriate when the 
outcome to be predicted is a rare event because they can underestimate the probability of the 
event (G. King & Zeng, 2001). I estimated the impact of outsider presidents on dissolution 
attempts with a rare events logistic regression that develops corrections for the biases in logistic 
regression that occur when predicting or explaining rare outcomes. I also performed a modified 
Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity, which produced a significant test statistic (prob>chi2 
= 0.00) suggesting that there is heteroskedasticity across units –countries–.  So I ran the rare 
events logistic regression with country clustered standard errors as a robustness check. Table 6.7 
presents the results of these two rare events logistic regressions. 
6.4 RESULTS 
I estimated the impact of outsider presidents and other institutional and contextual variables on 
the likelihood of executive-legislative confrontation and Congress dissolution attempt with a 
series of logistic regressions including data from an original dataset on political outsiders in 
Latin America.  
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6.4.1 Executive-legislative confrontation 
Table 6.5 presents the results of two models that analyze the relationship between outsider 
presidents and executive-legislative confrontation. The results provide support for my 
hypothesis. The likelihood of executive-legislative confrontation significantly increases when the 
president is an outsider. In fact, the coefficient for the variable “outsider” is positive and 
statistically significant in the two logistic regressions presented in Table 6.5.  
As for the other independent variables in the model, the results validate again the seminal 
Mainwaring (1993) contribution on the impact of multipartism on executive-legislative deadlock. 
The results suggest that the level of confrontation between the president and the Congress 
increases as the number of parties that hold seats in the legislature increases. In the same vein, 
the results show that executive-legislative conflicts are more likely when the party of the 
president is divided into factions. Factions of the president’s party may prefer not to collaborate 
with the president for strategic reasons, especially when elections approach. The impact of 
factionalism on Latin American politics is understudied so this result warrants further 
investigation. 
The results also show that scandals and popular protests influence executive-legislative 
relations in Latin America. Both variables –corruption scandals and popular protests– are 
positive and statistically significant in the three models, which suggests that unpopular presidents 
whose authority is contested by social protests are more likely to be challenged by the 
legislature, thereby increasing the probability of executive-legislative confrontation.  
Finally, the model shows that the economic growth does not have a direct influence on 
executive-legislative relations. The variable measuring GDP per capita growth does not reach 
statistical significance in any of the models in Table 6.5. However, the variable measuring 
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inflation is positive and statistically significant in both models. This finding again suggests that 
presidential popularity has an impact on executive-legislative relations.73 
 
Table 6.5. Logistic Regressions. Determinants of Executive-Legislative Conflict in Latin America (1980-2007) 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Logistic Regression Random Effects Logistic 
Regression 
   
Outsider 1.211*** 1.124** 
 (.462) (.513) 
Effective Number of Parties .225*** .236** 
 (.085) (.104) 
Corruption Scandals .526*** .492** 
 (.186) (.199) 
Social Protests .724** .677* 
 (.331) (.352) 
Factionalism .917** .715 
 (.435) (.477) 
Per Capita GDP Growth .008 .013 
 (.036) (.037) 
Inflation .507** .506** 
 (.227) (.236) 
Constant -3.259*** -3.270*** 
 (.497) (.573) 
   
Observations 281 281 
Number of Countries 17 17 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The results suggest that outsider presidents pose a serious threat to governability in Latin 
America. However, it is not possible to evaluate how serious this threat is just by looking at the 
results presented in Table 6.5. In fact, the coefficients of logistic regressions cannot be 
straightforwardly interpreted to gauge substantive significance. In order to estimate precisely 
what impact the outsider presidents have on the probability of executive-legislative conflict in a 
                                                 
73 Previous research has shown that in Latin America high inflation leads to a decline in presidential approval 
(Weyland, 2002). 
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given administration-year, predicted probabilities have to be estimated. I calculated predicted 
probabilities from the logistic regression.74  
Table 6.6 presents the predicted probabilities of executive-legislative relations at different values 
of the independent variables.75 
Table 6.6. Predicted Probabilities of Executive-Legislative Confrontation in Latin America (1980-2007) 
Value on the independent variables Predicted Probability of Executive-
Legislative Confrontation 
  
All Variables at their Means 27.7% 
  
Non-Outsider President 25.7% 
Outsider President 53.4% 
  
Low Effective Number of Parties 21.1% 
High Effective Number of Parties 35.3% 
  
No Corruption Scandal 22.0% 
More than One Corruption Scandal 44.7% 
  
No Social Protests 19.8% 
Social Protests 33.4% 
  
No Factions in the President’s Party 25.9% 
Factions in the President’s Party 47.1% 
  
Low Inflation 21.9% 
High Inflation 34.7% 
 
The results presented in Table 6.6 show that executive-legislative confrontation is much more 
likely when the executive power is held by a political outsider. When the president is not an 
outsider and all the other variables are at their means, the probability of executive-legislative 
confrontation is only 25.7%. When the president is an outsider and all the other variables are at 
                                                 
74 King et al. (2000) developed a Stata routine (Clarify) that estimates predicted probabilities in logistic regressions. 
75 I calculated predicted probabilities only for the independent variables that were statistically significant in at least 
one of the models in Table 6.5. For the dummy variables, I calculated the predicted probabilities when the variable 
is at 0 and when the variable is at 1. For the trichotomous variables, I calculated the predicted probabilities when the 
variable is at 0 and when the variable is at 2. For the continuous variables, I calculated predicted probabilities when 
the value of the variable is one standard deviation below the mean, and when it is one standard deviation above the 
mean. 
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their means, the probability of executive-legislative confrontation is 53.4%. The impact of 
outsider presidents on the likelihood of confrontation between the two branches of government is 
very high. When compared to the effect of the other variables in the model, the variable 
measuring whether the president is an outsider is the strongest predictor of executive-legislative 
confrontation. 
6.4.2 Congressional dissolution attempts 
Two other models are presented in Table 6.7. These models assess whether congressional 
dissolution attempts by the chief executive are more likely to occur when the president is an 
outsider. These two models provide support for my second hypothesis. The sign for the 
“outsider” variable is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level in both models, 
suggesting that the risk of Congress dissolution attempt is higher when the highest office is 
occupied by a political outsider. Surprisingly, most of the other variables in the model are not 
good predictors of dissolution attempt. Political scandals and popular protests help to explain 
executive-legislative confrontation, but they appear to be unrelated to dissolution attempts. The 
number of parties is also a poor predictor of Congress dissolution attempts by elected presidents. 
The economic context, by contrast, appears to be linked to Congress dissolution attempts. The 
model suggests that attempts to dissolve the legislative body are less likely when the economy is 
growing. 
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Table 6.7. Rare events logistic regressions. Determinants of congress dissolution attempts in Latin America (1980-2007) 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Rare Events 
Logistic Regression 
Rare Events 
Logistic Regression with Country 
Clustered SE 
   
Outsider 2.521*** 2.521*** 
 (.771) (.656) 
Effective Number of Parties .189 .189 
 (.124) (.158) 
Corruption Scandals .191 .191 
 (.471) (.403) 
Social Protests -.295 -.295 
 (.825) (.563) 
Factionalism 1.255 1.255 
 (.858) (.978) 
Per Capita GDP Growth -.171** -.171** 
 (.073) (.080) 
Inflation -.254 -.254 
 (.531) (.429) 
Constant -4.083*** -4.083*** 
 (.719) (.890) 
   
Observations 281 281 
Number of Countries 17 17 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
In order to estimate the substantive impact of outsider presidents on the likelihood of 
Congress dissolution attempt, I calculated the predicted probabilities of dissolution attempt in the 
rare events logistic regression (see Table 6.8).76 Again, the variable measuring whether the 
president is a political outsider is the best predictor of Congress dissolution attempt. The impact 
of “outsidership” is much higher than that of the two other variables that appear as significant in 
one of the rare events models. In any given administration-year in which the president is not an 
outsider (holding all the other variables at their means) the predicted probability of Congress 
                                                 
76 I used the statistical program Zelig (Kosuke, King, & Lau, 2008) to estimate the predicted probabilities in the 
relogit model. I followed the same steps used to calculate the predicted probabilities in the previous model. Only the 
predicted probabilities for the variables that were statistically significant in one of the rare events logistic regressions 
were calculated.   
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dissolution attempt is 1.9%. When the president is an outsider, the likelihood of a dissolution 
attempt is 19.6%. 
Table 6.8. Predicted probabilities of congress dissolution attempts in Latin America (1980-2007) 
Value on the independent variables Predicted Probability of Congress 
Dissolution Attempt 
  
All Variables at their Means 2.4% 
  
Non-Outsider President 1.9% 
Outsider President 19.6% 
  
Negative Economic Growth 5.1% 
Positive Economic Growth 1.2% 
 
This finding shows that outsider presidents do not only imperil governability. They also 
represent a serious threat to democratic quality by undermining the authority and the legitimacy 
of the legislative body that is supposed to hold the executive power accountable for its actions. 
Outsider presidents often campaign using an anti-politics discourse promising radical changes to 
a disenchanted electorate (Hawkins, 2010). Moreover, they tend to arrive to power with no 
support in Congress. In many cases, this leads to repeated attempts or threats to dissolve the 
legislative body taking advantage of their high approval rating and of the lack of popular support 
for the legislative body. The rise of an outsider to the presidency can go hand in hand with a 
democratic breakdown if this dissolution attempt succeeds. But even when this strategy fails, the 
threat to dissolve Congress weakens the authority and the legitimacy of one of the key 
democratic institutions. 
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6.4.3 Endogeneity concerns and robustness checks 
The empirical results in this chapter suggest that executive-legislative conflicts and executive 
excesses against the legislature are more likely when the president is an outsider. However, there 
is an endogeneity concern in these empirical models which will be addressed in this section. The 
basic problem is that the same unobserved conditions that lead to the election of an outsider may 
trigger executive-legislative conflict. As the first part of this dissertation has shown, outsiders 
tend to come to power in moments of economic and sociopolitical crisis. This context of 
instability may also be related to the outcomes studied in this chapter (executive-legislative 
confrontation and Congress dissolution attempts). 
Endogeneity concerns are one of the hardest problems to tackle in the social sciences (G. 
King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994). In experimental research, subjects can be randomly assigned to 
treatment and control groups. In this case, as in most research in comparative political 
institutions, countries were not randomly assigned to the “treatment” (i.e. the election of an 
outsider). Hence, we must be concerned with differences between the “treated” and the “non-
treated” country-years to make sure the results are not affected by selection bias. 
In order to rule out the possibility that executive-legislative confrontation would have 
happened anyway in the “treated” country-years in the absence of an outsider, in this section I 
use propensity score matching to estimate causal effects (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983, 1985). The 
basic idea of this technique is to find among a large group of non-treated cases those cases which 
are similar to the treated cases in all relevant pre-treatment characteristics. This leads to a well-
selected and adequate control group, which allows a better estimation of causal effects (Caliendo 
& Kopeinig, 2005).  
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Estimating a good matching model requires that researchers have a good theoretical 
understanding of the variables that influence the possibility of being treated in the first place. 
Fortunately, my cross-national research on the causes of outsider rise in Chapters 3 and 4 makes 
it possible for me to identify the relevant variables to include in the model. As pointed out by 
Caliendo and Kopeinig (2005: 6), “only the variables that influence simultaneously the 
participation decision and the outcome variable should be included.” Moreover, the variables 
should be measured before the treatment to make sure that they are not affected by participation 
in the treatment. In this case, the relevant variables to be included in the matching model are the 
ones that influence both the probability of outsider rise and the likelihood of executive-
legislative confrontation. Based on the research conducted in Chapters 3 and 4, the variables that 
were used in the matching procedure were the following: the level of democracy (Polity IV 
score), economic growth, inflation, electoral volatility, ethnic fractionalization, and the electoral 
cycle.77 Unconsolidated democracies, economic crises, weak party systems, divided societies, 
and non-concurrent elections can both facilitate the rise of outsiders and make executive-
legislative relations more conflictive. 
The procedure for estimating the impact of a treatment can be divided in three steps. First, the 
propensity score has to be estimated. Second, the researcher has to choose a matching algorithm 
that will use the estimated propensity score to match untreated cases to treated cases. I chose the 
most straightforward matching estimator (nearest neighbor matching).78 The last step is the 
estimation of the impact of the intervention with the matched sample and the calculation of 
                                                 
77 To make sure that these variables are not influenced by the treatment (i.e. an outsider president), I include in the 
model measures of these variables in the year of the presidential election. Following the recommendation of Bryson 
et al. (2002), I do not include in the estimation of the propensity score matching variables that are related to the rise 
of outsiders, but have no clear theoretical link with executive-legislative conflict or dissolution attempts (e.g. 
compulsory voting or reelection provisions).  
78 When this matching algorithm is applied, the cases from the comparison group are chosen as matching partners 
for treated cases which are the closest in terms of the propensity score (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2005). 
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standard errors. Two parameters are of primary interest. The average treatment effect (ATE) is 
the expected gain for a randomly selected case from the sample. The average treatment effect on 
the treated (ATT) is the average gain from treatment for the cases which actually received the 
treatment. Although I will present both parameters, I will pay more attention to the ATT. The 
ATT tells us whether or not outsiders have an impact on executive-legislative confrontation in 
the treated country-years above and beyond the unstable context which influenced their rise to 
power. Table 6.9 presents the results of the estimated causal effects (ATE and ATT) of 
“outsidership” on executive-legislative confrontation and congress dissolution attempts by the 
president. 
 
Table 6.9. Estimation of the treatment effects of outsiders on executive-legislative confrontation and dissolution 
attempts (after propensity score matching) 
 
 Coefficient Robust SE z P>|z| 
 
Executive-legislative conflict 
 
    
ATE .143 .234 0.61 0.540 
ATT .304** .129 2.34 0.019 
 
Congress dissolution attempt 
 
    
ATE .214*** .080 2.67 0.008 
ATT .200** .080 2.50 0.012 
 
 
The results of these causal effect estimations provide support for the findings of the 
unmatched models above. Although, the average treatment effect (ATE) of the treatment 
(outsider presidents) is positive on both outcomes of interest, it only reaches statistical 
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significance in the ATE estimation for the congress dissolution attempt model. However, we 
should not put too much stock in this finding. The ATE is the expected gain for a randomly 
selected case from the whole sample when it receives the treatment. But it is clear that the rise of 
a political outsider does not happen randomly in the country-years in the sample. Hence, the 
most important parameter to analyze is the average treatment effect for the treated (ATT). The 
coefficient for this parameter is positive and statistically significant in both sets of models. In 
other words, independently of the context that leads to the rise of political outsiders, these 
independent and inexperienced politicians tend to have a deleterious impact on executive-
legislative relations and are more likely to attempt a dissolution of the legislative branch. 
In sum, the results of these causal effects estimations with propensity score matching suggest a 
nuanced finding. Outsiders would not necessarily generate an increase in executive-legislative 
conflicts if they emerged in politically stable countries. But this counterfactual is of limited 
empirical interest. We know that outsiders come to power in difficult contexts of economic and 
sociopolitical crisis. What these robustness checks confirm is that outsider presidents have a 
negative impact on institutional performance that goes above and beyond what one would expect 
given this unstable context. 
6.5 EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE CONFLICT UNDER FUJIMORI 
The statistical results reported above suggest that there is a link between the election of outsider 
presidents and sustained executive-legislative conflicts. In line with the methodological 
framework proposed by Lieberman (2005, see Chapter 2), this section goes beyond this 
statistical relationship to try to confirm the causal mechanisms identified above. It does so 
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through the in-depth analysis of the very conflictive executive-legislative relations in the first 
years of the Fujimori administration in Peru. This period of severe confrontation between the 
executive and the legislature will also be compared with the relatively more cooperative 
executive-legislative relations under the administrations of the two career politicians who 
preceded Fujimori in the presidency (Belaúnde and García). 
6.5.1 The facts: executive-legislative confrontation under Fujimori 
The first two years of the Fujimori administration until the Congress dissolution of April 1992 
were a period of severe and acrimonious confrontation between the executive and the legislative 
branches. As I will discuss in more detail below, Fujimori was in a minority situation and had 
weak support in the legislature. Moreover, he was not able (or willing) to overcome this 
precarious position by negotiating and reaching agreements with the other political forces in the 
parliament. The difficult relationship between Fujimori and the legislature can be grasped by 
looking at four different areas of confrontation between the executive and the legislature: 1) 
confrontation over bills and policies, 2) confrontation over executive appointments, 3) 
confrontation in which one of the branches challenges the constitutional ability of the other to 
legislate, and 4) verbal confrontation between the two branches. 
6.5.1.1 Policy disagreements 
The first type of executive-legislative conflict that existed during the first years of the 
Fujimori administration was the confrontation over bills and policy disagreements. There were 
two main areas of confrontation between the president and the legislature: economic policies and 
security policies. The 1979 Peruvian constitution gave constitutional decree authority (Carey & 
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Shugart, 1998) to the president to decide and implement economic policies. The article 211 of 
the constitution allowed the president to “dictate extraordinary measures dealing with economic 
and financial matters when the national interest so requires.” This prerogative was used 
extensively by Fujimori during his first years in office. Most of the policies of the neoliberal 
economic shock were enacted by decree (Kenney, 2004). However, Congress was not 
completely powerless on economic matters. The legislature attempted to influence the economic 
direction during the executive-legislative budget negotiations of the 1991 and the 1992 budget 
laws. On both occasions, the executive presented a budget that was unacceptable for the 
legislature which generated a heated executive-legislative confrontation. Whereas the executive 
wanted a balanced budget, the Budget Committee in the legislature rejected the proposal of the 
president and approved its own bill with higher spending in a number of areas (especially social 
spending). The conflict ended in both occasions –after a long period of interbranch conflict– with 
the president vetoing the proposals of the legislature and enacting its own budget (with cosmetic 
changes) in order not to derail the neoliberal economic policies. 
 The main policy confrontation between the executive and the legislature was related to 
the controversial security strategy chosen in 1991 by Fujimori to fight against the Shining Path 
guerrilla. In June 1991, the legislature granted decree authority to Fujimori in three areas: 
pacification, employment, and investment. Taking advantage of this delegated decree authority, 
Fujimori enacted a deluge of highly controversial national security decrees that essentially 
militarized national life and significantly increased the extraordinary powers of the executive on 
security affairs. These national security bills received very weak support in the legislature. In the 
words of Kenney (2004: 174), “what distinguished opposition to the national security decrees 
was that those opposing them represented almost the entire political spectrum and constituted a 
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majority in both houses of the legislature.” On 25 and 26 November 1991, the Senate repealed 
eight and modified ten national security decrees, thereby increasing the level of confrontation 
between the two branches of government. 
 The repeated policy disagreements between the president and the legislature are reflected 
in the high percentage of laws approved by Congress vetoed by the president, and also in the 
high percentage of presidential vetoes overridden by the legislature. Table 6.10 shows a 
comparison of presidential vetoes and vetoes overridden under the three administrations 
considered in this analysis (Belaúnde 1980-1985, García 1985-1990, Fujimori 1990-1992). 
Table 6.10. Presidential vetoes and overridden vetoes in Peru (1980-1992) 
 Belaúnde 
(1980-1985) 
 
García 
(1985-1990) 
Fujimori 
(1990-1992) 
Number Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage 
 
Laws approved by 
Congress vetoed by 
the president 
 
38 5.2% 60 9% 35 52.2% 
Presidential vetoes 
overridden by the 
legislature 
0 0% 3 5% 8 22.9% 
 
Sources: Schmidt (1998: 110) 
 
These figures reveal that executive-legislative relations were much more conflictive 
under the administration of Fujimori than under the administration of the leaders who preceded 
him in the presidency. Instead of reaching negotiated policy agreements, the executive and the 
legislature often used their prerogatives to the fullest extent to try to defeat the policy proposals 
of the other branch. This led to long periods of executive-legislative confrontation over bills and 
policies. 
 
 
 164 
6.5.1.2 Conflicts over executive appointments 
Confrontation over executive appointments also contributed to increase the level of 
executive-legislative confrontation in the months that preceded the self-coup. The 1979 
Constitution (articles 225-226) gave Congress the right to hold the executive accountable 
through two different mechanisms: interpellation (required the approval of one third of the 
deputies) and censure (required the approval of a majority of the deputies). Interpellation 
required that ministers come to the parliament to be questioned by legislators. Censured 
ministers were forced to resign. Interpellations were frequent during the administrations of 
Belaúnde and García during the 1980s, and continued under the Fujimori administration. But no 
minister had ever been censured under the 1979 Constitution. The weak support for Fujimori in 
the legislature made censures more likely. In November 1991, in the context of a severe 
executive-legislative confrontation over the national security decrees, the Chamber of Deputies 
announced that it would interpellate and maybe censure three ministers (Agriculture minister 
Enrique Rossl Link, Defense minister Víctor Malca, and Economy minister Carlos Boloña). In 
the end, only one minister was censured (Rossl Link), but this procedure infuriated Fujimori.79 
Fujimori took advantage of a loophole in the Constitution to delay Rossl Link’s resignation for 
two weeks which in turn frustrated the legislature (Kenney, 2004: 181). In sum, the confrontation 
over executive appointments was increasing in intensity when Fujimori dissolved the legislature 
in April 1992. 
 
 
 
                                                 
79 This was the first time Congress had censured a minister since the 1960s.  
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6.5.1.3 Confrontation over constitutional prerogatives 
The third type of interbranch conflict that existed during the first years of the Fujimori 
administration was confrontation in which one of the branches challenged the prerogatives or the 
ability to legislate of the other branch. First, President Fujimori implicitly challenged the ability 
of the Parliament to legislate by making extensive use of decree and veto powers. Fujimori used 
these prerogatives much more often than the presidents who preceded him. This violated the 
spirit (if not the letter) of the Constitution by reducing the legislature to a very secondary role in 
lawmaking. Although Peruvian governments in the 1980s made extensive use of the decree 
powers that existed in the 1979 Constitution, this tendency was exacerbated under Fujimori. A 
considerable proportion of all legislation in Peru in the 1980s corresponded to laws approved by 
Congress: 41.6% of laws under the Belaúnde administration (1980-1985) and 33.9% of laws 
under the García administration corresponded to laws initiated and passed by the legislature.80 
The corresponding figure for the first years of the Fujimori administration (1990-1992) is 8.5%, 
a much smaller proportion (Schmidt, 1998). 
The excessive –and sometimes abusive– use of decree powers often generated frictions 
between the two branches of government. For example, in October 1990 Fujimori issued an 
executive order to free several thousand unsentenced prisoners accused of minor crimes. The 
goal of the president was to limit overcrowding. However, this unilateral decision was a clear 
infringement on Congress’s exclusive right to grant amnesties. As a result, the Senate 
immediately repealed Fujimori’s decree thereby generating considerable interbranch conflict 
(Kenney, 2004: 132). In another clear example of executive abuse, Fujimori issued a series of 
emergency decrees to implement new taxes required to meet the demands of the IMF in July 
                                                 
80  Since the presidents’ parties had a majority in Congress, the use of decree authority by the president during the 
1980s also generated much less interbranch confrontation (Schmidt, 1998).   
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1991. These decrees were enacted in spite of the fact that the Bicameral Budget Committee had 
rejected these fiscal reforms. The executive’s decrees on this issue were criticized on the grounds 
that they were not constitutional and that they challenged the prerogatives of the legislature on 
fiscal and budgetary issues (Kenney, 2004: 152-153). The deluge of executive decrees in 
November 1991 also jeopardized the capacity of the legislature to fulfill the role assigned to it by 
the Constitution. According to Caretas (18 November 1991, p.12), the goal of the flood of 
legislative decrees was to “saturate the capacity of the legislature which cannot review 126 laws 
in 30 days (…). In this way, the executive hopes that the laws will be enacted after 30 days have 
passed.” 
 The multiple occasions in which Fujimori challenged (openly or implicitly) the 
prerogatives of Congress produced a reaction by the legislative body. In December 1991, 
Congress passed the Law of Parliamentary Control over the Normative Acts of the President of 
the Republic. This law gave the legislature the right to veto emergency economic legislative 
decrees and other unilateral decisions of the executive. Many analysts and legal scholars declared 
that the Law of Parliamentary Control was unconstitutional because it limited the prerogatives 
given to the President by the 1979 Constitution (Murakami, 2012: 285-289). In other words, by 
early 1992 the executive and the legislature were confronted over substantive policy issues, but 
also challenged each other’s constitutional prerogatives. 
6.5.1.4 Verbal confrontation 
These serious interbranch tensions were aggravated by a rhetoric confrontation between 
Fujimori and the legislature. The outsider president chose deliberately to attack discredited 
politicians and political institutions. His populist, polarizing, and simplistic discourse started as 
soon as he gained office. Fujimori repeatedly portrayed congressmen as “unproductive 
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charlatans” dominated by “mean spirited partisan interests.” He described legislators as corrupt 
and as out of touch with the harsh realities of Peruvians (Conaghan, 2005: 30; Kenney, 2004: 
178-179; Pease García, 1994: 107-108; 2003: 112-114). Occasionally, members of Congress 
replied to Fujimori and attacked him often using racist epithets to disqualify his leadership. For 
instance, Senator Rafael Belaúnde reacted to one of Fujimori’s attacks by saying “what can be 
expected of a president whose dead kin are not buried in this land?” (cited in Kenney, 2004: 
182). These exchanges contributed to a “war of words” that also increased the level of executive-
legislative confrontation. 
The severe confrontation between the executive and the legislature came to an abrupt end 
in April 1992 when Fujimori committed an autogolpe (self-coup). On the night of Sunday April 
5, 1992, Fujimori appeared on television and announced that he was "temporarily dissolving" the 
Congress of the Republic and "reorganizing" the Judicial Branch of the government. He then 
ordered the Army of Peru to drive a tank to the steps of Congress to shut it down. Fujimori 
immediately issued Decree Law 25418, which dissolved the Congress, gave the Executive 
Branch all legislative powers, suspended much of the Constitution, and gave the president the 
power to enact various reforms, such as the "application of drastic punishments" towards 
terrorists. 
6.5.2 Causal mechanisms 
This description of executive-legislative relations during the first years of the Fujimori 
administration makes clear that interbranch conflict was frequent and intense. But is this related 
to the causal mechanisms I identify in the theoretical framework (section 6.1)? The next section 
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will evaluate whether the conflictive executive-legislative relations under Fujimori can be 
explained by the factors mentioned above. 
6.5.2.1 Fujimori: a minority president 
The first fundamental difference between Fujimori and his predecessors in the presidency 
(Belaúnde and García) is that Fujimori found himself in a minority situation in the legislature as 
soon as he gained office, whereas the two other presidents had much higher support in the 
legislature.  
As many other outsiders, Fujimori ran in the presidential elections with a new electoral 
movement (Cambio 90). This new political party was a platform for the personal ambitions of 
Fujimori but was very weakly organized. Cambio 90 legislative candidates did not always 
benefit from the personal appeal of Fujimori. As a result, Cambio 90 received very little support 
in legislative elections. As can be observed in Table 6.11, Fujimori only had 17.7% of the seats 
in the Chamber of Deputies and 22.5% of the seats in the Senate. This level of support was so 
low that forming a stable coalition government was a very difficult task. The losers of the 
presidential race (APRA and FREDEMO) had larger cohorts in the legislature than Fujimori’s 
party (Tuesta Soldevilla, 1994: 65-68). 
 
Table 6.11. Support for the party of the president in the Peruvian legislature (1980-1992) 
Administration Party of the 
President 
Percentage of seats in the 
Chamber of Deputies 
Percentage of Seats in  
the Senate 
        Belaúnde 
(1980-1990) 
Acción Popular 54.4% 43.3% 
García 
(1985-1990) 
APRA 59.4% 52.5% 
Fujimori 
(1990-1992) 
Cambio 90 17.7% 22.5% 
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In contrast, APRA held an absolute majority in both houses of Congress when the leader 
of that party (Alan García) was in power in the period 1985-1990. Acción Popular had an 
absolute majority in the Chamber of Deputies and held a majority in the Senate after forming a 
coalition with a smaller party (Partido Popular Cristiano). In sum, Fujimori had much weaker 
“partisan powers” than his two predecessors (Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997a). The situation was 
very difficult for Fujimori when he reached office. In a detailed analysis of executive-legislative 
relations in Peru in the early 1990s, Kenney (2004: 84) summarizes the difficult scenario facing 
Fujimori when he was elected: “Under the 1979 Constitution, an opposition majority in both 
houses of Congress could pass laws contrary to the executive’s wishes, override the president’s 
veto, block legislation that the executive deemed critical and had made a matter of confidence, 
deny extraordinary legislative powers to the executive, censure ministers one by one without 
restrictions, impeach the president, or declare the presidency vacant.”  
Complicating things even further, Fujimori’s Cambio 90 group in the legislature was 
dismantled almost immediately because of internal divisions (Degregori & Meléndez, 2007, 23-
31, 41-42; see also Chapter 7). Cambio 90 legislators were also very politically inexperienced, 
and it would have been very hard for Fujimori to anchor a stable coalition around such a weak 
and disorganized political party.81 Moreover, Fujimori did not take his own movement seriously 
and never attempted to strengthen its internal organization (Cameron, 1997: 38). 
 The low support for Fujimori in Congress and the weakness of his own movement put the 
outsider president in a very critical situation when he gained office, which Cameron aptly 
describes as a “potential time bomb in legislative-executive relations” (Cameron, 1997: 49). 
                                                 
81 In March 1991, dissident legislators of Cambio 90 left the party to form a new party in government contrary to 
Fujimori. Half of Cambio 90 deputies formally abandoned Fujimori’s party in that moment (Degregori & Meléndez, 
2007). 
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Unless he managed to form a stable coalition with other parties in the legislature, Fujimori was 
constitutionally limited to declaring and renewing states of emergency and issuing extraordinary 
financial and economic measures. As shown above, Fujimori used (and abused of) his decree 
powers extensively which led to a severe confrontation with Congress. But at the origins of his 
excesses is a situation of minority in the legislature that left him with few choices to govern the 
country in the midst of a serious sociopolitical and economic crisis. 
6.5.2.2 Lack of political experience and democratic socialization 
The weak support Fujimori had in the legislature undoubtedly increased the risk of 
confrontation between the two branches of government. However, this is not the whole story. 
Several studies have shown that minority presidents tend to form multiparty coalitions in order to 
obtain support for their policies in the legislature. They react in the same way a prime minister 
would react in a similar situation (Amorim Neto, 2006; Negretto, 2006; Zelaznik, 2001). Why 
didn’t Fujimori put together a stable coalition with other parties? 
The key to answering this question is the lack of political experience and democratic 
socialization of Fujimori. A stable policy coalition was not unthinkable in Peru in the early 
1990s. The policy shift of Fujimori in a neoliberal direction after reaching office opened the way 
for a coalition with FREDEMO (a rightist coalition of parties that were in favor of orthodox 
economic policies). FREDEMO legislators supported the market reforms implemented by 
Fujimori. Together Cambio 90 and FREDEMO had 52.2% of the seats in the Chamber of 
Deputies and 53.2% of the seats in the Senate. Such a coalition would have provided Fujimori 
with a comfortable majority in Congress. According to several FREDEMO legislators 
interviewed by Cameron (1997: 54), “it would have been easy for Fujimori to build a stable 
governing majority within the Congress.” Pease García (leader of Izquierda Unida) similarly 
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argues  that “the majority of the legislators agreed with the policies of Fujimori. It is not true that 
Fujimori needed the autogolpe to be able to govern.”82 
If a stable multiparty coalition proved impossible, Fujimori could have attempted to pass 
his bills through the legislature with a series of ad hoc alliances with different parties. Actually, 
in his first months in office Fujimori managed to pass some of his policy reforms through the 
legislature through temporary agreements with different parties. A PPC politician interviewed by 
Caretas in November 1990 made the following statement: “If one has the ability to negotiate 
agreements… I do not see that it is impossible for the president to find ways to gather together 
other groups temporarily, converting these five years into a succession of conjunctions within 
one political line” (Caretas, 5 November 1990, p. 27).83 
In sum, Fujimori could have cooperated with the legislature either through a long-term 
coalition with FREDEMO or via temporary coalitions with different parties. The legislators 
made a series of goodwill gestures during Fujimori’s first months in office which suggests that 
Congress was open to cooperating with the executive.84 As Kenney (2004: 122-123) points out, 
“a politician more skilled at negotiating agreements and consensus building might have been 
successful at building a lasting governing coalition, and a politician more committed to 
democratic methods might have pursued the goal more single-mindedly.” 
But Fujimori deliberately chose a different path which can be ascribed to his lack of 
political and democratic socialization. Fujimori had almost no political experience before 
reaching the highest office in the country, and given his background “it was not surprising that 
                                                 
82 Interview with Henry Pease García, October 2012, Lima, Peru 
83 Cited in Kenney (2004: 139). 
84 For instance, the presidents of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies were selected from the ranks of Cambio 90 
despite the fact that the president’s party only had a minority in the legislature. Also, Congress delegated decree 
authority to Fujimori in a number of areas (Cameron, 1997: 54). 
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once in power he was unwilling to play by the established democratic rules of the game” 
(Cameron, 1997: 47-48). Fujimori had a very vertical political style verging on authoritarianism 
(Levitt, 2012: 171; Tanaka, 2001: 78). The outsider president never actively sought to generate 
consensus or to reach negotiated policy agreements with the legislature.  
The president of the Chamber of Deputies during the first years of Fujimori’s presidency 
(Víctor Paredes –a member of Cambio 90–) recalls an episode that shows this lack of interest of 
Fujimori in interbranch negotiations. In October 1990, Fujimori requested authorization to travel 
to a meeting of Latin American presidents in Caracas. The legislature stalled the authorization 
and used this as a mechanism to obtain policy concessions from the president. Fujimori decided 
not to attend the international meeting in order not to have to negotiate with the legislature. 
Opposition legislators were very surprised by this decision, and they approached Paredes to tell 
him they actually wanted to negotiate. Paredes revealed that Fujimori and the leaders of Cambio 
90 in Congress were not interested in bargaining with political parties.85 This episode reveals that 
the political parties in the legislature were playing a game that Fujimori did not understand or did 
not want to play. 
Fujimori emphasized the technical over the political. He saw himself as a manager or a 
political engineer who needed to solve the socioeconomic problems of Peru with the help of a 
small team of advisors only. This vertical political style focused on results, even if the means 
used to reach them were not democratic (Conaghan, 2005: 3-4; Murakami, 2012: 40-47). Unlike 
a traditional politician, Fujimori did not want to build a majority in Congress because he knew 
that such a majority would not be unconditional and he would constantly need to negotiate 
agreements with other political forces, which he refused to do (Cameron, 1997: 55; Pease García, 
                                                 
85 Interview with Víctor Paredes, October 2012, Lima, Peru 
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2003: 110). Some of Fujimori’s public statements in the early 1990s betrayed his anti-political 
views. For instance, Fujimori recognized in November 1991 that he followed the maxim “act 
first and speak later” (Kenney, 2004: 178). A month later, he stated that “perhaps it would be 
best that there be an emperor in Peru, and that he takes at least ten years resolving problems 
(Murakami, 2012: 288). 
A good example of Fujimori’s unwillingness to negotiate a solution to executive-
legislative conflicts is the fact that he wasted a very good opportunity for an agreement with the 
legislature in March 1992. A few days before the Congress dissolution, prime minister de los 
Heros attempted to find an agreement to facilitate cooperation with the legislature. This 
negotiation made considerable headway. De los Heros and the leaders of the main parties in the 
legislature agreed on a series of pacification laws that were acceptable for the legislature. If it 
had gone into effect, this agreement would have defused the main source of confrontation 
between the two branches of government. However, Fujimori scratched that agreement and 
chose an aggressive and authoritarian move: i.e. the dissolution of the legislature.86 
It is interesting to compare Fujimori’s authoritarian excesses with the actions of Belaúnde 
during his first administration (1963-1968). Belaúnde was an experienced politician and the 
leader of a political party (Acción Popular). Although he was in a minority situation similar to 
the one faced by Fujimori, Belaúnde actively sought to reach agreements with the opposition in 
the legislature through partisan and personal contacts. In spite of the little success of this 
strategy, Belaúnde never deviated from this negotiating line (Kenney, 2004: 80; Murakami, 
2012: 149-150). Similarly, during his second administration (1980-1985), Belaúnde formed a 
                                                 
86 Interview with Alfonso de los Heros, November 2012, Lima, Peru 
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coalition with another party (Partido Popular Cristiano) in order to have absolute majority in the 
Senate.87 
 In sum, Fujimori had the possibility to reach compromises and negotiate agreements with 
the legislature. However, his lack of political and democratic socialization pushed him in a 
completely different direction. Fujimori’s disdain for consensus building is the key reason 
behind the severe executive-legislative confrontation in the first years of his administration.  
6.5.2.3 Cambio 90: too weak to constrain Fujimori 
The previous section focuses on the personal background of Fujimori to explain some of 
his authoritarian excesses. But there is also an institutional factor that may help to explain the 
lack of respect of Fujimori for the democratic rules of the game. The outsider president was the 
leader of a divided, incoherent, and weakly organized electoral movement. Cambio 90 was not 
an institutionalized party and it split in different factions as soon as Fujimori reached office 
(Degregori & Meléndez, 2007: 23-42). As mentioned above, Fujimori never attempted to change 
this situation by strengthening the organization of Cambio 90 and making it more internally 
                                                 
87 The Fujimori administration can also be fruitfully compared with the Lula administration in Brazil. As in the case 
of Fujimori, Lula was elected president in 2002 as a leader of a party that had never been in power at the national 
level (Partido dos Trabalhadores – PT). Moreover, the PT only had 17.7% of the seats in the legislature when Lula 
reached the presidency. The key difference between Fujimori and Lula is that the Brazilian president was clearly an 
experienced insider politician when he reached office. Lula was the leader of an established and strongly organized 
party, and he had participated in three presidential elections before winning in 2002. Lula’s way of dealing with the 
minority situation was very different from Fujimori’s reaction. Upon taking office, Lula constructed a diverse 
multiparty coalition by bringing eight parties into the cabinet (Baiocchi & Checa, 2008: 116; Samuels, 2008). The 
Lula government also convinced several deputies to switch parties and join one of the coalition parties, which is a 
common practice in Brazilian politics. As a result of these early efforts at coalition-making, Lula’s government 
passed several important pieces of legislation (Samuels, 2008). Later on, the Lula administration chose to distribute 
pork and cash to build ad hoc legislative coalitions, which created a corruption scandal known as the mensalão 
(Kingstone & Ponce, 2010: 120-121). By doing this the Lula administration disappointed the hopes of those who 
expected a less corrupt government. However, Lula managed to pass several controversial bills by engaging the 
legislature and negotiating deals with opposition parties and politicians. With all its flaws, the Lula administration 
tried to govern within the limits of the Brazilian political system rather than outside of it. 
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coherent. By contrast, Belaúnde and García were the leaders of more established and strongly 
organized parties. 
This organizational difference is essential to understand executive excesses under the 
Fujimori administration. Although Belaúnde and García were also personalistic presidents who 
were criticized for their unilateral tendencies (Mauceri, 1997; Murakami, 2012: 159), these 
leaders were still constrained by formal rules and institutions –primarily their own political 
parties–. This is one of the main findings of Levitt in his analysis of executive-legislative 
relations during the administrations of García and Fujimori (Levitt, 2012). Levitt convincingly 
demonstrates that during President García’s first term, his own co-partisans curtailed his most 
unilateral tendencies. 
For instance, in 1987 García embarked on a radical new economic direction when he 
proposed to nationalize all domestically owned private banks and financial institutions. This 
proposal caught many APRA leaders by surprise, and many ministers and top bureaucrats 
resigned in protest. Many APRA legislators also had serious reservations about this measure. 
The proposal passed in the Chamber of Deputies, but it was stalled in the Senate. Many APRA 
senators came from the conservative wing of the party and strongly opposed this measure. In the 
end, the Senate modified the measure in order to protect banking conglomerates from executive 
abuses. García kept pushing for the measure to be enacted but by mid-1988 the bank 
nationalization had been modified several times within the legislature. The ambitious 
nationalization program was only partially implemented, and García respected Supreme Court 
rulings which declared some aspects of this initiative unconstitutional (Crabtree, 1992; Graham, 
1992; Levitt, 2012: 60-62).  
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Another example is the thwarted reelection bid of Alan García. The APRA leader took 
advantage of his high approval ratings during his first years in office to push for a constitutional 
reform that would allow him to run for reelection. However, this initiative failed because García 
did not obtain the support of the National Executive Council of his own party. APRA’s top 
politicians in the party and in the legislature refused to endorse this constitutional reform in the 
party and in the legislature because they were concerned about the long term electoral fate of the 
party and their own electoral aspirations (Levitt, 2012: 59-60; Reyna, 2000: 84). 
This is an important difference between the institutional context faced by Belaúnde and 
García, and the institutional context faced by Fujimori. In more organized political parties (such 
as Acción Popular and APRA), congressmen and party members have longer time horizons and 
are more concerned about the future democratic reputation of their party. Hence, they tend to 
exert pressure on their respective leaders to keep them within the limits of the rule of law. On the 
contrary, Cambio 90 was a divided and weakly organized electoral movement. Fujimori 
exercised a very vertical control over his party. Most Cambio 90 legislators owed all their 
political capital to their leader and they had no political future without Fujimori. Hence, Cambio 
90 was not in a position to constrain Fujimori’s authoritarian tendencies (Levitt, 2012: 156). 
6.5.2.4 Popular approval for Fujimori’s authoritarian excesses 
The final factor that contributes to executive-legislative confrontation when the president 
is an outsider is the sociopolitical context of deep disenchantment with Congress and political 
parties. The lack of trust in political parties may lead to executive excesses against other 
institutions because the outsider president knows that the public will tolerate (or maybe even 
reward) these authoritarian abuses. This pattern is very clear in the case of Fujimori. As 
described in Chapter 2, Fujimori came to power in the midst of a severe economic, political, and 
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security crisis. The general public was extremely dissatisfied with the way established parties 
dealt with these crises in the 1980s. Fujimori fed on this disenchantment by repeatedly pointing 
out the corruption and inefficiency of the partidocracia. This contributed to worsen executive-
legislative relations in two different ways. 
First, the outsider president was reluctant to enter into open agreements with discredited 
political parties. Fujimori knew that he was attractive to voters because of his image as an 
untainted outsider who had no links with corrupt politicians. Hence, Fujimori tried to avoid 
coalitions with political parties, which greatly compromised interbranch cooperation. In the 
words of Kenney (2004: 96): “to become wed to what was then the paradigm of all that was 
wrong in Peru would not have been an attractive option for the new president.” 
 Second, this context of popular discontent with political parties provided incentives for 
Fujimori to engage in executive excesses because he knew that the public would side with him 
rather than with discredited institutions in case of a serious conflict. Several scholars have shown 
that support for Fujimori increased every time he renewed his attacks on the legislature or other 
political institutions (Cameron, 1997: 50; Conaghan, 1995: 233-234; Pease García, 1994: 38). At 
the same time that Fujimori’s popularity increased, polls revealed low approval for Congress 
(Kenney, 2004: 152). All these polls led Fujimori to believe that authoritarian excesses against 
Congress would be accepted by the Peruvian population (Conaghan, 2005: 31-32). Víctor 
Paredes (president of the Chamber of Deputies between 1990 and 1991 and Fujimori advisor) 
describes Fujimori as “very astute” because he was perfectly aware that attacking legislators and 
political parties was politically advantageous for him.88 
                                                 
88 Interview with Víctor Paredes, October 2012, Lima, Peru 
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The best proof of the popular approval for Fujimori’s excesses came on April 5, 1992 
when the outsider president illegally dissolved the legislature. Fujimori did not pay a political 
price for this authoritarian excess (McClintock, 1994). All the polls conducted at the time 
showed immediate and strong support for the autogolpe. On April 6, all major poll firms 
measured popular support for the coup. The closure of Congress was approved by more than 
70% of the population according to the major three polls firms (Apoyo, Datum, and CPI). 
Fujimori even used this information as one of the post hoc justifications for the coup (Conaghan, 
2005: 33; Levitt, 2012: 68). Popular support for the autogolpe proved durable as well. Two years 
after the coup, the dissolution of the legislature was still approved by 59% of the population 
(Lynch, 1999b: 251). 
6.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter provides evidence that the level of executive-legislative conflict increases when an 
independent politician holds the presidency. On the one hand, governability is undermined when 
an outsider is in power. Outsider presidents lack support in the legislative body and also lack the 
connections and experience necessary to compensate for this situation by building stable 
coalitions in the legislature. Hence, the day-to-day relations between the two branches of 
government are negatively affected. Specifically, cooperation between the president and 
Congress on specific bills becomes rare and the president is more likely to engage in executive 
excesses, which further increases the confrontation between the executive and the legislative 
branches. On the other hand, the rise of outsiders has deleterious consequences for democratic 
stability. The results of the rare events logistic regressions presented above show that the risk of 
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Congress dissolution attempts is much more likely when the president is an outsider. This is also 
linked to the situation of institutional paralysis that results from the lack of support for outsiders 
in the legislature. This result also reflects the calculus made by political outsiders that absolutely 
need to deliver on some of their promises to survive politically. When their policy agenda is 
blocked by the opposition in Congress, outsiders are much more likely to attempt to dissolve 
Congress.  
 The in-depth analysis of the severe executive-legislative confrontation during the first 
years of Fujimori served to confirm the main causal mechanisms identified in the theoretical 
framework. There are four main factors that can explain the greater likelihood of interbranch 
conflict when the president is an outsider: 1) outsiders are minority presidents, 2) outsiders lack 
democratic socialization, 3) outsiders are not constrained by strongly organized political parties, 
and 4) outsiders govern in moments of acute public disenchantment with the congress. 
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7.0  OUTSIDER PRESIDENTS AND NEOPHYTE MINISTERS: AN ANALYSIS OF 
THE FUJIMORI CASE 
Outsider presidents arrive to power with very few ties with the political class and established 
parties. They do not have a government team ready to take on the different positions in the 
cabinet when they are elected. In general, they arrive to power through parties that are little more 
than electoral vehicles that serve their personal ambitions. In the previous chapter, I mentioned in 
passing that this situation makes it hard for outsiders to recruit partisan politicians to cabinet 
positions. This chapter analyzes in more detail how the composition and the work of the cabinet 
change when the president is an outsider. I do this through an in-depth qualitative analysis of 
Peruvian cabinets after the return to democratic rule in the country. I focus on the period 1980-
1995 which allows me to compare the cabinets of the first administration of an outsider 
(Fujimori) with the cabinets of the previous presidents (Belaúnde and García) which were 
leaders of established parties.  
The chapter is organized as follows. First, I introduce the key theoretical argument 
linking outsider presidents with inexperienced and non-partisan ministers. Second, I take an in-
depth look at the impact of outsiders on cabinet composition with detailed data about ministerial 
careers in Peru in the period 1980-1995. Finally, I analyze how a more inexperienced and non-
partisan group of ministers affected the functioning of the cabinet in Peru during the Fujimori 
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years. I do so using the extensive qualitative information I collected in Peru, where I interviewed 
several ministers of the different administrations in the period 1980-1995. 
7.1 OUTSIDER PRESIDENTS AND NEOPHYTE MINISTERS: THEORETICAL 
CONSIDERATIONS 
7.1.1 Technocratic ministers, multiparty coalitions, and Latin American cabinets 
In the past 20 years, numerous scholars have studied the composition and functioning of cabinets 
in Latin America. Until the mid-nineties, the conventional wisdom held that presidential 
institutions provided few incentives for presidents to form coalitions, and for opposition parties 
to join cabinets. In particular, the fixed terms of office in presidential systems were perceived as 
an important obstacle for coalition formation in Latin America (Linz, 1990; Sartori, 1994; Stepan 
& Skach, 1993). 
 The new generation of scholarly work on political institutions in Latin America showed 
that coalitions were actually common in the region. In her groundbreaking work, Deheza (1997) 
studied nine Latin American countries between 1958 and 1994, and showed that a majority of 
governments in this period were coalition governments. Other studies using different datasets 
also reached similar conclusions regarding the formation of coalition governments under 
presidentialism (Amorim Neto, 2006; Chasquetti, 2001; Martínez-Gallardo, 2012). Although 
presidents can survive without a coalition, “they still have incentives to include other parties in 
the cabinet to ensure a smooth passage of their political agenda through congress” (Martínez-
Gallardo, 2012: 64). The central argument of this literature is that presidents use portfolio 
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allocation as a legislative strategy. Minority presidents attempt to form multiparty cabinets 
including members from the most represented parties in the legislature in order to govern 
through the legislature (Amorim Neto, 2002; Chasquetti, 2008). 
 From the perspective of this literature on coalitional presidentialism, the portfolio 
allocation strategy of outsider presidents is an anomaly. The argument presented in this chapter 
goes against the conventional wisdom. Given outsiders’ lack of support in the legislature when 
they reach office, these traditional works lead us to expect that they will form multiparty 
coalitions and invite important figures of opposition parties to join their cabinets. I expect 
exactly the opposite because outsiders lack the political connections and experience required to 
recruit members from oppositions parties, and also because it is politically costly for outsiders to 
recruit traditional politicians to their cabinets. As a result, outsiders often prefer to invite 
politically inexperienced individuals (with a varying level of technocratic expertise) to occupy 
ministerial positions. 
 Of course, this is not the first study to analyze the rise of independent and politically 
inexperienced ministers in Latin America. There is a large literature on technocratic ministers in 
the region (Conaghan, 1998; Domínguez, 1997; Silva, 2009).89 Technocrats can be defined as 
“individuals with a high level of specialized academic training which serves as a principal 
criterion on the basis of which they are selected to occupy key decision-making or advisory roles 
in large complex organizations – both public and private” (Collier, 1979: 403). The appointment 
of technocratic ministers by several Latin American presidents is closely associated with the 
implementation of neoliberal policies after the democratic transitions. Presidents often recruited 
technocratic ministers who were ideologically committed to neoliberalism and had the technical 
                                                 
89 For a detailed review of the literature on technocratic politics in Latin America, see Estrada Álvarez & Puello-
Socarrás (2005). 
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expertise to manage complex structural adjustment programs in the midst of severe economic 
crises (Conaghan, 1998; Conaghan, Malloy, & Abugattas, 1990). The appointment of 
technocratic ministers to manage economic policies was also used by presidents during economic 
downturns to restore the investment climate (Schneider, 1998). The recruitment of “experts” in 
ministries with responsibility over economic policy is also common in the parliamentary systems 
in Western Europe (Blondel & Thiebault, 1991; Dowding & Dumont, 2009; Larrson, 1993). This 
literature provides important clues to understand the recruitment of several technocrats under 
Fujimori to implement neoliberal economic policies. Fujimori campaigned in 1990 promising an 
alternative to structural adjustment programs; but implemented very different policies when he 
reached office. Given the severe economic crisis facing Peru and the technical skills required to 
implement neoliberal reforms, Fujimori chose to appoint a series of experts to steer economic 
policies. However, the literature on technocratic politics cannot fully explain the ministerial 
appointment choices made by outsider presidents. Fujimori recruited neophyte ministers to 
occupy a wide array of cabinet positions (not only ministries with direct –or indirect– 
responsibility over economic policies). Moreover, a large number of non-partisan ministers 
recruited by this outsider president did not have a high level of technocratic expertise. Many 
cabinet members under Fujimori were public servants or worked in the private sector, but they 
were not technocrats if we accept Collier’s definition above. In fact, the literature on cabinets 
and ministers has tended to overlook other non-partisan profiles (beyond technocrats or 
“technopols”).90 Furthermore, the recruitment of technocrats and other non-partisan ministers 
extended well beyond the period of severe economic crisis faced by the Fujimori administration 
in the early 1990s.  
                                                 
90 For an exception, see Martinez-Gallardo & Schleiter (2013). 
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 Hence, the existing literature cannot fully explain the decision of Fujimori and other 
outsider presidents to appoint politically inexperienced individuals to their cabinets. Both the 
literature on coalitional presidentialism and the literature on technocratic ministers fall short of 
explaining this widespread pattern. I argue that the recruitment of neophyte ministers when the 
president is an outsider can be explained from two different perspectives.91 First, it is associated 
with a lack of political experience and political socialization. This political inexperience reduces 
the willingness of outsiders to build consensus and negotiate with other political forces. 
Inexperienced politicians may also lack the political resources necessary to recruit politicians 
from other political parties. Second, this pattern can be understood as a political strategy that 
outsiders use to distance themselves from a discredited political class. These explanations are not 
mutually exclusive. On the contrary, they are complementary and I analyze them separately 
solely for heuristic purposes. 
7.1.2 Lack of political experience 
By definition, outsiders are political amateurs who do not have ties with established political 
parties. This characteristic has a strong impact on the governing style of outsiders. Political 
parties have a key role in the recruitment and socialization of democratic political elites (Key, 
1942). According to Levitsky and Cameron (2003: 4), political parties “provide the foundation 
for a democratic political class.” Even when they have experienced serious political conflicts 
during their career, party leaders tend to be imbued with a democratic political culture. 
Traditional politicians know perfectly well that political decisions often require difficult 
                                                 
91 The theoretical framework in this chapter also builds on the general theoretical framework introduced in chapter 2. 
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negotiations in which all the actors make concessions. These negotiations occur both within and 
between political parties. Party politicians become socialized with a series of implicit rules that 
govern the democratic game. They accept that elections can be lost and that policy proposals can 
be defeated if the majority so decides. On the contrary, outsiders are political amateurs who lack 
this democratic socialization within established political parties and, in some cases, do not have a 
commitment to democratic institutions. Levitsky and Cameron (2003: 5) point out that outsiders 
are less likely than insiders “to have experience with (and be oriented toward) democratic 
practices such as negotiation, compromise, and coalition building.”  
This lack of democratic political socialization leads outsiders to have a more direct and 
aggressive style that sometimes rejects opportunities to negotiate with other political forces. This 
is reflected in the lack of willingness of outsiders to recruit ministers that belong to other 
political parties. As already mentioned in the previous chapter, outsiders tend to arrive to power 
with weak parties which are often nothing more than the electoral vehicle they create to compete 
in the presidential elections. However, once they are elected they face the opposition of 
traditional parties in congress. In general, presidents who find themselves in a minority situation 
in parliament try to negotiate with other parties to form political alliances. As part of these deals, 
presidents tend to include members from other parties in the cabinet in exchange for support for 
the initiatives of the president in the parliament (Amorim Neto, 2006; Zelaznik, 2001). 
Outsiders, however, prefer cabinets composed by individuals without experience in politics or 
public administration –independent technocrats and individuals in their personal networks of 
support– (Siavelis & Morgenstern, 2008). 
Political inexperience affects not only the willingness, but also the capacity to carry on 
successful political negotiations at the highest level with leaders of other parties. Even if 
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outsiders try at some point to recruit members from other parties in their cabinets in order to 
obtain support in parliament, they often fail because they lack the necessary resources and 
experience to carry on these negotiations successfully. Rospigliosi similarly argues that 
negotiating and building consensus in Congress requires “lots of skills and experience” which 
outsiders lack (Caretas, May 7, 1990). The leaders of established parties tend to be very able 
negotiators because they are used to seeking agreements with other political forces and with 
other factions within their own parties. Career politicians know the modus operandi of inter-
party negotiations and know when to make concessions to reach an agreement. Outsiders do not 
have such experience and often commit serious mistakes at key moments that condemn their 
attempts to recruit experienced politicians to their cabinets to failure. 
7.1.3 Political strategy 
In addition to the lack of willingness and capacity to form partisan cabinets, there is another 
fundamental cause that has to do with the political and electoral strategy of outsider presidents. 
As has been shown in Chapters 4 and 5 of this dissertation, the election of outsiders tends to 
happen in moments of deep economic and sociopolitical crisis when citizens are disenchanted 
with established political parties. 
This context of deep economic and sociopolitical crisis, as well as the disenchantment of 
citizens with political parties, paves the way for several executive excesses against discredited 
political parties. Outsiders tend to use an aggressive rhetoric against the political class and 
political parties, accusing them of being the main cause of all the country’s problems. This 
defiant attitude towards political parties produces high political and electoral returns to outsiders, 
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as can be inferred from the high approval rates and the easy reelection of outsiders who chose 
this path.  
This strategy of confrontation with the political class has clear consequences for the 
composition of the cabinet. Since outsiders choose an aggressive style and harshly criticize 
political parties, they cannot then recruit members of these parties to the cabinet. On the one 
hand, career politicians may choose not to collaborate with an outsider who attacks them 
publicly. On the other hand, outsiders prefer not to recruit individuals affiliated with traditional 
political parties in order to maintain a clear anti-politics stance that produces political and 
electoral benefits for them. 
7.2 THE CABINETS OF FUJIMORI 
I analyze the impact of outsider presidents on the composition and the functioning of the cabinet 
by conducting an in-depth analysis of the cabinets of Fujimori, which are systematically 
compared to the cabinets of the two presidents who preceded Fujimori in office (Belaúnde and 
García).  
7.2.1 Descriptive statistics: the cabinets and ministers of Fujimori 
The best way to understand the specificity of the cabinets of Fujimori (an outsider) is to compare 
their composition with the composition of the cabinets of the two predecessors of Fujimori in the 
presidency who were career politicians: Fernando Belaúnde and Alan García. These two men 
arrived to power as leaders of established political parties. Belaúnde was the historic leader of 
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Acción Popular (a center-right party) and arrived to the presidency by winning the first 
democratic elections since the return of democratic rule to Peru in the late 1970s. He governed 
Peru between 1980 and 1985.92 García took the reins of APRA –a center-left party with a long 
trajectory in the Peruvian political life– after the death of the historic leader of the party (Haya de 
la Torre). He won the presidential elections in 1985 and governed between 1985 and 1990.  
In order to conduct this comparative analysis, I elaborated a database on Peruvian 
ministers in the period 1980-1995. Using the SEDEPE93 codebook and a recent codebook about 
cabinets in presidential systems (Camerlo & Pérez-Liñán, 2012), I collected detailed 
biographical information about each of the ministers of the cabinets of Belaúnde, García, and the 
first Fujimori administration. The database includes information about the age, the level of 
education, the professional experience, and the political career different ministers had before 
arriving to the cabinet. I obtained these data consulting the newspaper archives of the National 
Library of Peru and other specialized libraries such as the library of the Instituto de Estudios 
Peruanos (IEP). Moreover, two books were particularly useful to collect data on the ministers of 
Belaúnde (García Belaúnde, 1988) and the ministers of García (García Belaúnde, 2011). 
Table 7.1 presents some descriptive statistics that show the previous political experience and the 
partisan affiliation of cabinet members of the different Peruvian administrations in the period 
between 1980 and 1995. First, the table shows the percentage of ministers in the different 
administrations that were affiliated with a political party, either as simple members, as members 
of the party executive, or as party leaders. Second, the table shows the percentage of ministers in 
                                                 
92 Belaúnde had already been president of Peru between 1963 and 1968, when his constitutional mandate was 
interrupted by a military coup. 
93 SEDEPE (Selection and Deselection of Political Elites) is a network of researchers that studies the selection and 
deselection of ministers in different political systems. This network elaborated a codebook to facilitate the collection 
and exchange of data between scholars (Dowding & Dumont, 2009). The codebook is available on the SEDEPE 
website: http://sedepe.net/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/SEDEPE_Codebook_Jan2010.pdf. 
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each administration that had parliamentary experience before becoming cabinet members. In this 
percentage are included all ministers that had been senators, deputies, or members of a local 
legislature before arriving to the cabinet. 
 
Table 7.1. Legislative experience and partisan affiliation of ministers in Peru (1980-1995) 
 
Percentage of ministers 
with partisan affiliation 
Percentage of ministers 
with legislative 
experience 
Fernando Belaúnde 1980-1985 84.6 34.1 
Alan Garcia 1985-1990 90.5 42.1 
Alberto Fujimori 1990-1995 16.6 8.3 
 
The table clearly shows a striking difference between the cabinets formed by career 
politicians (Belaúnde and García) and the cabinets formed by an outsider (Fujimori) in what 
concerns the partisan affiliation of the ministers. The vast majority of ministers in the cabinets of 
Belaúnde and García naturally belonged to the parties of these two presidents (Acción Popular 
and APRA respectively). This was mainly due to reasons of programmatic and ideological 
affinity. The members of a political family tend to have similar goals and ideas, and defend a 
common program. The recruitment of ministers from the president’s party also responds to 
political reasons. Both Belaúnde and García took into consideration the internal divisions within 
their own parties in their appointments, and sought to give satisfaction to the different groups or 
factions.94 Moreover, Belaúnde and García negotiated political alliances with other parties. These 
alliances insured support from smaller parties for the presidents’ policies in parliament, in 
exchange for the appointment of some members of these parties in the cabinet. Belaúnde formed 
                                                 
94 Interview with José Carlos Requena, November 2012, Lima 
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an alliance with the Partido Popular Cristiano (PPC). Acción Popular had a majority in the 
Chamber of Deputies but not in the Senate. The agreement with PPC insured support for 
Belaúnde’s program in exchange for two positions in the cabinet for the PPC (ministry of justice 
and ministry of industry). This agreement only broke when the 1985 elections approached.95 In a 
similar vein, APRA negotiated an alliance with the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) when 
García arrived to power in 1985. This alliance was not essential for governability because APRA 
had absolute majority in both chambers of parliament. But the newly elected leader (García) 
wanted to make clear that he was open to collaboration with other political forces. This political 
agreement gave one position in the cabinet to the PDC during García’s administration (first the 
ministry of labor and then the ministry of justice).96 
The case of Fujimori is radically different. Only 16.6% of Fujimori’s ministers had a 
partisan affiliation before joining the cabinet. As mentioned above, most ministers in the cabinets 
of Belaúnde and García came from their own parties. On the contrary, Fujimori appointed very 
few ministers from his own party. Cambio 90 was little more than an electoral vehicle for 
Fujimori and had no experienced political cadres to take on these positions. At its origins, the 
members of Cambio 90 were scattered in four different groups: 1) the “molineros” (a group of 
individuals that were close to Fujimori when he acted as rector of the Universidad Nacional 
Agraria La Molina), 2) the evangelicals (a group of activists in the evangelical community who 
helped organize the 1990 presidential campaign), 3) the small businessmen, and 4) members of 
Fujimori’s family and persons in Fujimori’s personal network of support in the Japanese 
community in Lima (Degregori & Meléndez, 2007: 23-29). These diverse support groups 
considerably helped Fujimori during the presidential campaign and members of these four 
                                                 
95 Interview with Lourdes Flores Nano, November 2012, Lima 
96 Interview with Grover Pango, December 2012, Lima 
 191 
groups were elected to the parliament representing Cambio 90. But these individuals had very 
little experience in politics or public administration. Given the severe economic and security 
crises that Peru was facing when Fujimori arrived to power, Fujimori opted for a group of 
independent technocrats rather than appointing inexperienced individuals from his party. This 
tendency was maintained during the whole Fujimori administration, with some rare exceptions 
such as Víctor Paredes (minister of health between 1991 and 1993) and Jaime Yoshiyama (who 
occupied different cabinet positions between 1991 and 1997). For reasons that will be analyzed 
below, Fujimori also failed to incorporate members of other political parties to his cabinet 
through broad agreements or political alliances. The few ministers that were affiliated to other 
parties entered the cabinet in their individual capacity and not as representatives of their parties. 
In many cases, these individuals received pressure from their parties not to accept a cabinet 
position or to leave the cabinet if they had already accepted the position. For instance, Félix 
Canal (an APRA militant), accepted a position in the cabinet as minister of fisheries in 1991 in 
spite of the strong pressures from his party to dissuade him.97 In the same vein, Gloria Helfer 
(minister of education in the first Fujimori cabinet) received constant pressures from the 
militants of her party (Izquierda Unida) pushing her to abandon her position in the cabinet.98 
Another clear difference between the ministers of Fujmori and the ministers of the 
presidents who preceded him has to do with the political experience acquired in the parliament. 
More than a third of cabinet members in the Belaúnde and García administrations had been 
deputies or senators before becoming ministers. In other words, a large sub-group of Belaúnde 
and García ministers were actively engaged in politics and had a distinct political trajectory 
                                                 
97 Interview with Felix Canal, November 2012, Lima  
98 Interview with Gloria Helfer, November 2012, Lima 
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before being recruited in these presidents’ cabinets.99 On the contrary, only a very small minority 
of Fujimori ministers in the period 1990-1995 (8.3%) had some form of legislative experience. 
Only five cabinet members had legislative experience, and two of those had acquired this 
experience as members of a local legislature. The vast majority of Fujimori ministers were 
political neophytes when they were appointed to the cabinet.  
So far, this section has shown that most Fujimori ministers had no partisan affiliation and 
very little political experience when they joined the cabinet. Now, I would like to present some 
descriptive statistics that show the typical profile of Fujimori ministers. Figure 7.1 shows the 
professional sector in which Fujimori ministers worked before being recruited into the cabinet. 
The figure shows the percentage of ministers that came from the political arena (deputies or 
senators), the military, the public sector, and the private sector. 
 
 
Figure 7.1. Sector of origin of Fujimori ministers 
                                                 
99 The differences in the table may actually understate the differences that existed between the ministers of Fujimori 
and the ministers of the presidents who preceded him. In fact, many other ministers in the Belaúnde and García 
administrations had tried to become legislators but had been defeated in the elections. Hence, there were more 
politically experienced ministers in the Belaúnde and García administrations than the table suggests.  
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The figure clearly shows that very few ministers were career politicians. Only 6.3% of 
cabinet members (four ministers) came from the political arena. These are ministers that were 
recruited when they occupied positions in the parliament as deputies or as members of the 
Democratic Constituent Congress (CCD).100 A relatively important proportion of ministers 
(14.1%) came from the military. All defense ministers came from the military sector, but 
Fujimori also appointed some military men to occupy other positions in his cabinets.101 Close to 
a third of the members of Fujimori’s cabinets came from the public sector. Among these 
ministers, there were two main profiles. First, there was a group of technocrats that had acquired 
experience in public administration. Second, there was a group of academics or physicians who 
had specialized knowledge linked to the ministry they were called to head. Finally, the majority 
of Fujimori ministers came from the private sector. These individuals were professionals with 
experience in the private sector in a diverse array of positions (businessmen, engineers, lawyers, 
etc.). The vast majority of ministers in the economic area in the first Fujimori administration 
(ministers of economy, ministers of industry, and ministers of housing) came from the private 
sector. In sum, almost 80% of the ministers of Fujimori were professionals, originating either in 
the public or in the private sector, who did not have previous experience in politics. Most of 
them were also politically independent. 
It is also interesting to analyze the activity of ministers after occupying a position in 
Fujimori’s cabinet. Figure 7.2 shows the main activity of cabinet members in Fujimori’s 
administration once they abandoned their positions. 
 
                                                 
100 It is even exaggerated to consider that these ministers came from the political arena because in fact they had a 
very limited political experience as legislators of Cambio 90. None of these four individuals were career politicians.  
101 For example, he appointed a retired admiral (Raúl Sánchez Sotomayor) as minister of fisheries in his first cabinet. 
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Figure 7.2. Main professional sector of ministers after leaving the cabinet 
 
The figure shows that only a third of the ministers continued to be engaged in politics 
after they left their positions in the cabinet. Nineteen percent of the members of Fujimori’s 
cabinets occupied legislative positions after their ministerial jobs. A smaller number (12% of 
ministers) went on to occupy other positions in Fujimori’s government.102 Some of the neophyte 
ministers used the notoriety that they gained by joining the cabinet to start a political career. 
Such is the case of Jaime Yoshiyama Tanaka, an engineer who occupied two cabinet positions 
between 1991 and 1992 (ministry of transportation and communication, and ministry of energy). 
Then, he was elected to occupy a seat in the CCD and subsequently became the president of that 
legislative body. But the most important information revealed by Figure 7.2 is that almost 70% 
of the individuals that occupied cabinet positions during Fujimori’s administration went back to 
occupy professional roles (both in the public sector and in the private sector) and quickly 
abandoned all forms of political engagement. 
                                                 
102 For example, some ministers occupied diplomatic positions or became political advisors. 
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In sum, this section clearly shows that the vast majority of ministers during Fujimori’s 
administration were technocrats or professionals with a specialized training, but with very little 
political experience. They came mostly from the private sector, but there were also many cabinet 
members who had worked in the public sector. In general, these ministers had a very brief 
political involvement and went back to their professional activities (public or private) as soon as 
they left their positions in Fujimori’s cabinet. 
7.3 NEOPHYTE AND INDEPENDENT MINISTERS: CAUSES 
The previous section clearly demonstrates that the composition of cabinets radically changed 
with the arrival to power of Fujimori. The cabinets of the 1980s were formed by individuals 
affiliated with political parties, and a large number of them also had political experience 
(especially legislative experience) before arriving to the cabinet. Fujimori cabinets were 
composed of political neophytes who often had some technical expertise acquired in the public 
or in the private sector. In this section, I will analyze the main reasons for these differences in the 
Peruvian case. For this purpose, I will go back to the theoretical framework presented above. 
7.3.1 Lack of political experience 
The main reason that explains the lack of experienced and partisan ministers in the cabinets of 
Fujimori is the lack of political experience and political socialization of Fujimori, which reduced 
his willingness to negotiate with other political forces and generate consensus.  
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Fujimori favored a managerial approach of government to try to bring solutions to the problems 
Peru was facing. According to the vision of Fujimori, it was necessary to leave behind the petty 
interests of bureaucrats and politicians, who were portrayed as selfish, corrupt, and inefficient. 
Fujimorismo had a clear disdain for deliberation and the creation of consensus within political 
institutions.103 The “politics of anti-politics” –as Fujimori himself often described this vision– 
considered that governing was equal to an efficient management of public affairs by a team of 
technocrats and specialists. There was no space for negotiation or deliberation, because the focus 
was set on attaining a series of pre-established goals (Conaghan, 2005; Degregori, 2000; Lynch, 
2000). This vision of democracy was defended by Fujimori in an interview in the Houston 
Chronicle:  “We want a democracy that is more efficient, that resolves our problems. Democracy 
is the will of the people—good administration, honesty, results. They don’t want speeches, or to 
be deceived by images” (cited in Conaghan, 2005: 3). 
This technocratic and managerial view of politics certainly had an impact on cabinet 
composition. Presidents who find themselves in a minority situation in parliament tend to seek an 
alliance or coalition with other political forces to facilitate the legislative work and the 
implementation of their programs (Cheibub et al., 2004; Negretto, 2006; Zelaznik, 2001). The 
easiest way to form these coalitions is to distribute some positions in the cabinet to the parties 
that accept to support the program of the president in the parliament. This often leads to an 
increase in the proportion of ministers who have political experience and a clear partisan 
affiliation when the president is in a minority situation in parliament (Amorim Neto, 2006). As 
was analyzed in the previous chapter, Fujimori faced a clear minority situation in the chamber of 
deputies, since Cambio 90 only obtained 18% of the seats in that body in 1990 elections. 
                                                 
103 This was visible not only in the relations of Fujimori with his ministers, but also in the relations of the executive 
with other institutions such as parliament, the judiciary, and the media (Conaghan, 2005; Kenney, 2004). 
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However, he reacted very differently from what the comparative politics literature predicts. 
Instead of trying to create a government team with members of established political parties with 
a strong presence in parliament, Fujimori selected his ministers one by one following purely 
technical criteria. The leftist politician and academic Henry Pease points out that Fujimori 
segmented the relation with the individuals working in his administration, and preferred a 
vertical relation between him and his ministers. This vision lent itself more to the appointment of 
apolitical ministers, rather than partisan ministers who had an independent basis of political 
support. Even when Fujimori recruited ministers affiliated with traditional political parties, he 
took into consideration the individuals characteristics of these persons rather than the parties to 
which they belonged.104 Bowen (2000: 258) goes even further and argues that Fujimori saw 
himself as a general manager administering a team of employees –his ministers–. 
The lack of political willingness of Fujimori to incorporate politically experienced 
individuals with a partisan affiliation to his cabinet partly explains why the Peruvian cabinets in 
the 1990s were so apolitical. However, there were certain moments –especially during his first 
years in office– in which Fujimori tried to recruit some experienced politicians to his cabinet, but 
these attempts invariably failed. This failure is associated with the lack of political skills of 
Fujimori. The formation of the first cabinet by Fujimori can be considered a “critical juncture” 
that influenced the composition of the executive branch during the whole Fujimori 
administration.105 Fujimori arrived to power without a government team and for some time he 
seemed disposed to reach out to traditional parties and include representatives from various 
political forces in his cabinet. In fact, a few days after being elected president, Fujimori declared 
                                                 
104 Interview with Henry Pease, October 2012, Lima 
105 A critical juncture is a contingent decision that establishes a path of institutional development that is difficult to 
revert later on (Thelen, 1999). 
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that he was interested in recruiting talents from different political parties (La República, July 15, 
1990). However, in these key weeks Fujimori committed several mistakes that revealed his 
political amateurism and led to a cabinet formed mostly by technocrats and professionals from 
the private and public sectors. First, he irritated many party leaders because he tried to negotiate 
directly with some individuals affiliated with established political parties without negotiating 
with party chiefs first, which is the normal modus operandi when a president seeks collaboration 
with other parties. For instance, one of the leaders of FREDEMO (Javier Silva Ruete) pointed 
out in July of 1990 that “the normal procedure is to call the chiefs of the political parties with 
which collaboration is sought (…). In this case, there were contacts with certain persons 
belonging to political parties (…). But there was nothing clear” (Caretas, July 9, 1990). 
Similarly, an op-ed piece of the newspaper El Comercio pointed out that several politicians 
“considered that the procedure used [to form the cabinet] was inadequate, because the 
recruitment of partisan ministers should have been negotiated with the competent organs of the 
political parties to which they belong.” As a result, several party leaders outright rejected any 
form of political agreement with Fujimori, and gave orders to the members of their parties 
forbidding the participation in the cabinets of Fujimori. The most paradigmatic example is 
Acción Popular. The party leader (Fernando Belaúnde) was infuriated by the attempt of Fujimori 
to recruit members of Acción Popular without negotiating directly with him. This closed the 
door of Fujimori’s cabinet to some members of Acción Popular who rejected a position in the 
cabinet out of party discipline. The prime minister in the first Fujimori cabinet (Hurtado Miller) 
had to resign from Acción Popular to take on this position, which clearly shows that this 
appointment was not the result of an agreement among party leaders.  
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Fujimori also failed when he tried to negotiate with political heavyweights to incorporate 
them into the cabinet. For instance, Fujimori met with Henry Pease (leader of the main leftist 
party –Izquierda Unida–) when he was designing his first cabinet in July 1990 to offer him the 
ministry of education. The recruitment of Pease would have meant an important support for a 
political neophyte like Fujimori. But the president elect Fujimori did not have any experience in 
this type of negotiations. Pease was expecting a political and programmatic agreement but 
Fujimori did not give him any specific detail about the program he wanted to implement. In 
Pease’s own words, Fujimori “was complete improvisation and had no idea of where he was 
going. (…) He called people to appoint them to his cabinet but he did not tell them where the 
ship he was inviting them to embark was going.” 106 
7.3.2 Political strategy 
Finally, there are a series of “political strategy” factors that help understand the reluctance of 
Fujimori to incorporate experienced and partisan individuals to his cabinet. As already 
mentioned, Fujimori arrived to power in the midst of a serious economic and sociopolitical crisis. 
This dramatic situation resulted (at least partially) from the failure of the economic and security 
policies adopted by traditional parties after the return to democratic rule. Established political 
parties were greatly discredited in Peru in the early 1990s (Rospigliosi, 1994). Fujimori was 
perfectly aware of the dissatisfaction of the citizenry with political parties. In fact, he stirred this 
disenchantment even further with relentless attacks on the political class and political parties. 
During his administration, Fujimori criticized in countless occasions the traditional politicians 
                                                 
106 Interview with Henry Pease, October 2012, Lima 
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and the political parties, which he described as corrupt and inefficient. This defiant attitude 
produced great political benefits for the president. The citizenry clearly supported Fujimori in 
this confrontation between the president and traditional parties. In December 1991, Fujimori had 
a very high approval rate –95%– whereas the congress had an extremely low approval rate –8%– 
(Kenney, 2004). 
Even though Fujimori tried to incorporate some representatives of established political 
parties to his cabinet during his first months in office, he quickly switched to a confrontation 
strategy. This conflictive relationship with the political class did not allow him to recruit 
ministers with a recognized political and partisan profile. The citizenry would not have 
understood if Fujimori had harshly criticized the inefficiency of political parties and the 
corruption of legislators, only to form later a cabinet composed by members of the traditional 
political class. On the other hand, political parties were also irritated by the strategy of 
confrontation chosen by Fujimori. This led them to reject any possibility of institutional 
collaboration with Fujimori through a stable presence in the cabinet. The mutual distrust between 
the president and the parties, and the confrontation path chosen by Fujimori naturally led to a 
cabinet composed mainly by independent technocrats.  
A final factor to be considered is that outsiders arrive to power with a very limited 
political capital. When he arrived to power, Fujimori was a political novice who did not have a 
significant political capital. Several ministers I interviewed pointed out that this lack of political 
capital and political experience made Fujimori very distrustful and suspicious of cabinet 
members working alongside him. This also contributes to explaining why Fujimori did not call 
many experienced politicians to participate in his cabinet. In the words of a close advisor to 
Fujimori (Víctor Paredes), “Fujimori was afraid that someone could use a cabinet position to 
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confront him”.107 If Fujimori had recruited experienced politicians into the cabinet, these 
individuals could have used this space to challenge the neophyte president. For the same reason, 
Fujimori preferred to trust in independent technocrats rather than recruiting prominent members 
of his own party, who could have used that position to try to challenge Fujimori’s leadership in 
the Cambio 90 movement. 
7.4 NEOPHYTE AND INDEPENDENT MINISTERS: CONSEQUENCES FOR THE 
FUNCTIONING OF THE CABINET 
The previous sections analyzed the causes of the recruitment of politically inexperienced and 
non-partisan ministers when the president is an outsider. In this section, I will analyze the 
consequences of this pattern for the functioning of the cabinet and for the relationship between 
the president and his ministers.  
The first consequence of having a cabinet composed by individuals who are political 
neophytes is a loss of ministerial autonomy. When ministers have acquired an important political 
status and have their own political capital, presidents are almost obliged to grant them a certain 
autonomy in their ministerial work. On the contrary, ministers who are complete political 
neophytes owe all their political capital to the president who appoints them. The difference 
between the insider presidents (Belaúnde and García) and the outsider president (Fujimori) is 
very clear in this respect. Belaúnde and García represented established parties that held 
presidents accountable and sometimes vocally opposed the positions taken by the party leaders 
                                                 
107 Interview with Víctor Paredes, November 2012, Lima 
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(Bowen, 2000: 209). These presidents respected the autonomy of the ministers who represented 
different tendencies within the parties they headed because they wanted to maintain a fragile 
internal equilibrium. Belaúnde was extremely respectful of the activity of his ministers, both the 
ones belonging to his own party (Acción Popular) and the ones belonging to PPC.108 For 
instance, a minister of fisheries during the Belaúnde administration points out that the leader of 
Acción Popular let his ministers work autonomously. Belaúnde gave the broad orientations but 
he also gave his cabinet members important latitude to decide the specific policies necessary to 
achieve these general goals.109 Although García is sometimes accused of governing in a direct 
fashion and not always respecting the investiture of his ministers, the leader of APRA was very 
much aware of the equilibrium of forces within his party. Hence, he gave many positions in the 
cabinet to individuals representing the different tendencies within the party. The APRA leader 
respected the most prominent figures of the party such as Luis Alberto Sánchez or Armando 
Villanueva who were offered important ministries during the García administration. These 
historic leaders of Aprismo had a consolidated political capital, and president García was obliged 
to reserve them a sphere of power and to respect their autonomy.110 
On the contrary, the vast majority of Fujimori ministers did not have any political capital.  
Hence, they were more easily malleable by the outsider president. This is patent in the 
justification that Fujimori gave to one of his advisors (De Soto) for the appointment of Hurtado 
Miller as prime minister in his first cabinet. De Soto recalls Fujimori saying that “Hurtado does 
not have anywhere else to go; therefore he is my man”, and De Soto further pointed out that 
Fujimori “is afraid that if you arrive to the cabinet with a team, this team will respond to you and 
                                                 
108 Interviews with Alberto Musso and Lourdes Flores Nano, November 2012, Lima 
109 Interview with Fortunato Quesada Lagarrigue, November 2012, Lima 
110 Interview with Grover Pango, December 2012, Lima 
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not to him; but if the man is isolated, Fujimori is his only source of survival (cited in Bowen, 
2000: 37). In the same vein, the main advisor of Fujimori during his first years in office points 
out that Fujimori was aware that he was the boss, and he did not let anyone escape from the 
direction he established. For instance, the inclusion of leftist activists in the first cabinet did not 
reflect a political agreement that would entail certain autonomy for these individuals. On the 
contrary, what Fujimori sought was to co-opt prominent individuals who could oppose his 
neoliberal policies and threaten his political survival but without giving a real space of 
autonomous power to these leftist activists.111 In any case, these ministers with a clear political 
profile were in the cabinet for a very short time during the first months of the Fujimori 
administration. As soon as these leftist militants abandoned their ministerial positions, the 
cabinet was formed by more subservient technocrat ministers with a low profile (Conaghan, 
2005: 25-26).  
The essential attribute demanded from the new ministers was absolute loyalty. Fujimori 
could accept inefficiency from his ministers, but never a betrayal. Given this reality, ministers 
often preferred not to speak to the press because they were afraid of saying something that 
Fujimori would not like (Bowen, 2000: 40, 362). According to Gloria Helfer (minister of 
education in the first Fujimori cabinet), the president limited the autonomy of his ministers by 
giving extremely precise orders to his cabinet members. Fujimori did not give any leeway or 
flexibility to his ministers in the implementation of the policies he decided.112 
A very common practice used by Fujimori to control his ministers was the appointment 
by the president of the vice-ministers. While the ministers in the different ministries regularly 
changed, Fujimori kept in place the vice-ministers and these individuals directly responded to 
                                                 
111 Interview with Víctor Paredes, November 2012, Lima 
112 Interview with Gloria Helfer, November 2012, Lima 
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Fujimori.113 Félix Canal (minister of fisheries in 1991) affirms that Fujimori tried to control his 
decisions through the vice-minister. Canal points out that the vice-minister once bluntly told him 
that “whatever you are going to decide, I have to see it first”. Canal aspired to have a more 
decisive and autonomous role, and he resigned only six months after his appointment in the wake 
of several disagreements with Fujimori.114 Carlos Amat y León (minister of agriculture in the 
first Fujimori cabinet) went through a similar experience. A few months after his appointment, 
Fujimori tried to change the staff of the ministry of agriculture and to impose a vice-minister that 
the minister had not approved.115 Amat y León quickly resigned because he considered that 
ministers had an excessively subordinate role in the Fujimori government (Kenney, 2004: 135-
136). Neophyte ministers were to a certain extent obliged to work with their vice-ministers. 
Since many Fujimori ministers had no previous experience in politics or in public administration, 
there were many things that they ignored when they arrived to the ministry.116 This reality 
allowed Fujimori to limit the autonomy of his ministers by tightly controlling the vice-ministers. 
Some ministers of Fujimori have a more nuanced view of the margin of autonomy that ministers 
had under Fujimori. Although they recognize that Fujimori gave very precise orders and 
controlled some of his ministers through vice-ministers or other officials in the ministries, they 
also point out that Fujimori let ministers work more freely if he trusted them and if he perceived 
that they were trustworthy.117 All things considered, however, it is clear that the ministers of 
Fujimori had little autonomy in their decisions, and their lack of individual political capital often 
led them to be simple executers of a political line dictated by the president.  
                                                 
113 Interview with Lourdes Flores Nano, November 2012, Lima  
114 Interview with Félix Canal Torres, November 2012, Lima 
115 Interview with Carlos Amat y León, December 2012, Lima 
116 Interview with Gustavo Caillaux, November 2012, Lima 
117 Interview with Alfonso de los Heros, November 2012, Lima 
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Another consequence of the appointment of technocrat and independent ministers is a 
greater difficulty for the cabinet to work as a team. A cabinet is much more than the sum of its 
parts. A good collaboration and coordination between the different ministries is essential because 
there are many public policies that require many different ministries to work together. The 
coordination between ministers is more complicated when they have different professional 
backgrounds and they do not have any political experience. On the contrary, when most 
ministers belong to the same political family and know each other from past political activities, it 
is easier to achieve collaboration. From a purely institutional point of view, little changed 
between the governments of the 1980s and the Fujimori administration in what concerns the 
organs of ministerial coordination. Once a week, there was a council of ministers under the 
direction of the president. Moreover, there were additional informal weekly meetings where 
certain ministers discussed the issues that would be debated in the council of ministers.118 
Fujimori did not dismantle these institutions, but they became less relevant during his 
administration. Víctor Paredes points out that Fujimori preferred a direct relationship with each 
minister, and councils of ministers were held less regularly –only when Fujimori considered it 
necessary–.119 120  
Above and beyond this institutional dimension, several pieces of evidence show that 
Fujimori cabinets tended to work in a more atomized fashion. Fujimori favored a direct 
relationship between the president and the ministers with little deliberation between the different 
                                                 
118 Not all ministers attended these meetings. In general, only ministers that had a specific interest in the topics that 
would be discussed in the council of ministers at the end of the week attended the preparatory meetings. Ministers 
with a military background almost never participated in these meetings. 
119 Interview with Víctor Paredes, November 2012, Lima 
120 Unfortunately, there are no official statistics corroborating that the councils of ministers were held less frequently 
under Fujimori, but the information comes from a source very close to Fujimori (Víctor Paredes). 
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members of cabinet (Conaghan, 2005: 4). As already mentioned, ministers were considered by 
Fujimori as managers that had to execute the decisions taken by the president. One of the 
ministers of justice of Fujimori points out that Fujimori did not want the councils of ministers to 
become long debates between the different cabinet members. By keeping these meetings short, 
Fujimori minimized the possibility of collaboration between ministries.121 The testimony of Félix 
Canal (minister of fisheries in 1991) is very revealing. According to this minister of Fujimori, 
“each minister spoke individually with the president and there was no ‘team work’. (…) 
Everything was very divided”. Canal mentions the example of an industrial development 
complex that was ripped to pieces between different ministries. Each ministry claimed a part of 
the project for itself without collaborating with the other ministries. This lack of coordination led 
to the failure of the project soon afterwards. The reasons put forward by this minister to explain 
this lack of coordination are also interesting. Canal mentions that “Fujimori was not a leader of 
an established party who appoints a team of people that know each other to the cabinet. The 
individuals in the cabinets of Fujimori came from different professional backgrounds and did not 
know each other before occupying their positions. This led to several disagreements between 
ministries because there was no trust between the different cabinet members.”  
The lack of “team work” is also evident in the fact that many ministers in the Fujimori 
cabinet were very surprised by some of the key decisions of the Fujimori administration, which 
clearly shows that these decisions were not deliberated in the cabinet. For instance, Gloria Helfer 
mentions that many leftist ministers did not know anything about the neoliberal shock that was 
implemented by Fujimori, and that they found out about it just a few hours before it was 
                                                 
121 Interview with Sandro Fuentes Acurio, November 2012, Lima 
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announced to the public.122 Similarly, the prime minister de los Heros was surprised by the self-
coup of Fujimori in April 1992. When this authoritarian excess was committed, de los Heros had 
reached a difficult agreement with the Congress regarding the measures that Fujimori proposed 
to fight against terrorism in Peru. Fujimori had approved this attempt to overcome the executive-
legislative gridlock, but took de los Heros (and the other cabinet members) by surprise when he 
decided to dissolve the legislature soon after the agreement was reached.123 As a result of this 
decision, many ministers (including prime minister de los Heros) decided to immediately 
abandon the cabinet.  
7.5 CONCLUSION 
The last two chapters of this dissertation have analyzed the deleterious consequences of the 
election of outsiders for democratic governability and institutional performance. While the 
previous chapter showed the impact of outsiders on executive-legislative relations, this chapter 
suggests –through an in-depth analysis of the case of Fujimori– that outsider presidents also 
influence the internal work of the executive branch. 
 Outsider presidents reach office with very little connections with established parties and 
experienced politicians. More importantly, they lack the kind of political experience and 
democratic socialization that would help them to build these connections and to reach difficult 
agreements with the leaders of established parties. Hence, outsider presidents tend to offer 
                                                 
122 Interview with Gloria Helfer, November 2012, Lima 
123 Interview with Alfonso de los Heros, November 2012, Lima 
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ministerial positions to professionals with no political experience, rather than to career 
politicians. 
 This tendency of outsider presidents to recruit neophyte ministers has important 
consequences for democratic governability and for the functioning of the cabinet. Executive-
legislative relations are more conflictive as a result of the incapacity of outsider presidents to 
recruit partisan ministers belonging to the more represented parties in the legislature (see Chapter 
6). Moreover, cabinets formed by apolitical individuals tend to work in a more atomized fashion 
since the group of ministers does not share a political socialization within one or a few political 
parties before arriving to the cabinet. Finally, politically inexperienced ministers are more easily 
dominated by the president because they lack an independent source of political capital and 
prestige, and they owe their cabinet position exclusively to the president. 
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8.0  CONCLUSION: KEY FINDINGS AND AN AGENDA FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The rise of outsider politicians to top executive positions is a priori surprising. University 
chancellors or provosts have long academic careers before reaching a top administrative position. 
The chief executive officers (CEOs) of large corporations also tend to have long careers in 
business administration before occupying senior corporate positions. Empowering someone with 
no academic expertise to lead a university or an individual without business experience to lead 
an important corporation carries considerable and obvious risks. In the political arena, however, 
outsider candidates with no (or very limited) political experience sometimes manage to reach 
high-level positions in the administration. This phenomenon has been particularly prevalent in 
Latin America, where eight outsider candidates were elected presidents since the beginning of 
the Third Wave of democratization and many other outsider candidates obtained very high scores 
in presidential races. This dissertation has attempted to show (1) which are the main 
determinants of the rise of outsider politicians in national elections (particularly in presidential 
systems), (2) what is the impact of outsider presidents on democratic governability and 
institutional performance. 
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8.1 KEY FINDINGS AND CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
The first contribution of my dissertation is an effort at conceptualizing the outsider phenomenon. 
Scholars and political commentators often refer to candidates or politicians as outsiders but few 
have attempted to clearly define the term. In Chapter 2, I reviewed the literature on outsider 
politicians, and I identified two main outsidership dimensions: 1) rise to power through a new 
party or a new electoral movement, and 2) political inexperience. I argued that both dimensions 
are important constitutive elements of the definition of “political outsider.” I explained that it is 
misleading and counterproductive to consider candidates with many years of political experience 
as outsiders simply because they run with new political parties. Whether the future literature on 
the subject accepts, amends, or rejects this conceptualization I hope that the definition I have 
provided in this study will help anchor future academic debates on outsider politicians. 
 Beyond providing a rigorous definition of the concept, my dissertation also studies the 
main causes and consequences of the rise of outsider politicians. Chapter 3-5 of this study 
analyze the institutional and individual-level determinants of the electoral success of outsider 
candidates in national elections. Given the very good results obtained by outsider contenders in 
the presidential systems of Latin America, it was natural to start by testing the accepted wisdom 
that the rise of outsiders is a “peril of presidentialism.” As explained in more detail in Chapters 1 
and 3, a series of scholars (sometimes referred to as the “critics of presidentialism”) argued in the 
wake of the democratic transitions of the Third Wave of democratization that presidential 
systems were more prone to institutional instability and authoritarian breakdowns (Lijphart, 
1992b; Linz, 1990, 1994). These scholars identified a series of “perils of presidentialism” such as 
the problem of dual democratic legitimacy (both the president and the congress are 
democratically elected); the breaking down of political processes into rigidly determined periods; 
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and the difficulty of forming stable coalitions. As I showed in Chapter 3, further research on 
presidential institutions casted considerable doubt on the arguments of the critics of 
presidentialism. Many of the perils of presidentialism appeared to be non-existent or at least 
considerably overstated (Cheibub, 2002; Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997a; Pérez-Liñán, 2007). 
However, the comparative institutions literature paid considerably less attention to another of the 
proclaimed perils of presidentialism: the rise of outsiders (Linz, 1994; Suárez, 1982). This was 
the last man standing after all the other claims of the critics of presidentialism were shown to be 
incorrect or exaggerated. The first goal of this study was to empirically assess the link between 
presidentialism and “outsidership.”  
 In order to test this argument, data were gathered on 517 presidential and parliamentary 
elections in 63 countries in the period 1945-2010. The dependent variable in the quantitative 
analyses was whether an outsider president or prime minister reached office immediately after 
the election. Previous works argued that presidential elections tend to be more personalized 
(Linz, 1994) and less programmatic (Kitschelt, 2000) than parliamentary elections. However, the 
findings in Chapter 3 challenged the conventional wisdom. Presidentialism does not influence 
the rise of outsiders. Two other factors (the level of democracy and the economic conjuncture) 
are the key predictors of outsiders’ success. Outsider politicians are less likely to become the 
heads of government in robust democracies and in countries which are undergoing economic 
expansion. 
 I proposed a series of tentative explanations to account for the lack of positive association 
between presidentialism and “outsidership.” First, the “presidentialization” of parliamentary 
systems in the last decades has produced a personalization of electoral processes (Foley, 1993; 
Poguntke & Webb, 2005). This process may have eroded some of the differences that existed 
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between parliamentary and presidential elections. Second, the formal requirements to run for 
president are more strict and costly than the requirements to run for a legislative seat. Third, 
coalition-making may allow popular outsiders to become heads of government after the election, 
an option that is not available to presidential candidates. 
 This negative finding generated a host of new questions. If outsiders are not caused by 
presidentialism, why have so many outsider candidates obtained high scores in the presidential 
systems of Latin America? In order to answer that question, I scaled down the level of analysis. 
Pathbreaking works in the early study of presidential institutions pointed out that the dichotomy 
presidentialism vs. parliamentarism is often not the most important factor in explaining political 
outcomes in presidential systems. These works suggested instead that looking at a series of 
institutional factors within presidentialism might be more useful to explain variations in political 
and institutional processes between presidential systems (Shugart & Carey, 1992; Shugart & 
Mainwaring, 1997).  
In Chapter 4, I followed this recommendation by looking at the institutional design 
characteristics that facilitate the success of outsider candidates in the presidential elections of 
Latin America. The empirical approach adopted was quantitative. Using an original database on 
political outsiders, I analyzed the institutional factors that predict the rise of outsiders in all Latin 
American presidential elections between 1980 and 2010. The dependent variable in this analysis 
was the percentage of votes captured by outsider candidates in each election. The key finding of 
this chapter is that three institutional design characteristics influence the success of outsiders in 
presidential elections. First, concurrent elections tend to make it harder for outsider candidates to 
obtain high scores. In fact, concurrent elections tend to be dominated by established parties 
which are very active during the campaign because they want to maximize the number of seats 
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they get in the legislature. This finding suggests a coattail effect in reverse, whereby presidential 
candidates can benefit from the campaign efforts of legislative candidates. Second, outsider 
candidates are less likely to be successful when reelection provisions are in place and the 
incumbent participates in the election. Incumbent candidates have easier access to the media and 
can use public resources to their advantage, thereby making it harder for other candidates 
(outsiders or not) to win the presidential election. I argued that viable outsider politicians are less 
likely to run when the incumbent runs for reelection. Third, compulsory voting facilitates the rise 
of outsiders in presidential elections. When disenchanted voters –who would prefer to abstain– 
are forced to participate in the elections, they tend to express their political dissatisfaction by 
supporting political outsiders who often use an anti-establishment rhetoric in their campaigns. 
This dissertation shows that certain institutional design characteristics facilitate the 
emergence of outsider candidates in presidential elections. Institutions alone, however, cannot 
fully explain the success of independent politicians. In order to be electorally successful, 
outsiders must be able to connect with a large group of disgruntled voters. Chapter 5 analyzed 
the demand side of the outsider phenomenon, by showing the individual determinants of support 
for outsiders. I used survey data from two different barometers (Latinobarómetro and LAPOP) to 
analyze the vote for outsiders in several elections in which viable outsider candidates were on the 
ballot. 
The key finding of this chapter is that voters with anti-party sentiments and voters on the 
left of the political spectrum are more likely to support outsider candidates. On the contrary, 
citizens’ economic evaluations are a much weaker predictor of the vote for outsiders. The results 
suggest that the rise of outsiders in Latin America is closely related to the crisis of democratic 
representation in many countries around the region. The crisis of democratic representation has 
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two dimensions, which are both linked to the vote for outsiders as reflected in the statistical 
analysis in Chapter 5. First, a large portion of the electorate is disenchanted with established 
political parties due to their poor performance in key policy areas –mainly the economy and 
public security– and to their moral failures –i.e. corruption– (Hagopian, 2005; Mainwaring, 
2006). Second, citizens on the left of the political spectrum were left unrepresented during the 
neoliberal era in Latin America when many leftist and populist parties accepted the basic tenets 
of the Washington consensus (Morgan, 2007). 
In sum, the first part of this dissertation showed that the rise of outsiders results from the 
combination of two series of factors: 1) on the supply side, a series of democratic characteristics 
(non-concurrent elections, compulsory voting rules, and the lack of reelection provisions) which 
make it easier for outsiders to run; 2) on the demand side, a serious crisis of democratic 
representation which explains citizens’ motivations to support outsider candidates once they are 
in the race. 
The second part of the dissertation shifts the focus from the causes to the consequences of 
the rise of outsider presidents in Latin America. Most previous research on outsider leaders has 
attempted to explain the reasons of their success, but we still know very little about the impact of 
outsiders on democratic governability and institutional performance. This was one of the main 
goals of this dissertation. Although this study has shown that outsiders are not a peril of 
presidentialism, I argued that outsiders constitute a peril for presidentialism because they govern 
in a more personalistic way and are more likely to engage in authoritarian excesses against other 
democratic institutions. These practices threaten democratic consolidation and horizontal 
accountability.  
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The main theoretical contribution of this dissertation is the identification of the three 
main causal mechanisms which explain the deleterious impact of outsiders on the quality of 
democracy and on institutional performance. First, outsiders are politically inexperienced and 
lack democratic socialization within political parties. Political parties play an important role in 
the recruitment and in the political education of political leaders. Party politicians become 
socialized with the democratic rules of the game, and they become aware of the need for 
negotiation and compromise in the political arena. On the contrary, outsiders are political 
amateurs who tend to govern following technocratic criteria. They lack the key political skills 
necessary to govern democratically and they are not committed to democratic practices such as 
negotiation and consensus building (Levitsky & Cameron, 2003). This lack of democratic 
socialization results in a more direct and personalistic governance style and it often leads to 
executive abuses against other institutions. 
The second factor that explains why outsiders pose a threat to democratic governability 
and institutional performance is the sociopolitical context faced by outsiders when they reach the 
presidency. Outsiders tend to come to power in moments of economic crisis and great 
sociopolitical instability. These are situations in which public disenchantment with political 
institutions (and political parties in particular) is at its peak. This context of public dissatisfaction 
with the political system provides a window of opportunity for outsiders to commit excesses 
against other democratic institutions. Bypassing other institutions –such as Congress, the 
judiciary, and political parties– may be politically beneficial for outsider politicians because they 
are aware that the public is likely to support them rather than other discredited institutions in case 
of an interbranch confrontation. In Chapter 6, I discussed in detail the case of Fujimori, outsider 
president who governed Peru between 1990 and 2000. Fujimori conducted a “self-coup” and 
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dissolved the legislature in April 1992. While the established political parties represented in the 
congress expected a popular upheaval against this undemocratic measure, all the polls conducted 
at the time revealed that the vast majority of Peruvian citizens supported Fujimori’s decision. 
Finally, political outsiders are more likely to commit authoritarian excesses and to bypass 
other democratic institutions because they are not constrained by established and well-organized 
parties. Political parties are concerned about maintaining a long-term democratic reputation. 
When a political leader from an established party attempts a controversial or undemocratic move, 
the party might incur serious political or electoral costs. Hence, party cadres concerned about the 
good name of the party often control their own members to make sure that they respect the 
democratic rules of the game. Political outsiders, on the contrary, run in presidential elections 
with new parties or electoral movements that are often nothing more than an electoral vehicle for 
these independent candidates. These parties have weak organizations and lack the capacity to 
keep the outsiders’ actions in check. Moreover, political outsiders often have more incentives 
than established political parties to bypass other institutions. If outsiders cannot provide rapid 
results, they can quickly lose their electoral credit. Hence, outsiders are more concerned about 
delivering immediate policy results –which might push them to commit excesses– than about 
maintaining an untainted democratic reputation for the weak and personalized parties they lead. 
This broad theoretical framework regarding the impact of outsiders on democratic 
governability was narrowed down in my dissertation by studying two specific empirical 
questions: 1) the impact of outsiders on executive-legislative confrontation, and 2) the influence 
of outsiders on the design and the functioning of cabinets. In Chapter 6, I analyzed the link 
between outsider presidents and executive-legislative conflicts. In line with the arguments 
described in the previous paragraphs, I hypothesized that outsider presidents in Latin America 
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are more likely to face sustained confrontation with the legislative branch. I also hypothesized 
that outsider presidents are more likely to attempt the dissolution of the congress. In addition to 
all the relevant theoretical mechanisms presented above, another factor that is especially 
important to explain executive-legislative confrontation when the president is an outsider is the 
fact that outsider presidents tend to be minority presidents with very little support in the 
legislature. These hypotheses were tested by using a mixed-methods approach. A cross-national 
longitudinal analysis assessed whether outsiders have a clear impact on executive-legislative 
relations. In the quantitative analysis, I used data from a database on political processes in Latin 
America (Pérez-Liñán et al., 2008). The empirical results showed that executive-legislative 
confrontations over bills and executive appointments are much more likely when a political 
outsider is in power. Similarly, outsider presidents are significantly more likely to try to dissolve 
the legislature. 
The second part of Chapter 6 is an in-depth analysis of the evolution of executive-
legislative relations in Peru between 1980 and 1992. The case of Peru is relevant because in the 
1980s the country was governed by two career politicians representing established parties 
(Fernando Belaúnde –1980-1985– and Alan García –1985-1990–), but in 1990 an outsider 
candidate (Alberto Fujimori) was elected president. This made it possible to make an interesting 
within country comparison, closely approximating a most similar systems design. The main goal 
of the qualitative analysis was to tease out the causal mechanisms explaining the very conflictive 
executive-legislative relations under Fujimori and the absence of major confrontation under the 
administrations of Belaúnde and García. The in-depth analysis of the Peruvian case provided 
strong support for the theoretical framework proposed in this dissertation. Fujimori’s repeated 
conflicts with the legislature appear to be linked to four main factors: 1) Fujimori was a minority 
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president and was not able to form a multiparty coalition, 2) Fujimori had a technocratic political 
style and rejected compromises and negotiations with other political parties, 3) Fujimori’s party 
(Cambio 90) was too weak to constrain Fujimori, and 4) Fujimori’s authoritarian excesses 
received widespread popular support. 
Chapter 7 analyzed the impact of outsider presidents on the formation and functioning of 
cabinets. This chapter focused on the case of Peru, and again the research design consisted of a 
within-country comparison between the political style and the executive appointments of two 
career politicians (Belaúnde and García) in the 1980s and an outsider president (Fujimori) in the 
early 1990s. Following the theoretical framework presented above, I argued that outsider 
presidents are more likely to recruit neophyte ministers with little or no political experience. 
First, outsiders’ lack of democratic socialization is often associated with a rejection of political 
negotiations or consensus-building. Hence, outsiders often prefer to recruit technocrats or cronies 
rather than experienced politicians from other political parties. Even when they consider the 
possibility of appointing members of the opposition as ministers, outsiders often fail because 
they do not have the experience to conduct these difficult negotiations. This lack of political 
experience often leads to political blunders, as I showed in the in-depth discussion of Fujimori’s 
cabinets. Second, outsiders often choose a strategy of confrontation against the political 
establishment because this approach pays off in a context in which citizens are disenchanted with 
established political parties. This confrontation strategy makes it very difficult for outsiders to 
recruit more experienced politicians to their cabinets without completely losing face. The 
comparison of cabinet composition in Peru revealed that the proportion of partisan cabinet 
members and ministers with legislative experience was much lower in the administration of 
Fujimori than in the administrations of the two presidents who preceded him in office (who were 
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career politicians from established parties). The last section in Chapter 7 showed that having a 
cabinet composed by individuals who are political neophytes has two major consequences for 
democratic governability. First, it leads to a loss of ministerial autonomy because ministers who 
are complete political neophytes owe all their political capital to the president who appoints 
them. The second consequence of the appointment of technocrat and independent ministers is a 
greater difficulty for the cabinet to work as a team. These conclusions again suggested that the 
rise of outsider presidents might have deleterious consequences for democratic governability and 
institutional performance in Latin America. 
8.2 AN AGENDA FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
As always, the theoretical and empirical findings presented here open as many questions as they 
answer. In this final section, I would like to propose four avenues for further research. 
8.2.1 Outsiders in parliamentary systems 
Perhaps one of the most interesting questions that remains is whether the theoretical framework 
presented here applies more widely to parliamentary or semi-presidential systems. Against the 
conventional wisdom, this dissertation has shown that outsiders are not more likely to come to 
power in presidential systems. Several outsider politicians have become prime ministers in 
parliamentary systems across Europe in the last two decades. Are these outsiders equally 
threatening for democratic governability as outsider presidents have been in the Latin American 
context? A priori, many of the same causal mechanisms identified in the theory may apply in 
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parliamentary systems. Outsiders in parliamentary systems also lack democratic socialization 
within political parties, and they also run with new and weakly organized parties. Moreover, 
outsider parties suffer from “a lack of suitable personnel to occupy positions and a party 
organization capable of handling the added pressures of office” (McDonnell, 2011: 447). 
However, outsiders in parliamentary systems often need to form some type of multiparty 
coalition in order to govern. Whereas outsider presidents can govern with scant support in the 
legislature, this is simply not possible for outsider prime ministers. Since outsider parties join 
forces with established parties, they might be less inclined to commit authoritarian excess. Also, 
electoral support for outsider parties may decrease because they start governing with discredited 
parties. An unpopular outsider may be less dangerous for institutional stability than an outsider 
president who maintains his popularity by attacking the political establishment. But whether this 
is really the case remains an open question. Answering this question might provide an interesting 
avenue for cross-regime comparison. 
8.2.2 Subnational outsiders 
Another potential line of inquiry is the analysis of the rise of outsider politicians at the 
subnational level. Since the costs of entry are lower for mayoral and gubernatorial elections, 
independent and inexperienced candidates might be even more successful in subnational 
elections. Since many more subnational officials (mayors and governors) are elected now than in 
the past (T. Campbell, 2003; Eaton, 2012), it is possible to analyze the institutional and 
contextual factors that lead to the emergence of outsider candidates at the subnational level. 
Scaling down would allow us to understand the impact of outsiders on institutional performance 
while holding many other confounding factors constant (Peters, 1998; Snyder, 2001). Future 
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research could explore whether outsider mayors or governors also pose a threat for democratic 
governability. In addition to the problems pointed out in the analysis of outsider presidents, 
outsider politicians at the subnational level might increase coordination problems between the 
different levels of government. National governments might find it easier to negotiate with 
experienced governors or mayors (even if they are in opposition) than with neophyte politicians. 
8.2.3 Outsiders, democratic representation, and political engagement 
Several outsider presidents –such as Alberto Fujimori, Hugo Chávez, and Rafael Correa– 
managed to maintain high popularity in the midst of a severe crisis of representation. This 
observation generates several questions. For instance, can outsiders be considered escape valves 
that allow the democratic system to survive (albeit with flaws) in contexts of deep sociopolitical 
crises? Do outsiders succeed at providing political representation to previously marginalized and 
excluded groups? Are the most unprivileged sectors of society more supportive of politicians and 
democratic institutions when an outsider is in power? The widespread availability of survey data 
for Latin America makes it possible to tackle these questions. Although the focus of this 
dissertation was the negative impact of outsiders on the performance of democratic institutions, 
the overall impact of outsiders on democracy might be more nuanced. Paradoxically, outsiders 
might hurt the consolidation of democratic institutions but at the same time provide better 
democratic representation for certain sectors of society. 
Another interesting question is whether the rise of an outsider increases societal 
polarization. It is possible that while certain people show very strong support for the outsider 
president and are satisfied with the way democracy works –mainly people who felt 
unrepresented prior to the emergence of the outsider–, other sectors of the population harbor very 
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negative feelings about the outsider and become extremely critical of democratic institutions. If 
outsiders do increase the level of political polarization, a follow-up question is whether this 
cognitive activation in turn leads to higher levels of political engagement when an outsider is in 
power. Again, available survey data could tell us whether citizens are more likely to vote and 
participate in public demonstrations when the president is an outsider.  
8.2.4 Policy consequences of the rise of outsiders 
Another natural extension of this research is to investigate the policy consequences of the rise of 
outsiders. Outsider candidates tend to succeed in contexts of economic hardship and deep 
sociopolitical crisis. Do outsiders favor a particular set of economic policies to address the 
economic downturn they face when they come to power? Since outsiders are not constrained by 
strong parties and often bypass other institutions, it is possible that they implement more 
irresponsible macroeconomic policies. However, some outsiders such as Alberto Fujimori and 
Ollanta Humala in Peru have chosen to adopt orthodox economic policies. Further research could 
analyze and explain the reasons that lead outsiders to choose very different economic policies. 
 Another policy issue that is worth analyzing is the fight against corruption. Outsiders 
often run in presidential elections with an anti-establishment rhetoric promising to “clean 
politics” if they are elected. But are outsiders any different from career politicians in the way 
they fight against corruption? Do they adopt anti-corruption policies when they are in power? 
Are these policies effective in reducing corruption? Anecdotal evidence suggests that corruption 
remained at very high levels during the administration of Alberto Fujimori in Peru or Hugo 
Chávez in Venezuela, but a more systematic empirical analysis is warranted. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Table A.1. Elections included in the statistical analysis in Chapter 3 
 
Parliamentary Elections Presidential Elections 
 
Western Europe & North America 
United Kingdom (1945-2005), Netherlands (1946-
2006), Belgium (1946-2003), France (1947-1958), 
Spain (1979-2008), Germany (1949-2009), Italy 
(1946-2008), Sweden (1948-2010), Norway 
(1945-2009), Denmark (1945-2011), Greece 
(1977-2009), Israel (1949-2009), Canada (1945-
2011) 
United States (1944-2008) 
Eastern Europe 
Hungary (1990-2010), Czech Republic (1992-
2010), Albania (2001-2009), Estonia (1992-2011), 
Latvia (1993-2006), Estonia (1992-2011), Latvia 
(1993-2006), Turkey (1983-2011) 
Cyprus (1983-2008) 
Asia & Pacific Region 
Turkey (1983-2011), Japan (1955-2009), India 
(1952-2009), Pakistan (1988-1997 & 2008), 
Bangladesh (1991-2001), Sri Lanka (1947-1977), 
Nepal (1990-2001), Thailand (1992-2001), 
Malaysia (1959), Australia (1946-2010), New 
Zealand (1946-2011) 
South Korea (1988-2008), Philippines (1953-1965 
& 1992-2001), Indonesia (2004), 
Latin America & Caribbean 
Jamaica (1962-2011), Trinidad and Tobago (1961-
2001),  
Argentina (1983-2003), Colombia (1958-2002), 
Mexico (2000-2006), Dominican Republic (1978-
1986 & 1996-2008), Guatemala (1995-2003), 
Honduras (1981-2005), El Salvador (1984-2009), 
Nicaragua (1990-2006), Costa Rica (1948-2006), 
Panama (1989-2004), Venezuela (1958-1998), 
Ecuador (1979-2006), Brazil (1945-1960 & 1989-
2002), Bolivia (1982-2005), Paraguay (1993-
2008), Chile (1958-1970 & 1989-2005), Uruguay 
(1966 & 1984-2004), Peru (1980-1990 & 2001-
2006) 
Africa 
Mauritius (1968-2010) Gambia (1966 & 1982), Benin (1991-2006), 
Ghana (2000-2008), Somalia (1960-1967), 
Zambia (2002-2011), Malawi (1994-2009), South 
Africa (1994-2009), Botswana (1984-2009) 
 
Total Number of Elections 
428 elections (72% of the sample) 166 elections (28% of the sample) 
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APPENDIX B 
Additional models to Chapter 4 
 
Table A.2. FEVD models with interaction terms between inflation and institutional design characteristics: 
determinants of vote for outsider candidates in Latin America (1980-2010) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES     
     
Runoff -8.477* -4.509 -3.445 -4.845 
 (4.786) (3.211) (3.150) (3.205) 
Concurrent Elections -8.061** -1.975 -8.090** -8.236** 
 (3.917) (6.722) (3.915) (3.932) 
Compulsory Vote 8.019*** 8.066*** 11.64*** 8.304*** 
 (2.548) (2.603) (3.515) (2.518) 
Incumbent Running -7.698* -8.513* -9.113** -0.0442 
 (4.430) (4.363) (4.357) (8.955) 
Growth 0.351 0.304 0.401 0.345 
 (0.501) (0.504) (0.493) (0.494) 
Inflation 4.234* 10.28** 10.04*** 6.345*** 
 (2.271) (4.144) (3.191) (1.724) 
Democracy Age 0.393*** 0.434*** 0.422*** 0.420*** 
 (0.0864) (0.0903) (0.0879) (0.0876) 
Percentage Outsiders (lagged) -0.0963 -0.0828 -0.0757 -0.0669 
 (0.106) (0.105) (0.104) (0.106) 
Corruption 4.100*** 4.325*** 4.616*** 4.295*** 
 (1.321) (1.320) (1.322) (1.319) 
Ethnic Fractionalization 18.61** 18.44** 18.45** 18.67** 
 (7.557) (7.529) (7.432) (7.473) 
Runoff * Inflation 3.117    
 (3.193)    
Concurrent Elections * Inflation  -4.905   
  (4.497)   
Compulsory Vote * Inflation   -2.752  
   (1.988)  
Reelection * Inflation    -9.320 
    (8.540) 
Constant 2.002 -5.615 -4.954 -0.853 
 (7.717) (8.007) (7.556) (7.300) 
     
Observations 92 92 92 92 
R-squared 0.639 0.641 0.644 0.640 
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APPENDIX B (continued) 
 
 (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES      
      
Runoff -1.196 -4.176 -3.200 -3.995 -4.334 
 (4.361) (3.158) (3.221) (3.168) (3.175) 
Concurrent Elections -7.448* -11.76** -8.034** -6.653* -8.452** 
 (3.930) (5.600) (3.909) (3.911) (3.937) 
Compulsory Vote 7.352*** 8.047*** 6.587** 7.269*** 8.445*** 
 (2.539) (2.513) (3.071) (2.492) (2.535) 
Incumbent Running -7.341 -7.710* -9.002** -16.49** -8.675* 
 (4.431) (4.443) (4.391) (8.235) (4.389) 
Growth 1.114 -0.763 -0.415 0.203 -0.306 
 (0.826) (1.206) (1.033) (0.507) (1.471) 
Inflation 6.090*** 6.141*** 5.891*** 5.707*** 5.719*** 
 (1.773) (1.708) (1.710) (1.687) (1.750) 
Democracy Age 0.357*** 0.405*** 0.395*** 0.363*** 0.413*** 
 (0.0833) (0.0865) (0.0863) (0.0832) (0.0878) 
Percentage Full Outsiders (lagged) -0.0825 -0.0864 -0.0993 -0.0534 -0.0922 
 (0.106) (0.105) (0.106) (0.112) (0.106) 
Corruption 3.917*** 4.272*** 4.553*** 4.008*** 5.119** 
 (1.314) (1.317) (1.340) (1.313) (2.032) 
Ethnic Fractionalization 18.48** 20.67*** 19.99*** 18.69** 19.71** 
 (7.523) (7.499) (7.449) (7.462) (7.463) 
Runoff * Growth -1.094     
 (0.975)     
Concurrent Elections * Growth  1.321    
  (1.301)    
Compulsory Vote * Growth   0.562   
   (0.635)   
Reelection * Growth    2.349  
    (2.010)  
Corruption * Growth     0.183 
     (0.366) 
      
Constant -2.330 1.771 2.142 -0.115 2.285 
 (7.654) (7.765) (8.042) (7.254) (9.387) 
      
Observations 92 92 92 92 92 
R-squared 0.641 0.640 0.639 0.642 0.636 
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APPENDIX C 
Variables used in the regression analyses in Chapter 5 
 
VOTE FOR OUTSIDERS OR INCUMBENT FORMER OUTSIDERS 
The dependent variable is a measure of national vote intention. Latinobarómetro uses the standard 
formulation of: “If there was an election tomorrow/this Sunday, which party would you vote for?” The 
LAPOP survey for Peru 2006 and Paraguay 2008 asks for the names of the specific candidates. In some 
models the response variable is binary – 1 for the vote for outsiders or incumbent former outsiders, and 0 
otherwise (“no answer” and “don’t know” are coded as missing). In the models with three categories, 0 
represents the vote for a traditional opposition party, 1 the vote for outsiders, and 2 the vote for the 
candidate of the incumbent party. 
 
NO CONFIDENCE IN PARTIES (dummy) 
Dummy variable coded 1 if the respondent has no confidence in political parties, 0 otherwise.  
 
CONFIDENCE IN PARTIES (continuous) 
Continuous variable coded as follows: 1 No confidence, 2 A little, 3 Some, 4 A lot. 
 
POSITIVE ECONOMIC EVALUATIONS 
Dummy variable coded 1 if the respondent thinks the economy improved in the past 12 months, 0 
otherwise.  
 
NEGATIVE ECONOMIC EVALUATIONS 
Dummy variable coded 1 if the respondent thinks the economy deteriorated in the past 12 months, 0 
otherwise.  
 
AUTHORITARIAN ATTITUDES 
Dummy variable coded 1 if the respondent thinks that a) under some circumstances an authoritarian 
government is better than a democracy, or b) does not care whether an authoritarian government is in 
place or not, 0 otherwise.  
 
SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY 
Continuous variable coded as follows: 1 Not at all Satisfied, 2 Not very satisfied, 3 Fairly satisfied, 4 
Very satisfied. 
 
IDEOLOGY 
Categorical variable coded in the following way: 
1 – Left 
2 – Center (Reference Category) 
3 – Right  
4 – No Ideology  
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AGE 
Continuous variable coded as follows:  
1 - 18-24 
2 - 25-34 
3 - 35-44 
4 - 45-54 
5 - 55-64 
6 - 64 and older 
 
GENDER 
Dummy variable coded 1 if the respondent is a man, 0 if she is a woman.  
 
EDUCATION 
Continuous variable coded as follows:  
1 - Illiterate 
2 – Elementary school uncompleted 
3 - Elementary school completed 
4 - Secondary school uncompleted 
5 – Secondary school completed 
6 - Higher education uncompleted 
7 - Higher education completed 
 
SOCIOECONOMIC LEVEL 
Continuous variable based on the interviewers’ observations of respondents’ living conditions. Coded as 
follows:  
-2 - Very bad 
-1 - Bad 
0 - Regular 
1 - Good 
2 - Very good 
 
CATHOLIC 
Dummy variable coded 1 if the respondent is catholic, 0 otherwise.  
 
UNEMPLOYED 
Dummy variable coded 1 if the respondent is unemployed, 0 otherwise.  
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APPENDIX D 
Additional models to Chapter 5 
 
Table A.3. Multinomial logit models of the vote for outsiders in Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Paraguay 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Bolivia 2002 Nicaragua 2006 Paraguay 2008 
 Government 
Party 
Traditional 
Opposition 
Government 
Party 
Traditional 
Opposition 
Government 
Party 
Traditional 
Opposition 
No confidence in parties -.48** -.57*** -.83** -1.40*** -.81*** -.25 
 (.24) (.15) (.36) (.35) (.25) (.21) 
Positive economic evaluation .79** .20 -.23 -.55 .04 .51 
 (.38) (.30) (.50) (.52) (.44) (.40) 
Negative economic evaluation -1.01*** -.37** -.83** -.05 -.97*** -.16 
 (.26) (.16) (.40) (.38) (.26) (.22) 
Authoritarian attitudes -.04 .11 -.19 .01 .31 .45** 
 (.26) (.15) (.36) (.35) (.23) (.18) 
Satisfaction with democracy .49*** .23** .57*** .21 .14 -.24 
 (.17) (.10) (.21) (.20) (.17) (.16) 
Left -.75** -.24 -.73 1.24*** -.96** -.43* 
 (.38) (.17) (.44) (.42) (.39) (.25) 
Right 1.92*** 1.23*** 1.16*** .30 .43 .11 
 (.30) (.22) (.45) (.48) (.27) (.24) 
No ideology .28 .19 -1.18 -.25 .43* .03 
 (.49) (.28) (.78) (.70) (.26) (.21) 
Age .15* .07 .56*** .48 .09 -.29*** 
 (.08) (.05) (.16) (.15) (.09) (.08) 
Gender (male) -.30 -.57*** -.11 -/03 -.35 -.01 
 (.24) (.15) (.35) (.35) (.23) (.18) 
Education -.09 .10** .03 .04 -.01 -.18 
 (.08) (.05) (.12) (.12) (.08) (.07) 
Catholic .63** .49*** .02 .25 -1.25** -1.21** 
 (.31) (.17) (.36) (.35) (.41) (.35) 
Socioeconomic level .39 .27*** -.12 -.31 -.25 .15 
 (.11) (.07) (.19) (.19) (.16) (.12) 
Unemployment -.19 .24 -1.11* -.70 -.25 -.19 
 (.35) (.20) (.64) (.55) (.62) (.48) 
Constant -1.88** .96** -.37 -.19 1.02 3.07*** 
 (.85) (.49) (.87) (.86) (.84) (.69) 
      
Observations 1874 616 673 
Pseudo R2 .10 .23 .09 
Standard errors in parentheses 
         *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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